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7.1 Introduction
An ancient Japanese proverb speaks of a frog prideful of the beauty at
the bottom of his well and ignorant of the world beyond. The history of
Japanese corporate governance is especially interesting because the Japan-
ese literally searched the world for the best institutions of capitalism, and
changed their institutions more radically and more often than in any other
major industrial economy. These changes, and the associated successes
and failures associated, illuminate fundamental issues of corporate gover-
nance, corporate control, and the economics of institutions.
Historical and contemporary research into corporate ownership in
Japan both focus on intercorporate networks. In the last third of the twen-
tieth century, the interﬁrm networks of interest are horizontal and vertical
keiretsu groups. Horizontal keiretsu, like the Mitsui group, are interindus-
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collectively sum to control blocks. Vertical keiretsu encompass the suppli-
ers and customers of a single large ﬁrm, such as Toyota Motors. In both
variants, public shareholders only have access to minority interests, ren-
dering them essentially irrelevant to corporate governance. Adjunct to the
keiretsu networks, most Japanese ﬁrms have strong ties to their lead
lenders, or main banks.
However, keiretsuare a relatively recent development. During the feudal
Takagawa period (1603–1868), Japanese ﬁrms were owned entirely by fam-
ilies—or, perhaps more properly, by clans. The Mitsui and Sumitomo fam-
ily businesses both emerged during this era. In both cases, extensive sets of
family rules and traditions determined corporate governance issues.
Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the new government promoted
rapid industrialization. The Mitsuis, Sumitomos, and other new family
businesses like Mitsubishi (run by the Iwasakis) needed capital vastly in
excess of their own wealth, and they turned to public equity markets. The
families organized a new ﬁrm to ﬂoat equity for each new venture and or-
ganized them into pyramidal groups. At the apex of each was a family
partnership (later a family corporation), which controlled several public
corporations, each of which controlled other public corporations, each of
which controlled yet other public companies, and so on. These structures,
called zaibatsu, resembled modern Korean chaebol and similar pyramidal
groups elsewhere.1 Despite much research, the contributions of zaibatsu to
the rapid development of the prewar period remain unclear. The zaibatsu
were clearly key players in this development. But questions remain about
whether powerful zaibatsufamilies grew overly concerned about preserving
their wealth and control, and avoided high-risk projects in new industries
that might have further accelerated Japan’s modernization. Also, zaibatsu-
controlled banks that lent solely to other ﬁrms in their zaibatsu failed dur-
ing the interwar depressions, exposing problems inherent in related lending.
During World War II, Japan de facto nationalized many major corpora-
tions, subordinating them to centralplanners.2 The Temporary Funds Ad-
justments of Law of 1937 created the Kikakuin, or Planning Agency, to
centralize economic planning and administration. This required corporate
boards to obtain government approval for most important decisions, such
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1. The Kanji characters for zaibatsu are pronounced chaebol in Korean. One sees a stricter
adherence to blood kinship in the governance of chaebol.Confucianism, inﬂuential in Korean
cultures, extols respect for family, while Japanese Buddhism allows more leeway for sidelin-
ing inept blood kin.
2. Central planning in Japan involved rigid central plans, state command and control over
all aspects of the economy, and the de facto abolition of ownership rights for capital. How-
ever, de jure private ownership of land was retained, as in communist Poland, as was de jure
private ownership of zaibatsu and many other private-sector corporations. Japanese central
planning was corporatist, rather than socialist, though much rhetoric of the period obscures
this.as changing their articles of incorporation and issuing equity or debt. Fur-
ther government decrees abolished boards’ rights to set dividends in 1939
and to appoint managers in 1943, reassigning these powers to Kikakuin.
Although established by an extreme right-wing government, the Kikakuin
consciously imitated many of the planning methods the Soviet Union used
for its heavy industrialization in the 1930s.3 As in Nazi Germany, this was
accomplished amid much condemnation of “shareholders” (meaning the
controlling shareholders, or zaibatsu families) for their self-interest, risk
aversion, and unpatriotic myopia. This rhetoric would resurface later as a jus-
tiﬁcation for depriving small shareholders, rather than controlling share-
holders, of governance input.
Following the war, Japan was governed by the United States military
from 1945 to 1952. General MacArthur broke up the zaibatsu. Conse-
quently, Japan was brieﬂy a widely held economy, like the United States
and United Kingdom, in which most large public companies had no con-
trolling shareholders. Japanese ﬁrms undertook hostile takeovers of each
other, and raiders extracted greenmail from unwilling target ﬁrms.
Following the end of the U.S. occupation in 1952, Japanese ﬁrms began
preempting takeovers by acquiring white squirepositions in each other.4The
major banks were often key in organizing these intercorporate equity place-
ments. These holdings grew into the keiretsu system in the 1950s and de-
veloped more fully in the 1960s. That system, which still characterizes Japa-
nese big business, is now under growing stress. At the beginning of the
current century, Japan is once again bracing for major institutional changes.
Throughout all of these changes, the principals of Japan’s great busi-
nesses actively pursued their own interests, balancing proﬁt and control. In
general, they shaped and reshaped organizational forms to accommodate
this balance as new legal and other constraints emerged. This paper exam-
ines the emergence and evolution of these diﬀerent organizational struc-
tures as responses to changing political and institutional circumstances.
Of course, institutional changes also reﬂected lobbying by big business.
However, critical points in Japan’s business history seem to involve exoge-
nous events that clearly required adaptation by the business sector. The
abrupt opening of Japan to world trade and the decision of the Meiji gov-
ernment to embark on a crash program of modernization are examples.
The generally negative attitudes of both the Japanese military government
and the Allied occupation force in the mid-twentieth century to the great
zaibatsu families are two others.
Many factors underlie the rise of zaibatsu and the organization of
keiretsu—economies of scope and scale, reputation, the circumvention of
A Frog in a Well Knows Nothing of the Ocean 369
3. See Okazaki (1994) for details.
4. A white squire is a friendly ﬁrm that buys a block of stock in a target ﬁrm to protect it
from a raider. If the friendly ﬁrm takes the target over entirely, it is called a white knight.ﬂawed markets and institutions, and numerous other factors. However, we
argue that the primary purpose of both zaibatsuandkeiretsuwas to protect
the control rights of the great zaibatsu families and of professional man-
agers, respectively. The zaibatsu families and keiretsu managers, especially
main bank managers, also apparently beneﬁted from political ties at cer-
tain times. This allowed both to become entrenched, and sometimes to re-
tain governance powers they might otherwise have forfeited.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 describes the initial state
of ownership of Japan’s largest businesses immediately prior to the coun-
try’s industrialization. Section 7.3 describes the formation and develop-
ment of Japan’s great zaibatsu in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Section 7.4 details the culling of Japan’s corporate sector that
took place in the 1920s and 1930s, as the country endured tandem depres-
sions. Section 7.5 describes the imposition of a centrally planned economy
by the military in the late 1930s and 1940s. Section 7.6 describes the U.S.
occupation and the reconstruction of Japan as a widely held economy with
Anglo-American corporate governance. Section 7.7 describes the modiﬁ-
cation of this system into the present keiretsu ownership structures. Sec-
tion 7.8 reﬂects on the economics underlying the zaibatsuandkeiretsu,and
attempts to distill lessons from Japan’s corporate governance history. Sec-
tion 7.9 concludes.
Finally, we acknowledge a pervasive debt throughout this chapter to
Hirschmeier (1964), Hirschmeier and Yui (1981), McMillan (1984), Na-
kamura and Odaka (2003), and Yafeh (2004) for general background in-
formation. We are also grateful to Teranishi (2003), who made an English
draft of his volume available to us, also as general background informa-
tion. To avoid repetition, these sources are not cited except where we
speciﬁcally stress particular points they highlight.
7.2 Initial Conditions: The Tokugawa Economy
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Glaeser and Shleifer (2002),
and other students of institutional economics stress the importance of very
early historical events. We therefore begin with an overview of the econ-
omy of preindustrial Japan.
Japan’s ﬁrst contact with the Western world was a 1542 Portuguese trad-
ing expedition. At the time, Japan was divided into warring principalities.
By 1590, General Hideyoshi Toyotomi had united the country by force.
To pacify it, he demanded absolute submission from every part of society.
Foreign merchants and missionaries interfered with this submission, so
Hideyoshi persecuted and expelled foreigners.5
Hideyoshi died in 1598 after a failed invasion of Korea, and his comrade
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5. Japanese shoguns and warlords are often cited by their ﬁrst names.General Ieyasu Tokugawa quickly took charge. By 1603, Ieyasu had de-
feated rival warlords, many backed by foreigners, and was appointed
shogun by the emperor in Kyoto. He established a government in Edo (re-
named Tokyo in 1868 when the emperor moved there from Kyoto), and his
line would govern Japan as shoguns for over 250 years. Tokugawa froze an
already rigid caste system,6 with samurai warriors at the top, peasants in a
second tier, craftsmen below them, and merchants in the bottom stratum.7
Unsurprisingly, this moral inversion resulted in a prolonged economic
stagnation, exacerbated by a code of chivalry, called bushido, that gloriﬁed
honor above all else, entrusted all samurai with the power of life and death
over the lower castes, forbade the higher castes from transacting business,
and disparaged the pursuit of wealth as dishonorable.
Nonetheless, Ieyasu promoted foreign trade as he suppressed Christian-
ity. But the third Tokugawa shogun, his grandson Iemitsu, concluded that
trade and ideas were inseparable. Consequently, in 1633 he forbade travel-
ing abroad, banned foreign books, and proclaimed a death sentence on
foreigners found outside a small enclave in Nagasaki. Although some for-
eign books seeped in again after 1720, this early antiglobalization backlash
continued to hermetically isolate Japan.
Although foreign trade was prohibited, domestic trade continued, and
many merchant families grew wealthy. The Mitsui dynasty was founded by
Hachirobei Takatoshi Mitsui (1622–94), a silk merchant who expanded
into other commodities because of his extensive use of barter. The Sumi-
tomos, who grew wealthy mining and smelting copper, apparently started
in Kyoto and then moved to Osaka in the early Edo period. Both families
established complicated house rules—constitutions governing all aspects
of business. Power was divided between a patriarch and a family council,
which served a quasi-parliamentary function.
For example, the Mitsui family consisted of eleven founding clans and
devised elaborate rules for maintaining a balance of power among them.
Representatives from each clan participated in management. The Mitsui
house rules prohibited the founding clans from withdrawing their owner-
ship shares and prohibited other branches of the family from gaining own-
ership rights. Voting power in the family council passed to the eldest sons
of each founding clan. Younger sons could serve as managers or could be
given start-up funding. The Mitsui family was known for adopting com-
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6. The basis for this system dates to Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1536–98), a shogun who was born
as a peasant, became an adopted samurai soldier, and conquered Japan after conﬁscating the
weapons of peasants and religious institutions in 1588. Worrying that social mobility might
produce another Hideyoshi, he made castes permanent and hereditary in 1590. None but
samurai could carry weapons or wear armor. Despite this, some ﬂuidity reappeared—for ex-
ample, some feudal lords in the Edo era sponsored sumo wrestlers to become samurai and
carry two swords. Because of this, contemporary historians typically use the more ambiguous
term status group, rather than caste.
7. Only eta, outcasts with unclean professions, were lower.petent hired managers through marriage to Mitsui daughters.8 Additional
house rules governed the disposition of property, marriage, divorce, adop-
tion, and inheritance, and were strictly enforced at family councils to avoid
intrafamily feuds. House rules forbade any Mitsui from bringing any fam-
ily dispute to the public courts, becoming involved in politics publicly, cre-
ating debts, and guaranteeing debts. Involvement or investment in any
nonfamily business and serving in public oﬃce were proscribed unless the
Mitsui council granted an exception.9
Mitsui assets were divided into three classes. Business assetsbelonged to
the entire Mitsui family, and the house rules permitted no division of them
among the clans. Common assets were used for disasters and emergencies,
and so served as a sort of insurance fund. Each clan managed its common
assets as it chose, and the principal passed from generation to generation,
but accumulated returns did not. When a clan patriarch died, the family
council redistributed these gains among the eleven clans to preserve the
rankings of the eleven founding clans. Clan assets were the undisputed
property of the individual clans and could not be redistributed by the fam-
ily council under normal circumstances.
The Sumitomo zaibatsu began when Tomomochi Soga, who married
into the Sumitomo family and adopted its name, successfully reproduced
a copper-smelting method he had learned of from a Western merchant in
Osaka. The method, which uses lead to extract silver and other impurities
from copper ore, increases the eﬃciency of copper smelting drastically and
remained in use in Japan until the late nineteenth century. Soga built a cop-
per reﬁnery in Kyoto in 1590 and then (with his father) opened a business
in Osaka to license the new copper-smelting method to competitors. This
concentrated virtually all Japan’s copper smelting in Osaka and earned
Soga as much respect as a merchant might gain. He marketed his copper
products using the trade name Sumitomo Izumiya. In 1691 the family be-
gan mining copper at Besshi for the Shogunate.10 This proved extraordi-
narily lucrative, and ﬁnanced virtually all subsequent Sumitomo busi-
nesses—including textiles, clothing, sugar, and medicines. Subsequently,
one Sumitomo clan began a money exchange ﬁrm.
The Sumitomo family code resembled the Mitsui code in many ways.
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8. Adoptions, like marriages, had to be approved by the Mitsui family council. An impor-
tant example of this is Rizaemon Minomura (1821–77). Born to an unemployed samurai in
Nagano, he migrated to Edo. While working for a merchant, he negotiated with Mitsui. Mit-
sui hired him in 1866 and ultimately adopted him into the family as head of the Minomura
clan, one of the eleven at the Mitsui family council. (He adopted the Minomura name.) He
subsequently held various key positions with Mitsui companies. In 1876 he reorganized the
family money exchange operation into the Mitsui Bank and became its president. Rizaemon
Minomura later adopted a merchant’s son, Risuke Minomura (1843–1901).
9. See Yasuoka (1984) for details.
10. The Besshi copper mine remained in operation until 1973 and produced 700,000 tons
of copper during its lifetime.However, a few diﬀerences are worth noting. The Sumitomo code provided
for its own revision, declaring a consensus of the council suﬃcient to
change the code.11 Perhaps more important, the Sumitomo code had no
provision governing inheritance or requiring continued family dominance.
Nonetheless, family control was preserved, probably because of two other
diﬀerences. First, the Sumitomo patriarch led a symbolic existence. He
gave formal approval to matters set before him, but the council actually
made all signiﬁcant decisions. This prevented one clan from dominating
and creating a situation in which other clans might want out. Second, all
family disputes, even ones within a single Sumitomo clan, had to be re-
ferred to the council. This made the council aware of discontent within
clans at early stages. It also created a much more centralized management
structure than in the Mitsui group. Very detailed reporting of anything ex-
traordinary to the upper ranks was required.12
Famines, riots, and especially a growing ﬁnancial dependence of samu-
rai on merchants slowly weakened Tokugawa rule. The Mitsui and Sumi-
tomo families served the government in all manner of commercial and
ﬁnancial dealings. This “corruption” (by the standards of bushido) under-
mined Tokugawa legitimacy, as did incompetence and declining morality
among the Tokugawa leadership. From the late eighteenth century on,
Russia and other European nations tried to force Japan’s market open. In
1853 and 1854, the American commodore Perry bombarded Edo until the
Tokugawa government agreed to open a few ports to foreign trade.
However, foreign trade remained very limited until the Meiji Restoration
in 1868. Contemptuous of the Tokugawas’ increasingly craven attitude
toward foreigners, a group of samurai captured the emperor and seized
power, claiming legitimacy by restoring his rightful rule. In fact, the impe-
rial family, which provided titular emperors in Kyoto throughout the Edo
period, had been symbolic throughout Japanese history. Real power re-
mained with these samurai now as well. Nonetheless, this era is called the
Meiji Period, in honor of the emperor who reigned from 1868 to 1912.
7.3 Early Industrialization Following the Meiji Restoration
The new Meiji rulers quickly realized that, to gain freedom from foreign
pressure, Japan needed Western technology and therefore Western ideas.
They dispatched a cadre of Japan’s brightest students to study abroad and
return with descriptions of foreign institutions. The government then
launched a two-decade program of modernization, copying what they per-
ceived to be best practice abroad. This period in Japan’s history closely re-
sembles some of the “shock therapy” reforms of the 1990s in post-Socialist
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11. See Yasuoka (1984) for details.
12. See Asajima (1984).states. In rapid ﬁre, the new government introduced democracy modeled
on the German Diet, compulsory education modeled on the French and
German school systems, universities and an army modeled after those of
Prussia, and a navy modeled after the British Royal Navy. Religious free-
dom, social mobility, and land reform quickly undermined both bushido
and the caste system.
But most important, the Meiji government introduced the institution of
capitalism. During its crash modernization, Japan adopted a legal system
largely based on German civil law. Public bond trading began in the 1870s,
and in 1878 the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges were formed and sub-
jected to regulation under the Stock Exchange Ordinance. Leading mer-
chant families issued stock to ﬁnance industrialization, and the great py-
ramidal zaibatsu groups that came to dominate Japan formed.
A central problem Meiji governments confronted was the distaste of the
great mercantile families for pooling their capital with that of outsiders.
On the one hand, the government wanted Japan’s existing large businesses
to grow, and this required respecting the sensibilities of their principals. On
the other hand, the Meiji leaders knew that economic growth required
strangers to pool capital. Apparently with government prodding, the Mit-
suis, the Onos, and several other families formed the First National Bank.
Yet the Mitsui and Ono families could not get along. Dissatisﬁed, the Mit-
suis founded the Mitsui Bank in 1876. Similarly, after the Yasudas and
Kawasakis set up the Third National Bank, the Yasudas set up their own
Yasuda Bank in 1880.
This tension created apparent inconsistency in Meiji legal codes. For
example, the 1896 civil code stipulates that “joint owners of property can
demand their due shares of the property at any time.” Yet the same code
grants the head of a family control of family property, including that of
subfamilies, “to provide for their future support.” The same tension af-
fected the evolution of the zaibatsu.
7.3.1 Deﬁning a Zaibatsu
Before proceeding further, it is useful to deﬁne zaibatsu, a term replete
with the ambiguity Japanese so admire. Many academics and others, both
inside and outside Japan, use the term to refer to all the large business groups
in the country prior to World War II. However, beyond that, there is no
clear-cut uniﬁed deﬁnition of a zaibatsu.Several ambiguities are noteworthy.
First, the Japanese business and economic history literature generally
holds that the zaibatsu developed in the Taisho period (1912–26) after
World War I.13 This seems to be because the term zaibatsu came into use in
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13. Historians assign periods corresponding to the reigns of emperors. The Meiji period is
from 1868 to 1912, the Taisho period is from 1912 to 1926, and the Showa period is from 1926
to 1989. Note that emperors choose oﬃcial names upon their ascension. Thus in 1926, Hiro-
hito chose the oﬃcial name Showa, meaning enlightened peace.discussions of income distribution and monopoly capital (and Marxism) in
the Taisho period. However, both the Mitsui and Sumitomo groups, always
listed among the zaibatsu,formed long before this. Other major groups, like
the Mitsubishi and Yasuda zaibatsu, became important in the Meiji period
(1868–1912). Yet other zaibatsu clearly formed after World War I.
Second, even though zaibatsutypically implies family control, the often-
cited list of the ten main zaibatsu (table 7.1) includes Nissan. As we show
below, no family voted a majority of Nissan’s stock through most of its ex-
istence. Nevertheless, Yoshisuke Aikawa and his family successfully main-
tained control until the end of World War II.
Third, zaibatsu were often thought to have substantial monopoly power
in many, not just a few, industries. Indeed, the U.S. military government
used industry market shares to ascertain whether or not a group was a zai-
batsu and thus to be broken up. Fourth, zaibatsu are often thought to have
been relatively independent of bank ﬁnancing. Fifth, zaibatsu were busi-
ness groups with vast land holdings, under which lay great mineral wealth.
Sixth, a zaibatsuwas sometimes deﬁned as a group of ﬁrms connected with,
and dependent on, a general trading ﬁrm, or sogoshosha.Seventh, the term
zaibatsu is now sometimes extended to cover family-controlled groups of
listed companies in developing economies in general.
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Table 7.1 Ten zaibatsu combines designated by the Holding Companies Liquidation
Commission (HCLC) for dissolution
Number of  Number of  Paid-in capital 
subsidiaries  subsidiaries  as % of Japan’s 
Zaibatsu in 1937 in 1946 1946 totala
Mitsui 101 294 9.4
Mitsubishi 73 241 8.3
Sumitomo 34 166 5.2
Yasuda 44 60 1.6
Total 252 761 24.5
Nissan 77 179 5.3
Asano 50 59 1.8
Furukawa 19 53 1.5
Okura 51 58 1.0
Nakajima — 68 0.6
Nomura — 19 0.5
Total 197 439 10.7
Top ten zaibatsu total 449 1,200 35.2
Sources: HCLC volumes as cited in Hadley (1970), Takahashi and Aoyama (1938, pp. 151–
52).
aJapanese government estimates for Japan’s paid-in capital in 1946 are 32 billion yen (Min-
istry of Commerce and Industry), 43 billion yen (Ministry of Finance), and 48 billion yen
(Bank of Japan). The HCLC used the Ministry of Commerce and Industry estimate without
any explanation in deriving these ﬁgures.Finally, zaibatsu had pyramidal structures. A family holding company
or partnership controlled a set of directly owned subsidiaries, which then
controlled other ﬁrms, which then controlled yet other ﬁrms, and so on.
The family usually had an operating decision rule for determining which
ﬁrms to own directly versus indirectly. Figure 7.1 illustrates the stylized
structure of a pyramidal corporate group. As we show below, the vague def-
inition of zaibatsuin the minds of the Japanese and foreign architects of the
postwar system may be, at least in part, responsible for their less-than-
complete dissolution after the war.
We use the term zaibatsu to denote any large pyramidal group of listed
ﬁrms. This distances the term from both origin and control, from con-
tentious issues like monopoly power or land rents, and from diﬃcult-to-
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Fig. 7.1 A stylized representation of a zaibatsu control pyramidmeasure concepts like the importance of bank ﬁnancing or general trading
ﬁrms. It also distinguishes the pyramidal zaibatsu from the keiretsu groups
of postwar Japan, whose structure of intercorporate ownership is not py-
ramidal.
We use the term apex ﬁrm to denote the family-controlled entity at the
top of the pyramid. Firms whose shares it holds we refer to as directly con-
trolled subsidiaries. Firms it controls but whose shares it does not hold we
call indirectly controlled subsidiaries. Indirectly controlled subsidiaries can
be controlled by either directly controlled subsidiaries or other indirectly
controlled subsidiaries. These terms are illustrated in ﬁgure 7.1.
7.3.2 Zaibatsu Formation
The development of zaibatsu(and other ﬁrms) was relatively unhindered
by government intervention until the 1930s. Few regulations existed in ﬁ-
nancial markets, yet capital markets provided 87 percent of the new capi-
tal required by Japanese corporations in 1931. Rajan and Zingales (2003)
describe a substantial stock market in early twentieth-century Japan, de-
spite the absence of statutory shareholder rights. Corporate governance
was generally in the hands of controlling shareholders—usually wealthy
families. Banks had little or no corporate governance role. Public share-
holders bet on the honesty of insiders.
The main zaibatsu families ﬁrst expanded beyond their traditional busi-
nesses when the Meiji government undertook a mass privatization in 1880.
The state had established industries it deemed essential to modernization
but had accumulated a huge public debt doing so. To solve this ﬁscal prob-
lem, the government implemented a mass sell-oﬀ of state-owned enter-
prises in all areas except munitions. Included were factories producing
virtually all important manufactured goods—steel, cement, coal, metals,
machines, ships, textiles, and so on.
The main buyers, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and a few other zai-
batsu,thus entered new lines ofbusiness.14Although there was no clear-cut
method of allocating state-owned factories, each of the three main zaibatsu
ended up with some assets in each key industry: mining, shipbuilding, ma-
chinery, textiles, and so on.
7.3.3 Zaibatsu Expansion and the Problem 
of Preserving Insider Control
One of the most important corporate governance considerations for
business families during this period was preserving family control while
satisfying an ever-growing need for capital. Families that kept their ﬁrms
unlisted found this growing need for capital a serious problem.
Such problems were not new. As the number of relatives grew with each
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14. Some historians consider this the beginning of Japan’s zaibatsu.generation, preserving meaningful control for the patriarch had always
presented problems. As mentioned above, and illustrated in table 7.2, the
Mitsui family redistributed assets to the diﬀerent clans of the Mitsui fam-
ily continuously since its foundation in 1694. The stakes are remarkably
stable.
Nonetheless, the Mitsui patriarch dictated most family businesses deci-
sions. This system, divided ownership with an imposed centralized control
that largely negated the rights of individual owners, grew increasingly diﬃ-
cult to maintain. The problem grew even worse when the Meiji government
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Table 7.2 Ownership shares of the Mitsui families
1694 1722  1867–1873  1909  Mitsui 
Mitsui family member  Takatoshi’s  Takahira’s  End of  partnership 
in 1694 willa willb Edo/Meiji Rest. establishedc
Mitsui, Takatoshi’s sons
Oldest son 29 (41.5) 62 (28.2) 62 (28.2) 230 (23.0)
Second oldest son 
(Takahira) 13 (18.6) 30 (13.6) 30 (13.6) 115 (11.5)
Third oldest son 9 (12.9) 27 (12.3) 27 (12.3) 115 (11.5)
Fourth oldest son 7.5 (10.7) 25 (11.4) 25 (11.4) 115 (11.5)
Sixth oldest son 4.5 (6.4) 22.5 (10.2)
Ninth oldest son 1.5 (2.1) 22.5 (10.2) 22.5 (10.2) 115 (11.5)
Tenth oldest son 
(merged with sixth) 1.2 (2.1) 22.5 (10.2) 115 (11.5)
Other relatives and wife
1 Takatoshi’s wife 100 kanmed
of silver
2 2 (2.9) 8 (3.6) 8 (3.6) 39 (3.9)
3 1.5 (2.1)
4 0.8 (1.1) 6 (2.7) 6 (2.7) 39 (3.9)
5 7 (3.2) 7 (3.2) 39 (3.9)
6 2.5 (1.2) 39 (3.9)
7 3 (1.4) 39 (3.9)
Remainder 10 (4.5) 4.5 (2.0)
Total 70 (100) 220 (100) 220 (100) 1,000 (100)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.
aThe founder of the Mitsui family enterprise, Hachirobei-Takatoshi Mitsui (1622–94), began co-
ownership of their family business. His 1694 will states that total family business annual proﬁts be di-
vided into 70 units for an annual distribution among his wife and sons.
bTakahira, the second-generation head of the Mitsui family business, revised the proﬁt distribution
method in his 1722 will. The will states that total annual proﬁts be divided into 220 units for an annual
distribution among the family owners of the business. In this revision the ownership shares of the ﬁrst
and second sons’ families were decreased, while the ownership shares of other family members and rel-
atives were increased. These revised ownership shares remained unchanged for the following 150 years.
cAfter the revision of the Mitsui family constitution was worked out during the ﬁrst 20 years of the Meiji
period, the Mitsui family partnership was created, and its ownership shares remained unchanged into
the 1940s.
d1 kanme is about 3.75 kg.instituted new laws aﬃrming individual ownership rights. Although these
rights could be relaxed in family ﬁrms to preserve the power of the patri-
arch, this exemption did not extend beyond blood kin—for example, to
share-owning employees.
This presented problems, for shareholders who were not blood kin had
become common. It made sense to reward competent hired managers with
shares. And sometimes competent hired managers, rewarded in other
ways, grew wealthy and demanded the right to buy stock.
When the Meiji government established the civil code, large family busi-
nesses were usually recognized as general partnerships. As more outsiders
supplied capital, and as each new generation created more insiders, these
businesses found the legal status of a limited partnership advantageous. In
1893, when Japan enacted a commercial code, many zaibatsuholding com-
pany partnerships incorporated, though most remained unlisted. More
new laws on ownership granted hired managers who had become share-
holders a legal status equal to that of family members. This was diﬃcult for
the great families to accept, but the concept of random members of society
buying and selling such a status was intolerable.
Even letting skilled managers and distant relatives hold shares often
proved unbearable, and controlling families often went to considerable
lengths to repair such perceived errors. For example, the Mitsui Bank,
founded in 1876, soon had more than four hundred manager-shareholders.
When the Mitsui group reorganized it as a general partnership in 1893,
they bought up all of these shares. When the Kamoike zaibatsu family es-
tablished the Thirteenth National Bank, forty distant relatives were share-
holders. In 1897, the family’s main branch bought them out and reestab-
lished the bank as the Kamoike Bank, privately owned by the Kamoike
patriarch.15
This sort of response is perhaps understandable, for successful family
businesses operated with a common objective imposed by a core of family
values, traditions, and history. Outsiders, even very competent ones, could
not share fully in this, and their input would surely appear to the family as
interference. Nevertheless, family ﬁrms closed to outsiders risked alienat-
ing their best managers and being shut out of the top end of the manage-
rial labor market. Family businesses lacking management skill among
blood kin, and unable to hire it, risked degeneration.
Some zaibatsu, most notably the Mitsui and Sumitomo zaibatsu, were
particularly successful in growing rapidly without outside equity ﬁnanc-
ing. Their success has been attributed to a series of highly competent hired
managers, but their connections with important political leaders were cer-
tainly at least as important as their raw competence.
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15. The Kamoike Bank subsequently became the Sanwa Bank, which evolved into the cur-
rent UFJ Bank.The Sumitomo family owned a lucrative cash cow, the Besshi copper
mines they obtained from the shogunate, and so could aﬀord to keep more
distant from the Meiji government—at least initially. The Mitsui group,
however, needed the Meiji government’s gratitude. They gained this by ﬁ-
nancing the struggling new government in its critical ﬁrst years. In return,
Mitsui was appointed government treasury agent, a duty that provided
many opportunities.
Tofulﬁll their treasury duties, the Mitsuis established a national network
of branch oﬃces. These generated cash ﬂows from treasury business and
served as bases for other trading. Business grew so fast that the Mitsui
group had to set up the Kokusangata Karihonten, or Temporary Head
Oﬃce for Domestic Trade, in Tokyo in 1874. Learning of the Meiji gov-
ernment’s aim of promoting foreign trade, the Mitsui group began selling
silk yarn and tea to Western merchants for commissions, and shipping im-
ports between Tokyo and Yokohama.16 The Mitsui group’s trading busi-
ness, handled by employees steeped in Tokugawa traditions, lost money. In
1876, the Mitsui group was about to close its trading ventures when Kaoru
Inoue (1835–1915), a leading Meiji politician, oﬀered his Senshusha com-
pany to the Mitsui group to raise political funds.17 The Mitsui group
jumped at this, for Senshusha came not only with government contracts
but also with its top manager, Takashi Masuda, who trained at the largest
American merchant house in Japan. The Mitsui group established Mitsui
Bussan (Mitsui and Co.) in July 1876 by merging Senshusha and the Tem-
porary Head Oﬃce for Domestic Trade, and appointed Masuda manager.
Mitsui Bussan’s ﬁrst government business was a monopoly selling coal
from the state-owned Miike mine. Exporting Miike coal on commission to
China through Shanghai was highly proﬁtable, and Mitsui Bussan estab-
lished its ﬁrst foreign oﬃce in there late in 1876. This let Mitsui Bussan
acquire international trade experience. Since Mitsui Bussan traded coal,
like all other items, entirely on commission, its capital requirements were
minimal. The only ﬁnancing the Mitsui group provided was a ¥50,000
overdraft allowance from the Mitsui Bank. In 1877, Mitsui Bussan made
¥200,000—a fortune at the time—supplying 60 percent of the military pro-
curements for the Seinan War, a large operation to put down rebellion in
Kyushu in 1877.
The Sumitomo and Mitsui houses were not the only great Takagawa
merchant houses. But they were the only ones to expand their capital bases
as the economy grew, and they were clearly the most adept at positioning
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16. See Yamamura (1976).
17. Inoue subsequently served as minister of foreign aﬀairs, the interior, and ﬁnance, and
also as privy councilor. Senshusha, established in 1872 by Inoue and others, was a moderately
successful trading business, mostly due to Inoue’s political inﬂuence. Its primary business was
executing government procurement orders for imports for Inoue’s powerful political associ-
ates. Senshusha imported wool, guns, and fertilizer, and exported rice, tea, and silk.themselves to assist the government in implementing its economic policies.
Other great business families of the Tokugawa era, such as the Kamoike
zaibatsu, were less nimble, grew too slowly, and were gradually eclipsed.
Expanding the capital base by bringing in outsiders held a diﬀerent dan-
ger. New investors could seize control, reducing the family to a limited
partner. Both the Shimomura and Ohmura zaibatsu brought in outside in-
vestors who took control. Even worse from the perspective of the old fam-
ilies, the new controlling shareholders shifted the business out of their
(money-losing) traditional Japanese clothing businesses and into depart-
ment store–based retailing.
Despite its freedom from outside shareholders, the Mitsui group faced
legal problems when diﬀerent branches of the family began exerting their
new rights as investors. Preserving control while accessing ever greater
capital, whether from more distant relatives or strangers, became increas-
ingly diﬃcult.
7.3.4 Pyramids as a Solution
In his memoirs, Yoshisuke Aikawa (1934), the founder of the Nissan zai-
batsu, describes pyramidal groups as an elegant solution to all of these
problems—they preserve total control by insiders while permitting access
to limitless capital. To see this, consider a family with a fortune of ¥1 bil-
lion invested in a family business, Choten Corp.18 The family sees a multi-
tude of proﬁtable business opportunities and feels it could proﬁtably invest
many billions of yen. To see how the family can undertake all of these in-
vestments yet retain control of Choten and all these new ventures by con-
structing a pyramidal group, return to ﬁgure 7.1.
First, the family expands Choten Corp. by issuing new public shares
worth almost ¥1 billion. Public shareholders end up owning almost 50 per-
cent of Choten, which is now worth almost ¥2 billion. This gives the fam-
ily almost ¥1 billion in cash yet preserves its complete control of the family
business. The latter is because its 50 percent–plus stake lets it appoint the
board of directors. Choten is now set to become the apex ﬁrm of the py-
ramidal group.
Next, the family organizes two new ﬁrms, Hitotsu-Ichi Corp. and
Hitotsu-Ni Corp.19 Each is ﬁnanced with a ¥500 million equity investment
from Choten and a public oﬀering to raise almost ¥500 million by selling
outside shareholders almost 50 percent. Hitotsu-Ichi and Hitotsu-Ni now
each have ¥1 billion. The family now fully controls three ﬁrms, with un-
consolidated balance sheets totaling ¥4 billion, and ¥3 billion in consoli-
dated assets. The family’s control is complete because it fully controls
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18. Choten is Japanese for apex.
19. In one Japanese counting system, hitotsuis one, futatsuis two, mittsuis three, and yottsu
is four. In another, ichiis one, niis two, sanis three, and yon is four. The appropriate use of the
two systems is a matter of grammar.Choten, and Choten’s board votes a 50 percent–plus stake in both Hitotsu-
Ichi Corp. and Hitotsu-Ni Corp., and thus controls their boards.
To expand further, the family has Hitotsu-Ichi and Hitotsu-Ni set up
four new ﬁrms. Hitotsu-Ichi organizes Futatsu-Ichi and Futatsu-Ni, ﬁ-
nancing each with a ¥500 million equity investment and a public oﬀering
to raise almost ¥500 million by selling outside shareholders almost 50 per-
cent. Hitotsu-Ni Corp. organizes Futatsu-San and Futatsu-Yon similarly.
The family now fully controls seven ﬁrms, with unconsolidated values to-
taling ¥8 billion and ¥5 billion in consolidated assets.
In the next step, each Futatsu-level ﬁrm organizes two new companies.
The family now fully controls ﬁfteen ﬁrms, with unconsolidated balance
sheets totaling ¥16 billion and ¥9 billion in consolidated assets. Each
Mittsu-level ﬁrm can then similarly organize two Yottsu-level ﬁrms, re-
sulting in a pyramid of thirty-one ﬁrms worth ¥32 billion on paper and
holding ¥17 billion in consolidated assets. This process can be repeated un-
til the family runs out of attractive investment opportunities. A pyramid
with n tiers contains 2n – 1 ﬁrms, with unconsolidated book values totaling
2n billion yen and consolidated assets worth 1/2(3  Σn
1 ) yen.
Thus, a ﬁve-tier pyramid lets the family raise ¥14 billion in public equity
but retain complete control. Had the family instead merely expanded their
ﬁrst company by issuing ¥14 billion in additional Choten shares, their stake
would have been diluted to one-ﬁfteenth or 6.67 percent, and they would
have lost control.
The elegance and simplicity of this solution, later extolled by Aikawa
(1934), the founder of the Nissan zaibatsu, appealed to the great mercan-
tile families, for they enthusiastically embraced this model to build the vast
prewar zaibatsu. Both public investors and querulous relatives could be
tapped for capital and excluded from corporate governance.
Of course, variations from this formula were possible. For instance, the
controlling families often kept the apex ﬁrm of the pyramid unlisted. They
thus used only family money to establish the ﬁrst tier of subsidiaries. Since
the Mitsui and Sumitomo families had both run highly proﬁtable busi-
nesses for generations, their accumulated retained earnings easily let them
skip the ﬁrst step in the above recipe. In contrast, later groups, like Nissan,
had public shareholders in their apex ﬁrms. Nonvoting or supervoting
shares permitted much more leverage at each tier. Firms at diﬀerent levels
could also have real assets and engage in real business while serving as
holding companies for ﬁrms in lower tiers. Actual pyramids were much
messier than shown in ﬁgure 7.1, in that diﬀerent levels of ﬁrms sometimes
cooperated to control ﬁrms in all levels, including higher tiers of the pyra-
mid. Nonetheless, ﬁgure 7.1 captures the essential logic of a pyramidal
group.
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the actual structure of the Mitsui group at
its greatest extent.
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to appreciate pyramidal groups as a solution to the quandary of tapping
public equity ﬁnancing without risking the loss of corporate governance
power. As the other chapters of this book show, zaibatsu were common-
place in Canada, the United States, and Europe during this period as well.
And as La Porta et al. (1999) show, zaibatsuremain the most commonplace
ownership structure everywhere except Japan, the United States, and the
United Kingdom at the end of the twentieth century too, though the term
pyramidal group is used outside Japan.
7.3.5 The Big Four Zaibatsu
While the Mitsui and Sumitomo zaibatsu may be said to have formed in
the late nineteenth century in the sense that their pyramidal structures
arose at that time, both have their true origins in the Tokugawa period.
However, other zaibatsu were genuinely new. The largest were Mitsubishi
and Yasuda. These four were the largest zaibatsu, so their development
merits close inspection.
The founding of the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges in 1877 allowed
Japanese companies to tap capital from individual investors. Mitsui and
Sumitomo both began expanding by constructing pyramids. However,
their ﬁrst investments outside their primary lines of business were relatively
small, experimental, and limited.
Thus, the Mitsui family, having begun as silk merchants, expanded into
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Fig. 7.2 The structure of the Mitsui zaibatsu in 1928Fig. 7.3 Record of the structure of the Mitsui zaibatsu in 1930
Source: Takahashi (1930b, p. 50).
Notes: Mitsui’s ﬁrst-tier direct subsidiaries were Mitsui Bussan, Mitsui Life Insurance, Mit-
sui Bank, Mitsui Trust Bank, Mitsui Mining, and Toshin Warehousing (see also table 7.2).
Mitsui Partnership owned and controlled fully its ﬁrst-tier direct subsidiaries but did not nec-
essarily fully control or own aﬃliated or related ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, Mitsui Partnership
controlled the ﬁrms with asterisks fully and the ﬁrms with no asterisks or triangles predomi-
nantly but not fully. Mitsui Partnership’s control was weakest over the ﬁrms with triangles.areas related to clothing manufacture and sale. The family established
trading operations in other commodities to facilitate barter transactions
for silk, and a currency exchange operation to deal with foreign companies.
However, the Mitsuis did invest signiﬁcant capital more broadly from time
to time. During the ﬁrst twenty years of the Meiji era, the government es-
tablished state-owned enterprises to develop strategically important in-
dustries. The Mitsui group often cooperated in these projects, and became
the government’s favored partner in many such ventures.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the government’s ﬁscal prob-
lems necessitated a mass privatization of all state-owned enterprises, save
armament factories, postal and telegraph systems, mints, and railroads.
The magnitude of this mass divestiture was unprecedented. Between 1874
and 1896 alone, twenty-six major government projects—including coal,
copper, silver, and gold mines; cotton- and silk-spinning mills; shipyards;
cement factory; ironworks; sugar reﬁnery; and glass factory—were trans-
ferred to private owners, usually the large zaibatsu.
However, except for these privatized enterprises, the great zaibatsu re-
mained commerce based. Only at the century’s end did they diversify fur-
ther, and this was often at the prodding of hired managers, not family mem-
bers. Extensive diversiﬁcation would wait until after the First World War.
Morikawa (1992, p. 27) argues that it took time for people knowledgeable
of the possibilities opened by limited liability and stock markets to attain
positions of inﬂuence.
Economic historians’ assessment of the mass privatization is mixed.
The limited number of bidders, their political acuity, and the govern-
ment’s ﬁnancial exigency perhaps made for bargain prices. The great zai-
batsu families were well connected, and though some sales were auctions,
others were negotiated privately. The great zaibatsu families were also vir-
tually the only entities with pockets deep enough to participate extensively.
Certainly, most privatization prices were far lower than the Meiji gov-
ernment’s capital outlays in establishing these enterprises.20 However,
many state-owned enterprises were in dismal shape, and although many
privatized enterprises subsequently encountered serious diﬃculties, the
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20. For example, Takashima Coal Mine (government outlay by 1885, ¥393,848) fetched
¥550,000 in 1874 from Shoraisha, owned by Shojiro Goto, who resold it to Mitsubishi’s
Iwasaki family in 1881. Other examples include the Shinmachi Silk Spinning Mill (setup cost
¥138,984), sold to Mitsui in 1887 for ¥141,000; the Nagasaki Shipyard (¥1,130,949), sold to
Mitsubishi for ¥459,000; Tomioka Filature (¥310,000), sold to Mitsui in 1893 for ¥121,460; the
Sado Gold Mine (¥1,419,244) and the Ikuno Silver Mine (¥1,760,866), sold together to Mit-
subishi in 1896 for ¥2,560,926; and Kamaishi Ironworks (¥2,376,625), sold to Chobei Tanaka,
an iron merchant and supplier for the Japanese army and navy, in 1887 for ¥12,600. Tanaka
subsequently sold Kamaishi Ironworks to his company, Kamaishi Mining, in 1924, and then
divested it to Nippon Steel. Tanaka and the Kamaishi Mining succeeded spectacularly, gain-
ing a 72 percent market share in pig iron by 1900. The rarity of exceptions, such as the sale of
the Miike Coal Mine (setup cost ¥757,060), sold to Mitsui in 1888 for ¥4,590,439, only accen-
tuates the low privatization prices. For further details, see Kobayashi (1985), pp. 64–65.Japanese government rarely provided direct subsidies. When an 1889
earthquake destroyed the Kattate shaft of the Mitsui Miike coal mine, Fi-
nance Minister Matsukata refused Mitsui pleas, supported by cabinet min-
isters, for subsidies and a debt rescheduling. The Mitsuis completed their
payments in 1902, as per the original agreement. Of course, the state did
provide generous tariﬀ protection and other indirect assistance to insure
the success of the privatized enterprises.
Regardless of the government’s intentions, many privatizations turned
out to be plums. At the time, mining was highly proﬁtable because of the
expense of importing. Privatized mining companies, acquired by the Mit-
sui and Mitsubishi companies at this time, served as core cash cows until
the mid-1950s, when major veins were exhausted. Most zaibatsu electric
equipment manufacturers also developed by supplying equipment to their
aﬃliated mining companies.
The positions of diﬀerent ﬁrms within the zaibatsu pyramids were ap-
parently of great concern. From time to time, weaker businesses were
moved to lower tiers and stronger businesses to higher tiers.
For example, the Mitsui group’s primary lines of business were still
Japanese clothing and money exchange when the family diversiﬁed into
banking in 1876. When Japanese clothing sales became shaky around
1873, the family restructured the pyramid, moving that business to a lower
tier and delegating its management to distant relatives. The Mitsui Bank
became increasingly proﬁtable and served as the apex ﬁrm of the Mitsui
zaibatsu until 1893.
Again, in 1909, the Mitsui council restructured the pyramid, creating a
holding company at the apex to control the Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Mining,
and the trading ﬁrm Mitsui Bussan. This was accompanied by a major re-
arrangement of ﬁrms throughout the pyramid, with good performers mov-
ing closer to the apex and weak ﬁrms moving deeper into the pyramid.
Morikawa (1980, pp. 46–57) and others argue that greater direct owner-
ship by the Mitsui family indicates a greater family “concern” for a ﬁrm.
The placement of undoubtedly key companies in deep levels of the Mitsui
pyramid confutes this. For example, the Mitsuis moved Mitsukoshi, the di-
rect descendent of their original silk business, to a low tier after its conver-
sion into a Western-style department store chain in 1904. Oji Paper and
Kanebo, ﬁrms of considerable national importance, were also low in the
pyramid. Shibura Engineering Works, which merged with Tokyo Electric
to form Tokyo Shibura (Toshiba) Electric in 1939, was also not a core Mit-
sui ﬁrm.21 General Electric had obtained 25 to 30 percent of Shibura in
1904 for technology licenses.22
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21. Morikawa (1980) proposes that some Mitsui top managers and partners recognized the
importance of Shibaura’s operations but could not understand them. The Mitsui considered
divesting Shibaura in 1902, but opposition from Mitsui Mining and others forestalled this.
Shibaura went public as a Mitsui-group company in 1904.
22. Zaibatsu were often important technology importers; see Goto (1982).It seems likely that ﬁrms’ positions in the pyramids were also selected to
facilitate tunneling—self-dealing to concentrate proﬁts in ﬁrms owned di-
rectly by the Mitsuis and losses in ﬁrms merely controlled by them. This
readily explains the better apparent performance of ﬁrms higher in the pyr-
amids, and the location of many clearly important ﬁrms in lower tiers.23
Certainly, Shibura’s performance in the early 1900s lagged behind that of
other major Mitsui ﬁrms.
Records attest that the Mitsui head oﬃce carefully considered which
companies to place where in the pyramid, and what stakes each company
should hold in other group ﬁrms. As the zaibatsu grew ever more complex
from 1912 to 1930, the lower tiers were periodically drastically restruc-
tured, but the apex tiers changed little. The Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Bussan,
Mitsui Mining, and Toshin Warehousing remained direct subsidiaries of
the Mitsui partnership. The only signiﬁcant change was the addition of the
Mitsui Life Insurance and Mitsui Trust Bank as direct subsidiaries after
1912.24
Table 7.3 shows that the amounts of other companies’ shares held by
these three Mitsui ﬁrms were already signiﬁcant by the early 1900s, though
Mitsui Bussan’s holding was relatively minor compared to the other two
Mitsui family ﬁrms.
The Mitsui group’s most intensive diversiﬁcation began with Mitsui
Mining’s entry into chemicals in the early 1910s. Mitsui Bussan founded a
shipbuilding company in 1917, purchased an iron and steel ﬁrm in 1924,
and established Toyo Rayon to enter chemical textiles. This wave of diver-
siﬁcation was undertaken exclusively through new subsidiaries of Mitsui
Mining, the Mitsui Bank, and Mitsui Bussan, or through new subsidiaries
of their subsidiaries. Table 7.4 shows the extent of this expansion, and ﬁg-
ures 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate the structure of the zaibatsu at this point.
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23. See, e.g., Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Claessens et al. (2002), Faccio and Lang
(2003), Bertrand, Mehra, and Mullainathan (2002), and Johnson et al. (2000). Recent work
suggests that tunneling is more common in countries whose minority shareholders are poorly
protected, like Japan throughout its history. Shareholder rights were poorly protected before
the war, and La Porta et al. (1999) assign Japan one out of six in an international comparison
of shareholder rights. Porter (1990) argues that weak shareholder rights advantaged Japanese
companies by freeing their managers from myopic shareholders, but Morck and Nakamura
(1999) dispute this. At present, shareholder rights remain a controversial issue in Japan.
24. See Tamaki (1976, pp. 84–86). Fruin (1992, pp. 100–102) describes how the Mitsubishi
pyramid was reorganized several times between 1916 and 1926 and argues that this reﬂected
evolving strategic considerations such as economies of scope and scale.
Table 7.3 Amounts of shares held
Company Date Shares held (paid-in book value, ¥1,000)
Mitsui Bussan April 1910 1,699
Mitsui Bank December 1909 4,893
Mitsui Partnership January 1910 42,420Figure 7.4 shows the Sumitomo pyramid with a structure quite similar
to the Mitsui pyramid. Financial institutions sit near the apex, and indus-
trial ﬁrms ﬁll lower tiers. Direct Sumitomo subsidiaries include a bank,
sogo shosha, trust bank, insurance ﬁrm, mining company, and warehous-
ing operation. Relatively fewer Sumitomo companies had publicly traded
shares. The Sumitomo Bank went public in 1917, Sumitomo Trust in 1925,
Sumitomo Chemical in 1934, Sumitomo Metal Industrials in 1935, and
Sumitomo Electric Wire and Cable Works in 1937. Other Sumitomo ﬁrms
remained unlisted until relatively late.
The Yasuda zaibatsu, whose structure also follows this pattern, is new
compared to Mitsui and Sumitomo. The Yasuda zaibatsu began at the
end of the Tokogawa era, when Zenjiro Yasuda (1838–1922), the son of a
poor samurai in Toyama, moved to Edo and obtained work in a money-
changing house. In 1863 he began providing tax-farming services to the
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Table 7.4 The Mitsui zaibatsu companies in 1930
Authorized capital  Paid-in capital  Mitsui Gomei 
(millions of yen) (millions of yen) percent stake
Mitsui family holding company, 
Mitsui Gomei 300 300 n.a.
Mitsui’s designated subsidiaries
Mitsui Bank 100 60 100
Mitsui Bussan 100 100 100
Mitsui Mining 100 62.5 100
Toshin Warehousing 15 12.5 100
Mitsui Trust 30 7.5 100
Mitsui Life Insurance 2 0.5 100
Subsidiaries of Mitsui’s designated 
subsidiaries
Taiheiyo Colliery 11 5.5
Kamaishi Mining 20 20
Claude-Process Nitrogen Industries 10 10
Toyo Cotton Trading 25 15
Toyo Rayon 10 10
Mitsui’s ordinary subsidiaries
Ojo Paper 65.91 48.68 24
Shibaura Engineering Works 20 20 56.4
Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship 70 43.68 19.7a
Nippon Steel Works 30 30 12.5
Dai Nippon Celluloid 10 10 27.9
Kanegahuchi Cotton Spinning 60 28.6 5.3
Onoda Cement 31 21.82 9.6
Denki Kagaku Kogyo 18 17.5 6.9
Mitsukoshi Department Store 15 15 0
Sources: Shogyo Koshinsho (1930), Morikawa (1992)
Note: n.a.  not applicable.
aAlso 20.7 percent owned by Mitsui Mining.Fig. 7.4 Record of the structure of the Sumitomo zaibatsu in 1930
Source: Takahashi (1930b, p. 161).
Notes:Sumitomo’s ﬁrst-tier direct subsidiaries were Sumitomo Bank, Sumitomo Trust Bank,
Sumitomo Life Insurance, Sumitomo Electric Wire and Cable Works, Sumitomo Fertilizer
Manufacturing, Sumitomo Warehousing, Sumitomo Besshi Copper Mines, and Sumitomo
Building. Sumitomo Limited Partnership owned and controlled fully its ﬁrst-tier direct sub-
sidiaries but did not necessarily fully control or own aﬃliated or related ﬁrms. More speciﬁ-
cally, Sumitomo Limited Partnership controlled the ﬁrms with asterisks fully and the ﬁrms
with no asterisks or triangles predominantly but not fully. Sumitomo Limited Partnership’s
control was weakest over the ﬁrms with triangles.shogunate, overseeing the collection and transport of silver and gold. Af-
ter the restoration, he provided the same services to the Meiji. Yasuda prof-
ited from the delay between the collection of taxes and their forwarding to
the government. He greatly magniﬁed his wealth by buying up depreciated
Meiji paper money that the government subsequently exchanged for gold.
Yasuda and Kawasaki established the Third National Bank in 1876, and
then the Yasudas set up their own Yasuda Bank in 1880. Although the Ya-
suda Bank’s investors consisted of several members of the Yasuda family,
it seems likely that Zenjiro provided all its initial ¥200,000 capitalization.
Zenjiro needed several family members to satisfy the Meiji government’s
dictate that no single investor establish a bank.
In 1887 Zenjiro capitalized his family company, Hozensha, with an ini-
tial one million yen, designated as the paid-in capital of the Yasuda Bank.
Zenjiro assigned half to Hozansha and the other half to ten of his relatives:
six Yasuda families given ¥360,000, two branch clans given ¥80,000, and
two other relations given ¥60,000. Hozensha’s ¥500,000 of stocks were
designated the common property of the six Yasuda families. The charter
Zenjiro established forbade the transfer of Yasuda Bank, even within the
family. No certiﬁcates were issued, and ownership was recorded in a reg-
istration book in Hozensha’s safe. Yasuda Bank shareholders also relin-
quished the right to embark on commercial activities of their own.
After observing the 1909 reorganization of the Mitsui group as a general
partnership, Yasuda reorganized Hozensha similarly in 1912. The part-
nership served as a holding company for Yasuda securities, properties, and
business operations. By this time, the Yasuda zaibatsu already contained
seventeen banks and sixteen other business operations. New biological
and adopted sons boosted the number of Yasuda family investors from ten
to thirteen. In 1919 the Yasuda group established its house constitution,
freezing the number of Yasuda investors at thirteen. The Yasuda zaibatsu
remained focused on ﬁnancial businesses. By not expanding into capital-
hungry heavy industries as aggressively as the other great zaibatsu, the Ya-
suda group limited public shareholders’ participation.25 Table 7.5, which
summarizes the industrial diversiﬁcation of the ten major prewar zaibatsu,
illustrates this focus.
The Yasuda focus on banking was narrowed by the folding of eleven
Yasuda-controlled banks into the Yasuda Bank in 1913. The new bank was
the greatest of all the zaibatsu banks, with a 1913 paid-in capital of ¥150
million—compared to ¥600 thousand, ¥500 thousand, ¥430 thousand, and
¥300 thousand for the Mitsui, Sumitomo, Daiichi, and Mitsubishi banks,
respectively. The Yasuda Bank continued expanding via mergers with
other banks, and rapidly developed strong relationships with the smaller
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25. A reorganization as a joint-stock company was discussed during World War II but never
implemented.Azano and Mori zaibatsu.These ties gave the Yasuda Bank an industrially
diversiﬁed loan portfolio, but the Yasuda core businesses remained ﬁnan-
cial—encompassing banking, insurance, and other ﬁnancial services. As
table 7.5 shows, the house of Yasuda limited its entry into heavy industries
even during World War II.
The Mitsubishi zaibatsu began as Tsukumo Co. and was renamed
Mitsukawa Company in 1872 because it had three (mittsu) owners—
S. Ishikawa (1828–82), S. Kawada (1836–96), and K. Nakagawa.26 In 1873
Mitsukawa Co. was renamed Mitsubishi Co., which appears to have been
a limited partnership between the three original owners and Yataro
Iwasaki (1834–85). After Yataro’s death, his son Hisaya (1865–1955) and
Hisaya’s younger brother Yanosuke (1851–1904) joined the partnership.
The Mitsubishi partnership was dissolved around 1891, and Hisaya and
Yanosuke Iwasaki each invested ¥250 million in 1893 to set up a new lim-
ited partnership—also called the Mitsubishi Company.
The Mitsubishi Company’s direct subsidiaries included Mitsubishi
Shipbuilding and Mitsubishi Mining, which both extensively developed
the privatized state-owned enterprises the zaibatsu purchased. Unlike the
Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda charters, the Mitsubishi charter allowed
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Table 7.5 Industrial diversiﬁcation of the ten major zaibatsu in 1945, in millions of yen
Industry
Heavy Light  Zaibatsu Zaibatsu
Zaibatsu Finance industry industry Other Total (% of economy)
Mitsui 169 2,214 274 404 3,061 9.4
Mitsubishi 160 1,866 73 605 2,704 8.3
Sumitomo 65 1,469 29 102 1,667 5.2
Yasuda 209 119 117 64 510 1.6
Nissan (Aikawa) 5 1,558 103 38 1,703 5.3
Asano 0 419 89 76 594 1.8
Furukawa 4 479 3 4 490 1.5
Okura 6 218 34 56 314 1.0
Nakajima 0 188 24 0.768 213 0.6
Nomura 26 50 27 62 165 0.5
Top ten zaibatsu total 644 8,582 773 1,412 11,420 35.0
Economy total 1,215 17,513 4,600 9,108 32,437 100.0
Top ten zaibatsu
(% of economy) 53 49 17 16 35
Source: Holding Company Liquidation Committee (HCLC), Japanese zaibatsu and Its Dissolution, as
cited in Yasuoka (1976, pp. 34–35).
26. Nakagawa’s birth and death dates are unknown. One variant of the number three in
Japanese is mittsu. The precise origin of the Mitsubishi group is a somewhat contentious is-
sue among Japanese historians; see Mishima (1981).each Iwasaki clan to retain its income and start up its own businesses. This
ﬂexibility let individual Iwasaki clans enthusiastically capture business op-
portunities that the Mitsubishi Company itself could not. For example,
Horaisha bought the privatized Takashima Coal Mine, whose continuing
government subsidies prevented direct Mitsubishi ownership.27 Other im-
portant de facto Mitsubishi ﬁrms, like Asahi Glass, Meiji Life Insurance,
and Kirin Beer, were de jure separate from the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. This
was clearly a bureaucratic slight of hand, for these companies had exten-
sive ﬁnancing and other relationships with formal members of the Mit-
subishizaibatsuand were controlled by the Iwasaki family. These ﬁrms also
all became Mitsubishi keiretsu companies after World War II.
Mitsubishi Company, the pyramid’s apex, was reorganized as a joint-
stock company in 1937, and shares were distributed to Iwasaki relatives
and seven unrelated executives, all of whom were forbidden to transfer
their shares without permission from the company. In 1940 the company
raised its paid-in capital from ¥120 million to ¥240 million, and the origi-
nal two Iwasaki families together retained a 47.5 percent stake.
Although Mitsubishi, like Mitsui and Sumitomo, remained family con-
trolled, the Iwasaki used marriage extensively to bring talented men into
the family. Thus, unusually in a family enterprise, marriageable daughters
were valued as highly as sons, if not more highly (Morikawa 1992, p. 53).
Mitsubishi Company’s stakes in direct subsidiaries, like the Mitsubishi
Bank and Mitsubishi Corporation, were small, averaging around 30 per-
cent, versus 66 percent for Mitsui. Similarly, Mitsubishi’s average owner-
ship in direct subsidiaries of direct subsidiaries was only 18 percent, versus
9 percent for Mitsui. The Mitsubishi zaibatsu was less averse to issuing
public equity, and so expanded further into capital-intensive industries like
machinery, mining, ﬁnance, and shipping. This made Mitsubishi ﬁrms
market leaders in these rising sectors, yet the Iwasakis retained full control,
for their stakes were always suﬃcient to dominate shareholder meetings.28
Figure 7.5 illustrates the structure of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu as it later
developed.
7.3.6 Industrial Zaibatsu
The Mitsui, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, and Yasuda zaibatsu are generally
ranked as the major family-controlled pyramidal groups of prewar Japan.
Three other zaibatsu were also important, but their inﬂuence extended
along speciﬁc product chains and did not include banks or ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
These so-called industrial zaibatsu included the Asano group, built by
Soichiro Asano (1848–1930) around the Asano Cement Company; the
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27. The Iwasaki family was only allowed to purchase it from Horaisha when Takashima ex-
perienced ﬁnancial distress. See Yasuoka (1976, p. 64) for details.
28. For details, see Mishima (1981, pp. 340–41).Fig. 7.5 Record of the structure of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu in 1930
Source: Takahashi (1930b, pp. 108–9).
Notes: Mitsubishi Limited Partnership’s ﬁrst-tier direct subsidiaries were Mitsubishi Ship-
building, Mitsubishi Steel, Mitsubishi Mining, Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsubishi Marine
and Fire Insurance, Mitsubishi Bank, and Mitsubishi Trust Bank. Mitsubishi Limited Part-
nership owned and controlled fully its ﬁrst-tier direct subsidiaries but did not necessarily fully
control or own aﬃliated or related ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally, Mitsubishi Limited Partnership
controlled the ﬁrms with asterisks fully and the ﬁrms with no asterisks or triangles predomi-
nantly but not fully. Mitsubishi Limited Partnership’s control was weakest over the ﬁrms with
triangles. The same ownership and control relationships apply to the ﬁrms under the Iwasaki
family’s control.Kawasaki group, built around Kawasaki Shipbuilding Co. by Shozo Kawa-
saki (1837–1911); and the Furukawa group, built by Ichibei Furukawa
(1832–1903) around his Ashio Copper Mines Co.
7.3.7 Widely Held Zaibatsu
In addition to the four major family zaibatsuand the three industrial zai-
batsu, ﬁve other pyramidal groups emerged in the early 1900s—Nissan,
Nichitsu, Mori, Nisso, and Riken. These structures grew with the stock
market, which became much more active in the 1900s. Share prices rose
rapidly from 1917 to 1919, and individual investors, like landlords and
other property owners, bought increasingly into equity (Hashimoto 1997,
p. 101). This augmented ﬂow of capital into the market allowed, and per-
haps arose from, the construction of pyramids ﬁnanced with public equity
throughout.
While the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo apex ﬁrms were family
owned, these new widely held zaibatsu had widely held apex ﬁrms. Al-
though their founders often held quite small equity stakes in the apex ﬁrms,
they had little fear of losing control because they were usually highly
skilled engineers, whose expertise was essential to critical company opera-
tions. The chemistry experts Shitagu Noguchi, Tomonori Nakano, and
Nobuteru Mori built the new Nichitsu, Nisso, and Mori zaibatsu, respec-
tively. Masatoshi Okochi, an expert in machinery manufacture, built the
new Riken zaibatsu, and the all-around genius Yoshisuke Aikawa built
Nissan into a large, diversiﬁed zaibatsu, although machinery remained its
most important business.
This technical expertise factor kept these new zaibatsu focused on heavy
industry, chemicals, and electric power. However, as they grew, they also
diversiﬁed to compete directly with family zaibatsu. Widely held zaibatsu,
like industrial zaibatsu, did not control ﬁnancial institutions and relied
heavily on outside ﬁnance.
The development of the widely held zaibatsu can best be illustrated by
the history of the largest such group—Nissan. The Nissan group was
founded by Yoshisuke Aikawa (1880–1967) in a rather roundabout way.
By 1919, Aikawa’s brother-in-law, Husanosuke Kuhara (1869–1965),
had acquired 30 percent of Japan’s domestic copper mines, 40 percent of
its gold mines, and 50 percent of its silver mines. He accomplished this by
ﬂoating ¥2.4 million in an initial public oﬀering of his Kuhara Mining
Company. After the First World War, Japan experienced a series of de-
pressions, and Kuhara Mining was badly hurt. When its subsidiary, Ku-
hara Trading, failed, Kuhara was forced to retire on a sick leave. He dele-
gated the rebuilding of his company to his brother-in-law, Yoshisuke
Aikawa, whose own much smaller ﬁrm, Tobata Cast Iron, had survived the
depressions. Aikawa was an engineer and had studied state-of-the-art iron
394 Randall K. Morck and Masao Nakamuracasting in the United States. To save Kuhara Mining, he pooled his own
money with funds from relatives, managers, and outsiders to inject more
than ¥25 million into the company.29
Having dealt successfully with Kuhara Mining’s debt crisis, Aikawa
joined its board in 1926 and quickly replaced Kuhara as president. To put
the ﬁrm on a solid long-term ﬁnancial course, Aikawa needed to raise more
capital without losing control. In December 1928 he listed a new holding
company, Nippon Sangyo (Nissan). Simultaneously he also organized
Nippon Mining, into which he merged Kuhara Mining. Since table 7.6
shows that Kuhara Mining had many public shareholders, this merger left
Nippon Mining publicly held but controlled through a majority stake by
Nissan.
Aikawa understood that Nissan, or any other new zaibatsu, would need
substantial capital very quickly to achieve economies of scale comparable
to those of the existing zaibatsu. The funds needed were far beyond his
family assets, so bringing public shareholders in was unavoidable. Aikawa
clearly understood the eﬃcacy of pyramidal groups for tapping unlimited
outside capital while retaining full corporate governance control. Figure
7.6 is Aikawa’s (1934) vision of how a pyramid of listed subsidiaries, sub-
sidiaries of subsidiaries, and so on, can put an unlimited amount of public
stockholders’ capital under his control.
Aikawa (1934) recognized that, since the apex ﬁrm of his pyramid was
widely held, it was his responsibility to make sure the company always
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29. He was widely expected to fail. Kuhara was compared at the time to Suzuki, described
below. That Kuhara ultimately prospered and formed the basis of a new zaibatsu, while
Suzuki failed and brought down an entire zaibatsu, greatly enhanced Aikawa’s standing.
Table 7.6 Kuhara Mining Company: The composition of shareholders, 1918–27
June 1918 June 1920 May 1927
Total number of outstanding shares 1,500,000 1,500,000 1,500,000
Total number of shareholders 9,761 13,842 14,858
Average number of shares held per shareholder 153.7 108.0 100.9
Shareholders with 5,000 or more shares
Total number of shareholders 31 20 18
Share ownership (%) 67.3 51.4 44.3
Average number of shares held per shareholder 32,566.5 38,550.0 36,916.7
Shareholders with fewer than 500 shares
Total number of shareholders 9,544 13,649 14,739
Share ownership (%) 28.5 35.8 39.6
Average number of shares held per shareholder 44.7 40.0 40.3
Kuhara family and relatives (%) 45.6 45.1 37.3
Source: Udagawa (1976).Fig. 7.6 Aikawa’s vision for using capital markets to ﬁnance Nippon Sangyo 
(Nissan)
Source: Aikawa (1934).
Notes: Unidirectional ﬂow pumps set the one-way ﬂows of funds corresponding to, for ex-
ample, payments of interest and dividends, and the proceeds from new issues of securities
such as bonds and shares. Bidirectional ﬂow pumps set the two-way ﬂows of funds corre-
sponding to, for example, the proceeds from and the repayments of loans, and the purchasing
and selling transactions of securities. Aikawa’s vision was that a holding company (H) and its
subsidiary ﬁrms (E1, E2, . . . , E6) could grow using primarily public capital (P) and ﬁnancial
institutions (B) while enriching the capital base of the holding company, represented by B, the
holding company tub.made acceptable proﬁts and that its shareholders received a stable pay-
ment of dividends.30Some 70 percent of Nissan’s assets were shares in Nip-
pon Mining, so Nissan was still dangerously exposed to that sector, which
remained chronically weak until the Japanese government began accumu-
lating gold in 1932. Using this business upturn, Aikawa sold Nippon
Mining shares and used the funds raised to diversify Nissan’s holdings
extensively.
Aikawa’s main strategy was to purchase promising ﬁrms, develop them
as fully owned subsidiaries, and then take them public through initial
public oﬀerings (IPOs). In creating these spin-oﬀs, or bunshin kaisha, Nis-
san’s role in Japan’s development resembled that of the 1990s venture cap-
ital ﬁrms in the United States (see, e.g., Gompers and Lerner 2002). How-
ever, while venture capitalists seek to sell their start-ups completely to the
public to raise funds for the next venture, Nissan always retained a control
block, using further IPOs to extend the pyramid. This appears to reﬂect
Aikawa’s desire to retain a ﬁnal say in important decisions.
Nissan’s partially spun-oﬀ subsidiaries usually prospered, further en-
riching both Nissan’s shareholders and their own. Subsidiaries acquired or
spun oﬀ their own subsidiaries, and the pyramidal structure expanded.
Nissan’s own paid-in capital increased from ¥5.25 million in 1933 to
¥198.37 million in 1937. During the same period, its total assets increased
from ¥91.08 million to ¥383.10 million, and its securities held increased
from ¥53.38 million to ¥269.92 million. Table 7.6 shows Nissan’s share
price for the period 1930–37.
All the while, Nissan itself became ever more widely held. By May 1937,
Nissan had 51,804 shareholders, 50,783 of whom owned fewer than 500
shares. The fraction of shares Aikawa and his relatives held continued to
fall—from 19.2 percent in 1929 to only 4.5 percent in 1937. By 1937, only
four shareholders, including Aikawa, held more than 10,000 Nissan shares.
By this time, table 7.7shows Nissan at the apex of a pyramid exceeded in
scale only by the Mitsui and Mitsubishi groups. The Nissan group now in-
cluded Nippon Mining, Hitachi Ltd., Hitachi Power, Nissan Motor, and
many other large manufacturers and utilities.31
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30. However, Aikawa (1934) also justiﬁes “management nationalism” as a legitimate rea-
son for having invested in “a few new business lines” that he thought were promising for the
future but would currently generate no returns in the near term.
31. Unlike Mitsui and Mitsubishi, which kept full family control of their holding compa-
nies (ﬁrst as partnerships and then as joint stock companies) until the end of World War II,
Nissan’s equity ownership was more widely held and became more so toward World War II.
Nevertheless, Yoshisuke Aikawa and his relatives managed to keep the Nissan pyramid under
their full control all the way through the end of World War II. Judging from his survey on
budgeting practices of many Japanese ﬁrms in the 1930s, Hasegawa (1938) concludes that
Nissan as a holding company uses the budgeting process of its more than thirty surveyed sub-
sidiaries in various industries in a centralized totalitarian way.7.3.8 Local Zaibatsu
There were many locally important business families in Japan at this
time, whose operations were limited to speciﬁc geographical areas (e.g.,
prefectures) and usually also speciﬁc lines of business. These families ac-
cumulated wealth in closely held family ﬁrms and then used this wealth to
expand into new businesses, sometimes bringing in other local investors.
Mostly, these pyramidal structures remained small, but a few acquired na-
tional scope—though they kept their head oﬃces in the original localities.
In general, these local zaibatsu did not develop into highly industrialized
operations. It is possible that their limited access to capital explains this.
Indeed, their dominance in certain regions may explain why industrializa-
tion favored some regions over others.
The role of local zaibatsu in regional development remains poorly un-
derstood. Important local zaibatsu include the Nakano group (based in
Niigata), the Itaya group of Hokkaido, the Ito group based in Nagoya, an-
other Ito group in Hyogo, the Yasukawa group of Fukuoka, the Kaishima
group of Fukuoka, and the Katakura of Nagano. Figure 7.7 describes
some of these groups.
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Table 7.7 Rankings of the top zaibatsu as of midyear 1937 by number of ﬁrms and
paid-in capital
Zaibatsu Number of group ﬁrms Total paid-in capital
1. Mitsui 101 ¥1,177,200,000
2. Mitsubishi 73 ¥848,204,000
3. Nissan 77 ¥473,632,000
4. Sumitomo 34 ¥383,800,000
5. Yasuda 44 ¥263,866,000
6. Asano 50 ¥236,261,000
7. Nichitsu 26 ¥197,100,000
8. Mori 20 ¥141,996,000
9. Okura 51 ¥133,845,000
10. Furukawa 19 ¥101,994,000
Source: Yasuoka (1976).
Fig. 7.7 (facing page) Representative local zaibatsu families
Source: Morikawa (1976).
Notes: There were many family-based zaibatsu groups in many localities in Japan before
World War II. The scale of their business operations and geographic coverage was much
smaller than that of the major zaibatsu groups such as Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi.
Nevertheless, these local zaibatsugroups often organized their companies in pyramidal struc-
tures as the major zaibatsu groups did. Some of these local zaibatsu companies survived
World War II and still exist today. For example, Kikkoman (Mogi zaibatsu in Chiba), Mat-
suzakaya Department Store (Ito zaibatsu in Nagoya), Kurashiki Textile (Ohara zaibatsu in
Okayama), and Yasukawa Electric (Yasukawa zaibatsu in Fukuoka) are shown here.7.3.9 The Zaibatsu and Independent Companies
Numerous independent entrepreneurs also shaped the economy in this
era. Sakichi Toyoda patented the Toyoda wooden hand loom in 1891 and
an innovative automatic loom in 1924.32Platt Brothers and Co. of England,
a world leader in looms, paid the 1929 equivalent of one million yen for the
rights, and Toyoda later used these funds to found Toyota Motors. An-
other important entrepreneur, Konosuke Matsushita, founded Matsushita
Electric Industries in Osaka in 1918 and developed it into one of the
world’s largest electronics manufacturers. Many of these new ventures
were aﬃliated with established zaibatsu to varying degrees.
Toyota was loosely aﬃliated with the Mitsui zaibatsu until the end of
World War II and the Mitsui keiretsu after the war.33 In 1898, Mitsui Bus-
san agreed to market Toyoda’s products. When Toyoda set up his own tex-
tiles ﬁrm, Toyoda Shokai, Mitsui Bussan provided capital. When he estab-
lished Toyoda Style Textile Machines, a predecessor to Toyoda Boshokuki,
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Fig. 7.7 (cont.) 
32. During his lifetime Sakichi Toyoda made 119 inventions, of which 13 were awarded U.S.
and other foreign patents.
33. As of 1930, ﬁgure 7.3 lists Toyoda Boshokuki (Toyoda Textile Machines) and another
Toyoda company as controlled by Toyo Menka Trading Firm, which was owned by Mitsui
Bussan.in 1906, Mitsui Bussan again provided capital. The Toyoda and Mitsui
continued to have close business and family ties. For example, Sakichi
Toyoda adopted his son-in-law, Risaburo Toyoda (formerly Risaburo
Kogama), the second son of the Kogama family, which ran Mitsui’s Toyo
Menka. Risaburo subsequently became the ﬁrst president of Toyota Mo-
tor.34
Matsushita did business with the Jugo Bank, but Sumitomo opened a
branch near his factory in 1925 and approached him about doing business.
Matsushita asked Sumitomo for a ¥20,000 line of credit, an unusual ar-
rangement at the time, and Sumitomo agreed. Although Matsushita had
never used the line of credit, when Jugo Bank failed in a depression shortly
thereafter, Sumitomo honored the agreement and extended credit. Mat-
sushita accordingly began a long-term relationship with the Sumitomo
Bank in 1927. Matsushita was never listed as a Sumitomo company, since
the group has as its own electronics ﬁrm, NEC. However, its close rela-
tionship with the Sumitomo Bank continued for decades. Matsushita ex-
panded, building its own pyramidal group, and was numbered among the
great zaibatsubythe Allied forces charged with rebuilding Japan’s postwar
economy. Following World War II the Sumitomo Bank became the largest
bank block holder of Matsushita shares and its main bank. At the end of
World War II Matsushita was not formally owned by the Sumitomo fam-
ily. Yet it was designated as a zaibatsu group by the Allied forces in June
1946, and Konosuke Matsushita and all other top executives with ranks
above managing directors were purged from all public oﬃces in November
1946. Konosuke Matsushita was apparently respected by the Matsushita
employees, and the purge generated sympathy among Matsushita’s labor
unions. The union leaders presented 15,000 signatures from their members
and families to the general headquarters of the Allied forces and the Japan-
ese government. Because of this unusual support, Konosuke Matsushita’s
and other Matsushita executives’ purge was downgraded and then was
dropped entirely in May 1947. Matsushita companies were able to resume
operation.
Table 7.5 shows zaibatsu ﬁrms owning about 35 percent of corporate as-
sets in 1946, with the remainder held by independent ﬁrms. Many inde-
pendent ﬁrms, like Toyota and Matsushita, were actually bound, more or
less tightly, to an established zaibatsu.Many that would become important
decades later were not key players in the prewar corporate sector. But zai-
batsu ﬁrms’ dominance of key industries like natural resources, chemicals,
manufacturing, and trade, and of the associated distribution channels, was
overwhelming by the start of World War II. Thus, despite their number and
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34. Kiichiro Toyoda, Sakichi’s son with his ﬁrst wife, spent most of his life developing au-
tomobiles, but he got along poorly with Risaburo and died without taking charge of Toyota
Motors.collective economic importance, independent ﬁrms were unquestionably
less politically inﬂuential during this period.
7.4 Ownership Changes during the Depressions
In the 1920s and early 1930s, Japan endured a series of depressions, cul-
minating in the Great Depression. The Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923
so disrupted the economy that the Roaring Twenties were essentially mute
in Japan. Several major zaibatsu collapsed. Studying which zaibatsu failed
and which survived is highly instructive.
Key factors explaining survival appear to be the existence of a bank in
the zaibatsu, its position in the pyramid, and its role in the business deal-
ings of the group. The Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo zaibatsu all had
banks very near the apexes of their pyramids. Consequently, their banks’
health was a primary concern of the controlling families. Moreover, any
tunneling that occurred would tend to increase the assets and incomes of
these banks.
The Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Sumitomo banks also had well-diversiﬁed
loan portfolios, with only 10 to 20 percent of outstanding loans to other
ﬁrms in their own zaibatsu.35 Moreover, these banks held equity in many
ﬁrms spanning many industries. Indeed, the reticence of the Mitsubishi
Bank to lend to related companies during the depressions forced many,
though not the mining and shipbuilding concerns, to issue public shares.
The average stake of the Mitsubishi apex partnership in its ﬁrst tier sub-
sidiaries fell from 83.5 percent in 1921 to 69.0 percent in 1928.
Other zaibatsu families used their banks primarily to raise money for
their zaibatsu ﬁrms. These so-called organ banks were thus poorly diversi-
ﬁed. For example, 94 percent of the Nakazawa Bank’s loans were to insid-
ers, as were 75 percent of the Watanabe Bank’s loans. Likewise, 75 percent
of the loans held by the Matsukata zaibatsu’sJugo Bank were to Matsukata
ﬁrms. Prior to their collapses in 1927, 72 percent of the loans of the Su-
zuki’s captive bank, the Taiwan Bank, were to Suzuki companies.
7.4.1 The Rise and Fall of the Suzuki Zaibatsu36
The Suzuki family, like many other Tokugawa-era mercantile families,
participated actively in Japan’s foreign trade after the restoration. Even
though they began as specialists in silk, copper, clothing, or sugar, they
eventually required a general trading ﬁrm, or sogo shosha, to transact
barter business domestically and to handle transactions with foreigners. A
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35. Such diversiﬁcation is clearly sound banking practice to reduce risk. This may have
been the banks’ deliberate objective, but this is not entirely clear.
36. Kato (1957) details the use and structure of organ banks, including that of the Suzuki
group, and is the source of much of this section. See also Okazaki and Yokoyama (2001) for
empirical evidence and a summary of other work.sogo shosha was a general entity that could deal with all types of proﬁt op-
portunities in both domestic and foreign markets. The ﬁrst and largest was
Mitsui Bussan, which served as a model for many others.37
One imitator was Suzuki Shoten, the Suzuki Merchant Company. The
Suzukis began as sugar traders and organized a sogo shosha to handle mis-
cellaneous transactions related to that business. Suzuki Shoten quickly
grew to become the second largest sogo shosha. Suzuki’s rapid expansion
took place in two stages.
The ﬁrst was during Japan’s intensive drive to develop its new colony in
Taiwan, acquired during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to 1895. Taiwan’s
climate was ideal for sugar cane, and the Suzukis were the logical point men
to handle Japanese investment in that industry. To transport sugar to Japan,
the Suzukis needed ships, so it expanded into shipping and shipbuilding. At
this point, the apex ﬁrm of the zaibatsuremained a single proprietorship run
by the family patriarch, soon one of Japan’s richest merchants.
The second stage occurred in the period immediately after World War I.
During a sustained boom from 1914 to 1919, Japan’s gross national prod-
uct (GNP) grew ﬁvefold, and the Suzuki zaibatsu expanded aggressively,
proliferating new ﬁrms into many industries. In 1903, the apex ﬁrm became
a general partnership capitalized at ¥500,000. By 1920, this had increased
one hundredfold to ¥50 million yen. Already in 1915, the Suzukis’ annual
business in foreign trade reached ¥1.54 billion, exceeding that of Mitsui
Bussan. By the end of the boom, the Suzuki group looked comparable in
many ways to the Mitsui and Mitsubishi zaibatsu.
One of the Suzukis’ critical successes occurred in November 1914, three
months after the beginning of the First World War. Although Japan was
mired in a deep recession, Naokichi Kaneko (1868–1944), the manager of
Suzuki Shoten, and Seiichi Takahata, the company’s London branch man-
ager, foresaw that German U-boats would raise ship and commodity prices
sharply. Kaneko ordered Takahata to buy everything available, including
raw materials aboard any transport ship. Suzuki’s purchases of ships, iron,
steel, sugar, wheat, and other commodities wrought an immediate proﬁt of
over ¥100 million. This move, more than anything else, make Suzuki a
global player in trade.
Takahata was also skillful in dealing with Great Britain and the other al-
lied countries, procuring for them raw materials, iron and steel products,
food supplies, ships, and the like. With 50,000 tons of ships sunk on an av-
erage day, Britain suﬀered a severe shortage of transport capacity, and was
directly in the business of buying ships. At one point, the British govern-
ment advanced Suzuki an unprecedented £500,000 deposit toward the
purchase of ships. Suzuki was also ﬂooded with orders for food from the
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37. Others were organized by the Mitsubishi, Masuda, Abe, Mogi, Takada, Iwai, Ataka,
and Yuasa groups.British and allied governments. Takahata responded, for example, by sell-
ing them entire cargos of beans, grain, and other food items from Hok-
kaido together with the ships themselves.
These developments caused Suzuki to enter a long-term relationship
with the Taiwan Bank. Suzuki’s foreign trade transactions were now so
enormous that Japan’s only government-authorized foreign exchange
bank, Yokohama Shokin Bank,38was incapable of handling them all, forc-
ing Suzuki to rely on more expensive merchant bankers.39 The Japanese
government had granted the Taiwan Bank special privileges to deal in for-
eign exchange, and Takahata seized upon this to unplug Suzuki’s foreign
exchange bottlenecks. The Taiwan Bank welcomed Suzuki’s overtures be-
cause its extensive nonperforming loans in China had discouraged other
zaibatsu companies from doing business with it.
A brief but severe recession followed the November 1918 armistice, and
several small zaibatsu, including Mogi, Kuhara, Masuda, and Abe, failed.
The Suzuki group survived, and when the economy recovered in Septem-
ber 1919, Takahata foresaw another boom. The pace of the Suzukis’ global
expansion was unprecedented. The Suzuki group gleaned huge proﬁts in
everything from Java sugar to wheat and soybeans from Siberia, Man-
churia, and Qingdao. In one transaction, the Suzukis shipped 360,000 tons
of wheat from Manchuria to Great Britain using 10,000 boxcars of the Man-
churian Railway and forty-ﬁve 8,000- to 10,000-ton freighters. In 1919 and
1920, Takahata sold ﬁfty shiploads of Java sugar and earned 65 million
guilders on the 1920 transactions alone.
In 1923, Kaneko restructured the Suzuki pyramid, ﬂoating the trade
division of Suzuki Shoten as the Suzuki Stock Company, or Kabushiki
Suzuki, capitalized at ¥80 million and with a paid-in capital of ¥50 million.
Suzuki Shoten’s remaining operations were reorganized into a holding
company, Suzuki General Partnership or Suzuki Gomei, capitalized at ¥50
million. Suzuki General Partnership became the new apex ﬁrm, control-
ling seventy-eight listed ﬁrms. Of these, ten were in food industries, twenty-
four in chemicals, four in textiles, two in tobacco, ﬁve in mining, ﬁve in iron
and steel, three in electric machinery, three in electric power, three in rail-
ways, two in shipping, two in ﬁshing, two in real estate and warehousing,
three in development, two in the banking and trust business, four in insur-
ance, and three in commerce.
The sixty-ﬁve of these that were integral parts of the Suzuki zaibatsuhad
a capitalization of ¥560 million. The apex ﬁrm employed 3,000 people, and
the pyramid ﬁrms had 25,000 employees in total. Figure 7.8 diagrams the
Suzuki pyramid at its greatest extent.
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38. Yokohama Shokin Bank became the Bank of Tokyo after World War II, which more re-
cently merged with the Mitsubishi Bank to form the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi.
39. The only other Japanese trading ﬁrm that had enough foreign business to warrant us-
ing merchant bankers was Mitsui Bussan.Fig. 7.8 The Suzuki zaibatsu: Aﬃliated ﬁrms, 1923–27
Source: Katsura (1976).
Notes:The 76 ﬁrms listed here were established between 1878 and 1926 and were generally considered mem-
bers of the Suzuki zaibatsu.Analysts before and after World War II diﬀer on the precise control relationships
the Suzuki Shoten had with these Suzuki companies. Columns (A)–(G) and (I)–(K) compare the estimated
control relationships published by ten diﬀerent analysts and securities ﬁrms between 1923 and 1928. ○di-
rectly owned by Suzuki;  majority-controlled;  minority-controlled; O fully controlled;  spin-
oﬀs; aﬃliated (mostly for investment purposes); ×closely related with little control. Column (H) com-
pares estimates of the chances of independent survival for former Suzuki companies, published in a business
magazine after the Suzuki zaibatsu’scollapse in April 1927. very good prospect, no impact from the col-
lapse; – no possibility for survival; ⏐survival possible depending on restructuring eﬀorts.Kaneko apparently created some of these manufacturing companies out
of a sense of nationalism. He shared with many Japanese managers of the
era a belief that import substitution would free Japan of its ignominious
dependence on foreigners.
The 1923 restructuring caused the Suzuki zaibatsuto take on a structure
superﬁcially resembling those of the other large zaibatsu. A holding com-
pany stood at the apex, major Suzuki powerhouse companies ﬁlled the ﬁrst
tier of subsidiaries, their spin-oﬀs ﬁlled the second tier, and various ac-
quired companies ﬁlled out the lower tiers. Many of these companies con-
tinued on with their original names.
However, two key diﬀerences ﬁgured in the Suzuki group’s demise.
First, while Suzuki Shoten’s trading division was separate from the apex
holding company, there was no corresponding separation in personnel. In
fact, f ﬁgure 7.9shows that numerous Suzuki family members and managers
held cross-appointments in Suzuki companies. And though the Suzuki
family held control rights, a hired manager, Kaneko, was actually making
all the management decisions. The Suzuki group’s rapid expansion of its
business activities was not accompanied by a corresponding expansion of
its management personnel.
Second, the Suzuki companies were ﬁnanced diﬀerently. Suzuki ﬁrms
borrowed much more than other zaibatsu ﬁrms, both to ﬁnance expansion




































































































































































.and to ﬁnance day-to-day business dealings. This debt generally took the
form of loans from the Taiwan Bank, the Suzuki group’s de facto group
bank. This seems to have reﬂected Kaneko’s desire to maintain undisputed
control throughout the pyramid. Equity ﬁnancing risked empowering out-
side shareholders, and even invited takeovers, jeopardizing Kaneko’s ab-
solute control. Debt from sources other than the Taiwan Bank risked in-
terference from outside creditors. This aversion led to a rapid buildup of
Suzuki companies’ debts to the Taiwan Bank, shown in table 7.8, and a
similarly rapidly increasing exposure of the Taiwan Bank to the Suzuki
companies’ fortunes.
Soon, the bulk of the Taiwan Bank’s loan portfolio was tied up in other
Suzuki companies. However, the integration of the Taiwan Bank into the
Suzuki group was via a “long-term relationship.” Kaneko only controlled
the Taiwan Bank because of its ﬁnancial dependence on business with
Suzuki companies. And the Suzuki group’s ﬁnancial position was weak-
ened in the early 1920s because of a costly failed eﬀort to merge two large
ﬂour companies, Nisshin and Nihon Flour Companies. Finally, most of
Suzuki General Partnership’s capital was tied up in Kabushiki Suzuki, the
trading company.
The collapse of the Suzuki zaibatsu was spectacular.40
The September 1919 boom that Kaneko gambled on turned out to be
short lived. The Japanese economy stumbled in 1920, and again in 1922,
and then collapsed with the Great Kanto Earthquake depression of 1924,
and the Showa ﬁnance depression of 1927. The latter two events kept
Japan’s economy from realizing the growth that seemed likely in 1919 and
exposed the weakness of the Suzuki zaibatsu and other similar pyramids.
The Great Kanto Earthquake of September 1, 1923, was one of the worst
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Table 7.8 Suzuki Trading Company debt to the Bank of Taiwan (yen)









Source: Fouraker (2002, p. 8).
40. The collapse of Suzuki zaibatsu compares in scale with the collapses of Ivar Kreuger’s
STAB in Sweden in 1932 and that of the Stinnes concerns in Germany in the 1920s (Kato
1957).in world history. It destroyed Tokyo, Yokohama, and the surrounding area,
killing 140,000 people either directly, in the ensuing ﬁres, or in mob vio-
lence against Koreans in the quake’s aftermath. Business oﬃces and
records were destroyed, and much of Japan’s most modern infrastructure
was ruined.
But another eﬀect of the earthquake was purely ﬁnancial—the Showa
depression. The earthquake seriously damaged numerous businesses,
many of which had issued bills prior to the quake that they were now un-
able to pay. This, in turn, created cash ﬂow problems for the banks holding
those bills. The government therefore developed a program under which
the Bank of Japan would rediscount bills listing the disaster area as place
of payment or listing a merchant with oﬃces in the disaster area as the
debtor. These earthquake bills, or tegata, provided a two-year grace period
for collection, subsequently twice extended, adding two more years of
grace. The government promised compensation to the Bank of Japan for
any losses due to the program. At the end of 1926, more than ¥200 million
in unsettled earthquake bills remained, of which ¥160 million had been re-
discounted by the Bank of Japan.41
Suzuki companies used more debt ﬁnancing than Mitsui, Sumitomo, or
Mitsubishi ﬁrms. The Suzuki group’s total debt at the end of 1926 was ¥500
million, of which ¥379 million was owed to the Taiwan Bank. Kaneko had
accumulated this amount of debt through adept ﬁnancial maneuvers mix-
ing and counterbalancing credit created by the Taiwan Bank, Suzuki ﬁrms,
other ﬁrms, and the Bank of Japan. Thus, a disproportionate fraction of
these unpaid earthquake bills were for debts owed by Suzuki companies,
and the Suzuki zaibatsu’s bank, the Taiwan Bank, accounted for fully 58
percent.42
Whenthe Japanese Diet debated how to absorb these unpaid promissory
notes, Suzuki hired heavy-handed lobbyists to sway votes. The campaign
backﬁred, and Suzuki’s ﬁnancial problems were exposed. Suzuki compa-
nies found themselves unable to ﬂoat debt. The ﬁnal law the Diet passed on
March 23, 1927, was accompanied by a resolution to rescue the Taiwan
Bank. On March 24, the Taiwan Bank announced that it was severing its
ties with the Suzuki group entirely. The sudden abandonment of Suzuki
companies by the Taiwan Bank forced them to default on payments due
the Mitsui Bank and other banks. Angered by the Taiwan Bank’s move, the
other banks called in their Taiwan Bank loans, putting the Taiwan Bank
(once again) on the verge of bankruptcy.
Suzuki collapsed on April 2, 1927. On April 13, the Bank of Japan, de-
spite the above resolution, refused to mount a second rescue of the Taiwan
A Frog in a Well Knows Nothing of the Ocean 409
41. See, for example, Ito (2001) for the role of the Bank of Japan in the depression periods
in the 1920s and 1930s.
42. Both Taiwan and Korea Banks were given special status by the Japanese government.Bank. Cha (2001) argues that a determination by the central bank to end
the gold embargo ﬁgured largely in this decision, but the politics of the sit-
uation surely also played a role. The Upper House of Parliament voted
down a special provision to rescue Taiwan Bank, arguing that the measure
was unconstitutional, and the Japanese cabinet fell on April 17. The Tai-
wan Bank closed temporarily on April 18. This resulted in an immediate
nationwide ﬁnancial panic.
7.4.2 The Disposition of the Remains
Although the Suzuki group failed because of its inability to pay its prom-
issory notes, it never actually went into bankruptcy. The Suzuki group
moved all its business to another company, Nissho, reorganized as a stock
company in 1928.43The original Suzuki company undertook all repayment
and restructuring activities and was dissolved in 1933 after repaying all of
its debts. During this six-year restructuring, no creditors’ meeting took
place, and the Japanese courts never declared Suzuki bankrupt. In their in-
vestigations, the Suzuki group’s creditors found no book fudging whatso-
ever, and accepted that the collapse was an honest ﬁnancial and manage-
ment failure. They unanimously agreed to settle all remaining accounts
privately. In this process no overseas clients of the Suzukis’ were adversely
aﬀected either.
Because the failure was purely ﬁnancial and managerial, the Suzuki
pyramid still contained viable ﬁrms with signiﬁcant assets. These, realizing
Kaneko’s worst nightmares, fell to the other major zaibatsuas Suzuki debts
were settled. The primary buyers were Mitsui and Mitsubishi, which accu-
mulated all of the Suzuki group’s most promising business units plus the
Taiwan Bank. This consolidation signiﬁcantly raised concentration ratios
in certain industries. For example, 84 percent of Taiwan’s sugar production
was now under the control of three zaibatsu: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Fu-
jiyama. Intangible assets, notably the many exclusive distribution rights
the Suzuki group owned, were transferred to Mitsui Bussan (Mitsui and
Co.) and Mitsubishi Shoji (Mitsubishi Corp.), the general trading ﬁrms of
those groups.
Suzuki had been willing to take risks. The established zaibatsu groups,
such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, had been much more cautious.
After acquiring Suzuki’s chemical companies—including plants, patents,
engineers, and scientists—Mitsui established a major ammonia produc-
tion facility. Mitsui clearly used research conducted by the former Suzuki
companies, whereas Mitsui itself would never have paid for such re-
search—at least without large government subsidies. Thus, although the
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43. Nissho Company continued as a general trading ﬁrm and merged with Iwai Trading
Company in 1968 to form the present Nissho Iwai Corporation. Their web site (http://
www.nisshoiwai.co.jp/in/e/index2.html) presents their corporate history involving the Suzuki
Shoten.Suzuki group ultimately failed, it still probably made a major contribution
to Japan’s subsequent development.44
7.4.3 Post Mortem
Kaneko (1928) himself reﬂected on the collapse of the Suzuki zaibatsu
and summarized the reasons for its collapse. In Kaneko’s opinion, a highly
centralized management system imposed on widely disparate ﬁrms pre-
vented proper monitoring and was the most important reason for Suzuki’s
ruin. Second, Kaneko reﬂects that Suzuki companies had too much debt
capital requiring too high interest payments given the recessionary envi-
ronment, noting that the “high cost of debt capital subsequently killed us.”
The two reasons Kaneko lists correspond precisely to the diﬀerences
noted above between the Suzuki pyramid and the zaibatsu that survived,
such as Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi. The Suzuki group’s organiza-
tional weakness, as pointed out by Kaneko himself, was its overly central-
ized management. The Suzuki group’s ﬁnancial weakness stemmed from
its extensive use of debt ﬁnancing from a single bank. Kaneko, quoted by
Nissho (1968), explains that “the proﬁts earned by Suzuki Shoten’s hard
work should be monopolized by the Suzuki family. I would rather borrow
money from banks than pay proﬁts out as dividends.” The two reasons
were not unrelated, for this statement is often interpreted to mean that
Kaneko wanted to maintain Suzuki family control in order to preserve his
own control. This left Taiwan Bank’s loan portfolio highly concentrated in
Suzuki companies—and essentially an organ bank for the group. In con-
trast, by 1912 most Mitsui companies were already able to grow on re-
tained earnings and equity issues. The Mitsui Bank was not needed as an
organ bank, and lent extensively to companies outside the Mitsui group.
Table 7.9 shows quite stable relationships between deposits and loan bal-
ances for the six largest zaibatsu banks for the early 1930s.
A third reason, which Kaneko does not mention, for the Suzuki group’s
collapse is that he expanded the Suzuki group too fast and in the wrong di-
rections. He certainly failed to foresee the chronic weakness of the Japan-
ese economy through the 1920s. Had the 1920s economy in Japan resem-
bled that in the United States, Suzuki might well have prospered. However,
in retrospect, the more risk-averse strategies of the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and
Sumitomo groups proved superior. Moreover, Suzuki missed some of the
most proﬁtable new industries of the 1920s, such as electrical machinery.
The Suzuki group was vulnerable to a downturn because, unlike Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, it lacked a reliably highly proﬁtable mining op-
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44. After the collapse of Suzuki, Kaneko set up a holding company, Taiyo Soda, in 1931,
with which he began another business career. He died in Borneo in 1944, while engaged in alu-
minum processing. Takahata was at his deathbed. Kaneko, with help from Nissho, developed
Taiyo Soda (renamed Taiyo Sangyo in 1939) into a holding ﬁrm controlling twenty-ﬁve com-
panies, including Kobe Steel Works.eration to serve as a cash cow for the entire groups during downturns. It is
also sometimes argued that the lack of mining in its industrial portfolio
prevented Suzuki from vertically integrating into electrical machinery,
which provided an additional ﬁnancial cushion for the Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
and Sumitomo zaibatsu.
A fourth reason, which Kaneko also fails to note, is that he was quite
ham-ﬁsted at lobbying. An interesting aspect of Kaneko’s personality was
that he apparently had no interest in personal wealth. He did not beneﬁt
personally in any way from his business dealings. He likewise could not
comprehend that politicians might value money, and he refused to make
any payments to bureaucrats or politicians. During the Meiji period,
rent-seeking investments seem to have been important aspects of the
business strategies of the other zaibatsu, and they probably played some
role in Mitsui and Mitsubishi taking over state mining operations. Tou-
suke Fukuzawa (1868–1938), a successful entrepreneur and well-known
industrialist responsible for much of the development of Japan’s electric
power industry in the early decades of the twentieth century, argues that
this was the biggest reason for the Suzuki group’s collapse and that Japan
should thank Kaneko deeply for not contributing to political corrup-
tion.45 A less laudatory interpretation is that Kaneko relished power
rather than wealth and failed to understand that others viewed life diﬀer-
ently. In any event, Kaneko’s lack of preexisting political connections cer-
tainly hurt him, and his last-minute attempts to manipulate the Diet
backﬁred badly.
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Table 7.9 Six largest zaibatsu banks’ deposits and loans, 1931–37 (in millions of yen)
Date Mitsui Mitsubishi Daiichi Sumitomo Yasuda Sanwa
June 1931 710 (413) 647 (313) 659 (371) 684 (402) 610 (438)
June 1932 620 (441) 616 (344) 648 (394) 679 (423) 607 (460)
December 1932 687 (429) 640 (317) 703 (399) 735 (447) 664 (479)
June 1933 696 (386) 705 (324) 769 (406) 815 (472) 730 (507)
December 1933 715 (409) 661 (274) 787 (418) 798 (461) 740 (511) 1,025 (519)
June 1934 759 (366) 696 (259) 816 (409) 827 (426) 800 (519) 1,063 (489)
December 1934 748 (383) 722 (265) 852 (422) 872 (466) 807 (548) 1,077 (496)
June 1935 759 (380) 752 (265) 868 (432) 886 (471) 818 (571) 1,080 (494)
December 1935 796 (451) 730 (294) 913 (448) 952 (522) 832 (578) 1,114 (494)
June 1936 824 (437) 805 (341) 940 (450) 970 (543) 891 (616) 1,151 (526)
December 1936 856 (518) 810 (370) 972 (545) 1,017 (618) 928 (679) 1,197 (532)
June 1937 904 (531) 903 (441) 1,054 (657) 1,093 (691) 1,023 (744) 1,263 (577)
Source: Mitsubishi Bank (1954).
Note: Loans in parentheses.
45. Fukuzawa (1930) regards Kaneko more highly than Iwasaki, the Mitsubishi zaibatsu’s
founder.7.4.4 The Culling of the Zaibatsu and Their Banks
Although the fall of the Suzuki zaibatsuwas the most spectacular, it was
not an isolated event. The 1920s depressions felled many other pyramidal
groups. The Nakazawa, Watanabe, and Matsusaka zaibatsu also collapsed
about the same time as the Suzuki zaibatsu.
Like the Suzuki group, these families preserved control by using loans
from their group banks to ﬁnance group companies. Thus, like the Taiwan
Bank, the Nakazawa, Watanabe, and Matsusaka banks were organ banks
of their zaibatsu—heavily dependent on interest payments from their re-
spective group companies. When key nonﬁnancial companies in each of
these zaibatsu encountered ﬁnancial diﬃculty, the group bank failed and
the rest of the zaibatsu then collapsed.
Moreover, these organ banks were located deep in their pyramids. Con-
sequently, tunneling would have concentrated losses and debts in the
banks, with income and assets rising toward the apex ﬁrms. In contrast, the
banks of the Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi zaibatsu were near the
apexes of those pyramids. Consequently, tunneling would have concen-
trated income and assets in the banks, with losses and debts sinking toward
the lower-tier ﬁrms.
Noting this pattern, Kato (1957) proposes the so-called organ bank hy-
pothesis. This hypothesis holds that certain banks were excessively tightly
connected to their zaibatsuindustrial companies, made easy loans to those
companies, failed, and caused the Showa ﬁnancial crisis in 1927. Okazaki
and Yokoyama (2001) present empirical evidence supporting this hypoth-
esis.
Since the stability of a country’s banking system has positive externali-
ties, there may be a public policy lesson here. Countries whose major banks
are parts of pyramidal groups should encourage the positioning of banks
near the apexes of those groups.
7.5 The Centrally Planned Economy under the Military Government
As the economy staggered, an anti-Westernization backlash grew. In
part, this was a result of Japan’s successful adoption of many Western
ideas. Japanese, now educated and middle class, chafed at Western arro-
gance when the Americans and British rejected Japan’s proposal for a ra-
cial equality clause in the League of Nations Covenant. A revival of con-
servative and nationalistic feelings renewed interest in bushido.
Japan had taken Taiwan from China in 1895, gained a foothold in
Manchuria by defeating Russia in 1905, annexed Korea in 1910, and in-
stalled the emperor of China in a puppet government in Manchuria in
1931. These victories amid economic stagnation elevated the prestige of the
military and weakened that of the political and business elite.
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politicians. Navy and army oﬃcers soon held most important public
oﬃces,including that of prime minister. Japan attacked China in 1937, and
by 1942 it had conquered Hong Kong, Indochina, Singapore, Indonesia,
and Burma, proclaiming a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.
To support the war eﬀort and further consolidate its power, the military
government enacted laws that stripped shareholders of their corporate
governance powers. Japan was soon a rigidly centrally planned economy.
Although zaibatsu families retained titular ownership of control blocks,
they had little say in management, and dividends were restricted so that
earnings could be reinvested patriotically. The military government deni-
grated the families’ objections as unpatriotic shareholder ﬁxation on cur-
rent dividends. Thus, by 1945, Japan had an economy little diﬀerent from
that of Russia in the 1920s.46
7.5.1 The Military Buildup
By the mid-1930s, Japan was recovering from its prolonged bout of de-
pressions. In part, this was because the yen depreciated sharply after Japan
left the gold standard, triggering a surge in textile exports.47 This deprecia-
tion also gave domestic heavy industry and chemical industry ﬁrms an ad-
vantage over imports, allowing them to expand (Teranishi 2000).
In part, the recovery also probably stemmed from Finance Minister
Korekiyo Takahashi’s adoption of Keynesian policies at the end of 1931,
when the government issued deﬁcit-covering bonds underwritten by the
Bank of Japan that were then sold to city banks. The government spent the
proceeds on public works and military industries, which further increased
demand for heavy and chemical industry products.
And in part, the recovery was due to the Manchurian Incident of Sep-
tember 1931, when a bomb ripped through a Japanese-built railway near
Mukden (Shenyang). The Japanese Kwantung army, or Kantogun, which
planted the bomb while guarding the railway, used the incident as a pretext
to occupy Southern Manchuria despite the government’s direct order to
withdraw. A subsequent military buildup elevated demand for chemicals
and heavy industry products.
Rising military spending seemed increasingly linked to economic pros-
perity in the minds of business leaders, politicians, and ordinary Japanese.
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46. See Okazaki (1994) for details. Wartime Japan was, of course, not a communist coun-
try. However, the economic structure imposed by its extreme right military government was
surprisingly similar to that of Russia in the 1920’s, as described by Hoskins (1992).
47. Japan abandoned the gold standard in September 1917, along with many other coun-
tries. After World War I, many other countries promptly returned to the gold standard, but
Japan delayed doing so until January 1930. It then abandoned the gold standard again in De-
cember 1931. For details, see Ogura (2002).When the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the Japanese
government mobilized the economy, emphasizing military-related indus-
tries and shifting production away from light industries, like textiles. Table
7.10 illustrates. This rapid change in Japan’s industrial structure, in turn,
had a major impact on the corporate sector.
The older zaibatsu—Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi—had ex-
panded aggressively into heavy industries and chemicals from the early
1930s on, ﬁnancing this expansion with equity issues. Table 7.11shows that
these became their most proﬁtable operations in the 1940s, accounting for
about 30 percent of the ﬁfty most proﬁtable ﬁrms. Thus, while the number
of established zaibatsuﬁrms in the top ﬁfty did not change greatly, their in-
dustrial composition did.
Until the early 1930s the ﬁrst-tier subsidiaries in the zaibatsu pyramids,
except Mitsubishi, were almost wholly owned by members of the zaibatsu
family and the apex ﬁrms collectively, as shown in table 7.12. In the 1930s,
however, the zaibatsu listed these ﬁrst-tier subsidiaries. This was because
the families saw immense proﬁt opportunities in rapidly growing military-
related industries if they moved quickly, as illustrated in table 7.13. Super-
ﬂuous stakes in control chains throughout the established pyramids were
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Table 7.10 Japanese production output by industry, 1929 and 1942 (in 1,000 yen)
1929 1942
Rank Industry Output Industry Output
1 Raw silk 795,599 Iron and steel 2,626,512
2 Cotton yarn 678,466 Navy and army arsenals 2,294,100
3 Electric power 658,316 Aircraft 1,930,400
4 Broad cotton fabrics 526,096 Guns, bullets, and weapons 1,915,242
5 National railways 517,795 National railways 1,441,921
6 Japanese sake 302,120 Electric power 1,375,943
7 Coal mining 245,762 Coal mining 1,077,769
8 Private railways 232,254 Shipbuilding 858,377
9 Military ordinance 208,537 Industrial chemicals 785,169
10 State-run steel mills 189,551 Special steel 753,170
11 Printing 186,304 Electrical machinery 633,292
12 Wool fabrics 176,896 Medicine 630,800
13 Steel products 173,833 Private railways 560,337
14 Sugar 158,125 Lumber 551,600
15 Flour milling 134,895 Pig iron 502,631
16 Chemical fertilizers 132,711 Raw silk 463,098
17 Broad silk fabrics 129,516 Metal machine tools 449,442
18 Lumber 112,170 Coke 421,210
19 Nonferrous metal mining 108,204 Cotton yarn 327,520
20 Copper 108,166 Tools 323,895
Source: Yamazaki (1988, p. 13).Table 7.11 Group aﬃliations of the ﬁfty ﬁrms with highest net proﬁts
1929 1943 1955 1973 1984




Zaibatsu total 16 25 23 23 19











Keiretsu totalb 23 23 19
“Old” keiretsu total 11 14 11
“New” keiretsu total 12 9 8
Fuji 4 5 3
Sanwa 5 2 3
Daiichi-Kangyo 3 2 2
Independent 29 14 25 24 27
Source: Yamazaki (1988, p. 17).
aIn 1943 three Manchurian ﬁrms are double-counted to be aﬃliated with both the govern-
ment and the Nissan zaibatsu.
bFor the post-WWII years, ﬁrms with two keiretsuaﬃliations, such as Hitachi, Ltd., and Nip-
pon Express, are counted as independent.
Table 7.12 Number of ﬁrst-tier subsidiaries and stockholding ratios (1928)
Stockholding ratio
Number
of ﬁrst-tier  Shares held by family  Shares held by all members 
Zaibatsu subsidiaries and headquarters (%) of the same zaibatsu (%)
Mitsui 6 90.2 90.6
Mitsubishi 10 69.4 77.6
Sumitomo 13 79.1 80.5
Yasuda 12 31.7 48.1
Furukawa 4 72.8 89.4
Asano 6 50.8
Okura 20 84.7 92.7
Source: Takahashi (1930b).sold to the public to raise capital for expansion. Thus, the stakes of zaibatsu
companies in their subsidiaries declined signiﬁcantly between 1929 and
1943 (table 7.14).
Table 7.11 shows that the newer zaibatsu were also present in these prof-
itable sectors, with eight of their aﬃliates among the most proﬁtable ﬁrms
of 1943. Most notably, Japan Industries represents Nissan, Japan Nitroge-
nous Fertilizer represents Nichitsu, Nippon Soda represents Nisso, Mori
Industrial Enterprises represents Mori, and the Physical and Chemical Re-
search Institute represents Riken. Recall that many of these newer zaibatsu
groups were developed by single entrepreneur chemists or engineers.
The number of independents among the most proﬁtable ﬁrms fell from
twenty-nine to fourteen, perhaps in part because of the state’s increased
control over the zaibatsu. Table 7.15 reveals the decreasing controlling
family stakes in independent enterprises, as these ﬁrms issued ever more
equity to ﬁnance expansion. By 1943, family holding company stakes were
less than the stakes of state-controlled banks, like the Industrial Bank of
Japan, which were now the most signiﬁcant shareholders in many inde-
pendent ﬁrms.48
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Table 7.13 Shareholding by large block holders
1919 1936
No. of sample ﬁrms 379 477
Holdings by large shareholders
No. of large shareholders (%) 0.59 0.36
Shares held by large shareholders (%) 21.0 37.4
Shares held by other types of shareholders
Individuals (%) 15.5 5.9
Banks (%) 0.8 2.1
Insurance/securities/trust ﬁrms (%)a 0.5 4.8
Corporations (%) 3.1 20.7b
Average number of shareholders per ﬁrm 2,040 3,589
Average number of shares held per shareholder
12 largest shareholders 4,644 17,434
Other 103 95
Source: Takeda (1995).
aInsurance ﬁrms, securities ﬁrms, trust banks, and ﬁrms.
bHolding ﬁrms owned 53.8 percent of these shares owned by corporations.
48. The Industrial Bank of Japan was created in 1900 under the Industrial Bank of Japan
(IBJ) Act, which provided ¥10 million in government money as initial capital and granted it
the privilege of issuing IBJ long-term debentures to raise further funds. The IBJ began oper-
ating as an investment bank in 1902. A 1918 revision of the IBJ Act let it underwrite securi-
ties. The IBJ Act was nulliﬁed in 1950, and the IBJ became an ordinary bank. Also in 1950,
the government passed the Bank Debentures Issuance Act, which let ordinary banks issue
long-term bonds to raise capital. In 1952, after the Allied occupation ended, the Japanese
government abolished the BDI Act and passed the new Long-Term Credit Bank Act. This7.5.2 The March to Serfdom
The military assumed dictatorial powers over the economy in stages.
Thus, the latter part of the 1930s is called the creeping war economy.
This development was possible because the weak economy convinced
many in Japan, as elsewhere, that democracy and free-market capitalism had
failed. Indeed, this view was widespread among business leaders themselves.
In response to the Suzuki failure, the government organized the Council on
Commerce and Industry in 1927. The council recommended a thorough
cartelization of the economy to allow “cooperation” and government edu-
cational measures to induce “patriotic economic behavior” by consumers.
The Ottawa Imperial Conference erected tariﬀs around the British Com-
monwealth, shutting Japan out of her best markets, and the ensuing break-
down of trade allowed the council’s recommendations to move forward.
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Table 7.14 Changes in zaibatsu structure, 1929–43
Combined stake of
other zaibatsu
companies (%) No. of shareholders
Subsidiary 1929 1943 1929 1943
A. First-tier subsidiaries’ ownership structure
Mitsui Bussan 31 15,155 100 75.8
Mitsui Mining 26 6,912 100 84.8
Mitsubishi Shipbuilding 23 6,912 100 40.9
Mitsubishi Shoji 20 5,940 100 47.2
Sumitomo Steel 14 7,557 100 41.4
B. First-tier subsidiaries that experienced mergers
Oji Paper Co. 6,000 23,516 25.2 3.5
Toshiba Electric 211 5,885 58.4 15.1
1929 1943








designated long-term credit banks and granted them the privilege of issuing long-term bonds
to ﬁnance corporate investment. The IBJ, along with the Long-Term Credit Bank, the Japan
Credit Bank, and the Bank of Tokyo, became a long-term credit bank. For further details, see,
e.g., Patrick (1967) and Tamaki (1995). We are grateful to Richard Sylla for pointing this out.The 1931 Important Industries Law sanctioned cartels run by “control
committees” of oﬃcials, and executives would designate crucial industries
in which cartels should regulate production and prices. Cartels could be
formed in any industry where at least half of the ﬁrms requested it. If two-
thirds of the ﬁrms requested cartelization, the remaining ﬁrms could be
forced into the cartel. The minister could rescind cartel actions only with
the approval of the control committee.49 The control committees, of
course, would end up staﬀed by military personnel.
The mood of the times is well captured by Takahashi (1930a), who
blames shortsighted shareholders who care only for high dividends and
neglect the long-term future of the ﬁrm. He declares that
The primary manifestations of “the degeneration of ﬁrm management”
were the short-sighted attitude towards business management and the
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Table 7.15 Composition of 10 largest stockholders of independent enterprises: 1929 and 1943
Financial Family  holding 
Corporations institutions  companies  Individuals 
(%) (%) (%) (%)
1929
Toyo Spinning 3.1 0.8 1.1 8.0
Osaka Godo Spinning 6.2 2.3 1.9 7.1
Dai Nippon Spinning 5.5 1.1 7.0
Sanjushi Bank 4.6 0.9 2.4 6.9
Yamaguchi Bank 36.2 1.0 33.3 10.7
Kamoike Bank 85.6 82.9 13.3
Dai Nippon Sugar Mfg. 6.9 2.8 2.9 6.0
Dai Nippon Breweries 10.8 2.1 8.7 3.0
Nippon Oil 9.1 1.9 7.2 7.4
Kobe Steel Works
Kawasaki Shipbuilding 17.0 15.9 15.2
Osaka Mercantile Steamship 3.1 1.5 4.4
Meguro-Kamata Electric Railway 28.1 23.5 4.5 30.4
1943
Toyo Spinning (merged) 8.2 2.8 1.1 3.5
Dai Nippon Spinning 7.6 1.8 1.0 3.1
Sanwa Bank (merged) 19.2 4.9 14.2 4.7
Dai Nippon Sugar Mfg. 22.1 17.4 4.7 1.6
Dai Nippon Breweries 13.8 10.8 1.2
Nippon Oil 9.4 2.9 5.6 9.5
Kobe Steel Works 38.7 27.2
Kawasaki Heavy Ind. 29.5 4.2 2.5
Osaka Mercantile Steamship 5.8 1.5 0.4 1.2
Meguro-Kamata Electric Railway 25.5 13.8 2.9 2.2
Source: Yamazaki (1988, p. 38).
49. See Fletcher (1989) for details.inability of management to aim at so-called “business prosperity for 100
years.” . . . [D]egeneration of company management was largely caused
bythe “high handed and short sighted selﬁshness of large stockholders”
and the corruption of the board of directors. (quoted in Okazaki, 1994,
pp. 4–5)
He also asserts that corrupt, inept directors preoccupied with big bonuses
and stock manipulation governed Japan’s large companies and that
It is uncommon to ﬁnd members of the board of directors who acquired
their status and position by virtue of their management ability. A large
number of directors get their position on the board only because of be-
ing large stockholders of the ﬁrm or having special relations in govern-
ment circles. (quoted in Okazaki 1994, p. 233)
Takahashi thus blamed Japan’s economic malaise on corrupt, inept, and
entrenched directors placed in charge of large companies by dint of family
history or political rent seeking. The military largely accepted (or at least
exploited) these views, and concluded not only that it should take over the
task of corporate governance but also that there would be broad public
support for this. They were correct.
Thus followed a creeping nationalization of the banking system and the
zaibatsu. Ironically, Okazaki (1994) argues that zaibatsu ﬁrms were actu-
ally the better performers because their dominant shareholders were more
likely to entrust governance to professional managers. Thus, they ought to
have been less vulnerable to such attacks. This was not the case.
The attack was three-pronged. First, the banking sector was placed un-
der state control. Second, the zaibatsufamilies were isolated and their con-
trol rights negated. Third, a full-ﬂedged central planning system was
erected. It is still a matter of debate whether this strategy was planned from
the beginning or whether the military government simply acted as oppor-
tunities presented themselves.
State control encompassed the banking sector in two ways. First, the
government proposed to stabilize the sector by implementing a one-local-
bank-per-prefecture policy.50 Still traumatized by the recent depressions,
the bankers gratefully accepted this largesse. This objective was achieved
by the end of World War II, reducing the number of banks from 1,402 in
1926 to 377 in 1937 to only 61 in 1945. While this policy did stabilize the
banking sector, it also erected an insurmountable barrier to entry. Bank ﬁ-
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50. The Bank Law of 1927 let the government restructure the banking industry, and the
number of banks fell sharply. This law, which was not substantially revised until 1981, gave
the government considerable ﬂexibility in regulating bank competition. For example, the
Ministry of Finance used it to announce its one-bank-per-prefecture policy in 1933, giving
these banks a degree of monopoly power according to Horiuchi (1999). The policy was im-
plemented fully in the 1940s but temporarily relaxed in the early 1950s when the Ministry of
Finance allowed twelve new small banks. The policy was subsequently tightened again.nancing was now in the hands of a relatively small cadre of people, whom
the military government could either control or replace.
At the same time, the Japanese government increased the amount of
funds supplied by the state-owned long-term credit banks, such as the In-
dustrial Bank of Japan. This made the state a major creditor to many in-
dustrial companies. State banks also increasingly took equity positions,
explaining the observation in table 7.11 that these organizations had be-
come the most signiﬁcant shareholders in many independent companies.
Thus, when the cabinet decided in November 1938 to regulate loans, the
number of banks to be controlled was small and their dependence on state
power was evident to all bankers. By then, most senior economic planners
under Japan’s right-wing military government were Soviet trained.
The military government pried corporate control away from the zaibatsu
families in two steps. Again, it is not clear that this was fully premeditated,
though it might have been.
The ﬁrst step was the conversion of the apex holding companies from
limited partnerships into joint-stock companies. This was done through in-
heritance and dividend income tax reforms in 1937 and 1938 that made
partnerships unviable. Dividend income was subjected to double taxa-
tion—once as corporate income of the partnership and again as personal
dividend income of the family. The latter was at an especially high rate.51
However, if the holding company was a joint-stock company rather than a
partnership, double taxation could be avoided.52By 1940, the holding com-
panies at the apexes of all Japan’s major zaibatsu had been transformed
from partnerships into joint stock companies.
At this point, Nissan was favored over other zaibatsu groups such as
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo by the military government because its
apex ﬁrm, unlike those of the other major zaibatsu, was not family con-
trolled.53 This favored status led to a drastic change in the organization of
the Nissan zaibatsu when Nissan was renamed the Manchurian Heavy In-
dustry Company and recapitalized as a ﬁfty-ﬁfty joint venture with the
Japanese and Manchurian governments. The Manchurian Heavy Industry
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51. The partnership was subject to an income tax of between 18 and 28 percent, depending
on the location of business, plus a capital tax. The same income was then subject to a personal
income tax with a top marginal rate of 65 percent.
52. For details, see Morikawa (1992, p. 213). Corporate income tax was only introduced in
Japan in a 1940 reform, which also increased tax burdens across the board. See Shiomi (1957)
for general information on these changes. Miyamoto (1984) describes the previous tax regime
in detail.
53. Reischauer (1988, p. 305) writes that “by the 1920s and 1920s there was widespread con-
demnation of the zaibatsu, particularly by the supporters of the military, as elements of West-
ern decadence in Japanese society, corrupters of the parliamentary system, and money
grubbing betrayers of Japan’s imperial destiny.” The lives of many zaibatsu leaders were
threatened. For example, Ikuma Dan (1858–1932), a former civil servant and chairman of
Mitsui Gomei (Mitsui Partnership), was assassinated by young naval oﬃcers in front of the
Mitsui Bank in Tokyo in 1932.Company was granted a monopoly on all development projects in Man-
churia.
The government also acquired controlling interests in a variety of previ-
ously independent ﬁrms. However, other zaibatsu ﬁrms remained under
the control of their family shareholders.
The military government’s second step was to cut oﬀ the income of the
zaibatsufamilies. The same November 1938 cabinet decision that regulated
loans also placed dividends under state control. This was justiﬁed as a pa-
triotic measure to build up Japan’s industries by raising retained earnings.
Since the apex companies of the zaibatsu were now joint-stock companies,
the zaibatsu families were entirely dependent on dividends for their in-
come. These were apparently now sharply curtailed. Thus, Asajima (1984),
noting that the Sumitomo group expanded dramatically from 1937 to 1945
using retained earnings, remarks that “if all the income from dividends is
channeled into paid-up capital, the question arises as to what the Sumit-
omo family relied on for income. This is also unclear at present” (p. 110).
On September 13, 1940, the State Planning Ministry, the Kikakuin, an-
nounced its new Outline of the Establishment of a New Economic Sys-
tem, under which ﬁrms were “set free from the control of shareholders”
and subjected to a system of quantitative production orders. Thus, the
Kikakuin set up full-ﬂedged central planning system, in which it assumed
the role of Gosplan.54 Under this system, the Kikakuin issued production
orders to industry control boards, or toseikai, which in turn issued orders
to individual ﬁrms. The cabinet explicitly commissioned the Kikakuin to
investigate and imitate Soviet best practice. In all of this restructuring,
ﬁrms were seen as consisting of workers and manager/bureaucrats. There
was no mention of shareholders, for they were by now eﬀectively irrelevant.
The Kikakuin also took control of the banking system, directing banks
to transfer capital to ﬁrms in accordance with the central plan.55 The Mit-
subishi apex company began issuing bonds to obtain the needed funds,
while the Mitsubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust Co.—deviating from their
prior practice—began large-scale lending to other Mitsubishi companies.
The planners who set quantitative targets for output also controlled the
prices of goods and services throughout the economy. By early 1945 (the
war ended in August 1945), the state was setting about ten thousand prices.
By 1942, the economy was in a state of crisis because many ﬁrms failed
to meet production quotas. Okazaki (1994) writes that the oﬃcials at the
Kikakuin now realized that ﬁrms were still thinking about production in
terms of making proﬁts, and were not willing to “bear sacriﬁces” despite
the removal of stockholder inﬂuence.
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54. Gosplan () was the command and control section of the Soviet government.
Okazaki (1994) states that Kikakuin was explicitly modeled on Gosplan and staﬀed by
Soviet-trained personnel.
55. See Horiuchi (1999) for details.The government responded in two ways. First, the February 1943 Out-
line of Emergency Measures for Price Controls organized a system
whereby the government would raise producer prices through subsidized
spending. Thus, market forces were allowed back into the system, though
in a very restricted way. Second, the Munitions Corporation Law of 1943
required each company to have one “responsible person” who was to be
“accountable” for the company’s achieving its production quota. All
workers had an unconditional duty to obey all orders of the responsible
person. Thus, rather tougher corporate governance standards were estab-
lished.
Whenthe U.S. occupation force entered Japan in 1945, they thus entered
a country that, though a former right-wing dictatorship, was nonetheless
virtually as centrally planned as many Eastern European countries were in
1989. While economic historians sometimes write that the zaibatsu were
dismantled and the banking system was reorganized under the U.S. occu-
pation, this is perhaps an overstatement. The zaibatsufamilies had already
lost control, and the banking system was already changed beyond recogni-
tion from its prewar structure. The issue of whether or not to destroy the
prewar system was moot. The real question was whether to rebuild it as it
had been or as something diﬀerent.
7.6 MacArthur Brings Anglo-American Capitalism to Japan
General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander of the Allied
powers (SCAP) and military governor of Japan under the U.S. occupation
from 1945 to 1952, apparently shared his predecessors’ suspicion of pow-
erful business families. Certainly, zaibatsu companies increased their mar-
ket power during the war and played important roles in providing military
equipment and supplies to the Imperial Army.56 However, the zaibatsu
families’ involvement in these activities remains unclear. Although no fan
of socialism, MacArthur let a cadre of New Dealers introduce SCAP
economic policies aimed at dismantling the zaibatsu.57 Prominent among
these eﬀorts were the reorganization of the banking industry and the re-
structuring of former zaibatsu member ﬁrms as freestanding widely held
ﬁrms of the sort that had recently replaced pyramidal groups under the
new Deal in the United States.58 Hostile takeovers and greenmail ensued
under Japan’s brief, but action-packed, adventure in Anglo-American cor-
porate governance.
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56. See Yafeh (2000).
57. Dower (2000) describes MacArthur’s orchestration of anti-Communist purges, his vast
antired censorship system, and his distinctly right-wing approach to dealing with unions.
58. The New Deal broke up pyramidal groups in the United States by subjecting intercor-
porate dividends to taxes and by proscribing intercorporate ownership in public utilities. See
Becht and DeLong (chap. 11 in this volume) and Morck (2005) for details.7.6.1 The Agenda of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
Following World War II, the U.S. occupation oversaw a full-scale re-
vamping of Japan’s corporate and ﬁnancial systems along the lines of the
U.S. systems. This revamping, while immensely complicated, has two key
elements that relate to the topic at hand. Both were copies of reforms en-
acted in the United States under Roosevelt’s New Deal.
First, banks could no longer underwrite securities, as in the United
States under the Glass Steagall Act of 1933, a key plank of the New Deal.
Although the U.S. government exerted considerable pressure for a com-
plete ban on bank ownership of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms’ stock, along the lines
of U.S. practice, the Allied forces ultimately decided against this. Banks’
share ownership in other companies was limited to 5 percent stakes. This
eﬀectively prevented banks from being situated near the apex of a pyramid.
Nevertheless, banks remained equity blockholders in their clients and
other ﬁrms.59
Second, MacArthur permanently broke up large pyramidal groups, as
Roosevelt did in the United States via the New Deal. Despite the military’s
usurpation of corporate governance power, the zaibatsu families’ share-
holdings remained on the books. In 1950, MacArthur ordered their shares
conﬁscated, all intercorporate blockholdings unwound, and the senior ex-
ecutives of zaibatsu ﬁrms purged.
The primary reasons the SCAP used to justify the breakup of the zai-
batsu was their alleged market power. Thus, the Department of State and
the War Department jointly reported in 1946 that
The almost complete zaibatsucontrol of banks and ﬁnancial institutions
prevented independent businesses from getting needed ﬁnancing; zai-
batsu-controlled distribution systems could cut oﬀthe supply of raw ma-
terials and supplies needed by independent businesses entirely; similarly,
selling independent business’s [sic] ﬁnished products outside strictly lo-
cal markets required the cooperation of the zaibatsu trading houses,
which largely controlled Japan’s distribution systems; and zaibatsuﬁrms
were able to cripple small ﬁrms by pirating their key employees and
skilled workmen. These practices, and the independents’ respect for not
violating zaibatsu’s territories, prevented meaningful competition from
existing in Japanese markets.
The SCAP seemed intent on removing barriers to entry for political as
well as economic reasons. The revamping it supervised was clearly in-
tended to democratize the economy and encourage a new cadre of entre-
preneurs. Hadley (1970, p. 19) writes that
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59. This let banks become major players in the postwar horizontal keiretsu, a unique Japa-
nese form of industrial organization that emerged after the U.S. withdrawal.the aim of the Allied economic deconcentration program was to give all
Japanese businessmen the opportunity to engage in the modern sector of
the economy, that is, to remove those conditions which preserved this
sector for chosen few, those conditions which in fact made it a private
collectivism.
Whether zaibatsu would have exercised an unhealthy degree of market
power in a free-market postwar economy is academic. Certainly, their mar-
ket shares had grown substantially in the 1930s and 1940s under the con-
trolled economy. Historically, Japan always had some sectors in which
competition was keen and entry open. However, especially after the demise
of the Suzuki zaibatsu,the remaining large pyramidal groups came to hold
substantial market shares in many key industries, as shown in table 7.5. The
central planners of the military government had little interest in entrants
and preferred directing the aﬀairs of large companies. Dealing with many
companies instead of a few simply made the transmission of orders more
complicated.
7.6.2 The Incomplete Process of Zaibatsu Dissolution
Toimplement MacArthur’s order to “dissolve large industrial and bank-
ing combines,” the Japanese government established the Holding Com-
pany Liquidation Commission (HCLC). The HCLC designated ten com-
bines and eighty-three holding companies for dissolution. The zaibatsu
core families and their relatives were ordered to surrender their shares in
exchange for ten-year nonnegotiable government bonds.60 Thus, no prop-
erty was formally conﬁscated without compensation. Indeed, the old
shareholders initially appeared generously compensated for their property.
However, the subsequent inﬂation made the government bonds almost
valueless.
The hired managers of zaibatsucompanies, many of whom were compe-
tent, were purged by the SCAP. This probably created a shortage of able
managers that persisted at least through the early 1950s. More extensive
purges in zaibatsu than in other ﬁrms might explain Yafeh’s (1995) ﬁnd-
ing of poorer accounting performance by former zaibatsu ﬁrms in 1953.
This could also explain depressed values for these same ﬁrms, as reported
by Miyajima (1994, table 10). After the occupation ended in 1952, many
purged managers returned in various capacities.
In contrast to the purgings of corporate executives, Noguchi (1998) re-
ports that Japanese bureaucrats were, to a large extent, untouched. While
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60. Tamaki (1976, p. 453) records that the HCLC redistributed about 166 million shares,
nominally worth ¥7.6 billion in paid-in capital, from these holding companies and ﬁfty-six
zaibatsu family individuals. The ﬁrms designated for dissolution constituted about 42 percent
of the paid-in capital of the corporate sector, or about ¥18.4 billion.21,000 managers were purged from other sectors of Japanese society, only
2,000 bureaucrats, mostly from the Ministry of the Interior, were
chucked. Most notably, only nine bureaucrats of the Ministry of Finance
were purged. This was important, for the Ministry of Finance worked to
alter or circumvent SCAP orders regarding many policy matters, often
aggressively. Indeed, Hadley (1970, p. 15) mentions the deep puzzlement
the U.S. personnel involved in this policy felt at the support business
groups, individuals, and Japanese government oﬃcials provided for this
interference. Overall, the implemented zaibatsu dissolution policies left
considerable wiggle room for the Japanese government to permit business
interests to organize new business groups along the lines of former zai-
batsu groups.
For example, we noted above that several alternative deﬁnitions of zai-
batsuare advanced by Japanese and foreign students of the Japanese econ-
omy. This ambiguity also aﬀected the non-Japanese personnel supervising
the postwar revamping of the economy, and may have been in part respon-
sible for the less than complete implementation of the original dissolution
plan. Thus, the HCLC decided not to disassemble the small group built
around Japan Nitrogenous Fertilizer Company, the Nippon Chisso Hiryo
zaibatsu, because its founder died in 1944 and it was therefore not really a
zaibatsu (Hadley 1970, p. 21).
The SCAP used market share as the primary determinant of whether a
zaibatsu was in need of dissolution. This had several odd eﬀects. For ex-
ample, the banking sector, in which no single bank held a clearly dominant
market share, was left relatively untouched throughout the occupation,
save that banks had to disgorge their shares in nonﬁnancial companies in
excess of 5 percent stakes. Many pyramidal structures in nonﬁnancial sec-
tors also remained in place and were carried over to the postwar era in the
formation of vertical keiretsu, also called capital keiretsu.
Confronted with a deepening cold war and the rising inﬂuence of the
Soviet Union in the Paciﬁc, policymakers in Washington deemphasized
MacArthur’s restructuring plans and sought to reconstruct Japan as rap-
idly as possible to defend the region jointly with the United States.61 The
HCLC was thus left to its own interpretation of its orders.
7.6.3 The Subsequent Stock Market Collapse
The SCAP closed Japan’s stock exchanges in September 1945 and re-
opened them on May 16, 1949. Table 7.16 shows the de jure shareholdings
of the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda zaibatsu in 1945. The
SCAP transferred these shares, and most other intercorporate block hold-
ings, to employees and other assigned investors. Employees and other se-
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61. This policy shift actually became evident when Ridgeway succeeded MacArthur in mid-
1950, well before the end of the occupation of Japan in April 1952.lect groups could buy these shares at very low prices, and in many cases the
shares were virtually or actually given away.62 This greatly diluted the eq-
uity of many of the companies involved and sharply reduced their share
prices. Because the larger zaibatsu contained the most extensive cross-
holdings, instances where subsidiaries also hold stock in their parent com-
panies or in which subsidiaries hold stock in each other, the impact of this
dilution was especially severe in those ﬁrms.
Figure 7.10 explains the dilution eﬀect and assumes for simplicity that
the intercorporate equity blocks were simply given to employees or other
favored investors. The upper panel shows a cross-holding arrangement,
common within pyramids. The family-controlled Firm A owns one mil-
lion shares in its subsidiary, Firm B, but B in turn owns one million shares
in the parent Firm A. Each lists its shares in the other as assets and its div-
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Table 7.16 Ownership structures of top four zaibatsu in 1945
Percent stakes of zaibatsu parties
Zaibatsu Firms Shares Family Apex ﬁrm First-tier ﬁrms Total
Mitsui 1 10,000 63.6 0.9 64.5
First-tier ﬁrms 10 17,979 9.5 53.9 11.9 75.3
Second-tier ﬁrms 13 9,038 0.0 35.9 17.2 53.1
Mitsubishi 1 4,800 47.8 10.8 58.6
First-tier ﬁrms 11 41,234 1.4 28.9 15.3 47.5
Second-tier ﬁrms 16 8,053 0.2 18.2 40.3 58.7
Sumitomo 1 600 83.3 16.7 100.0
First-tier ﬁrms 17 34,312 8.4 19.5 16.6 44.5
Second-tier ﬁrms 6 5,325 0.5 12.7 30.7 43.9
Yasuda 1 300 100.0 100.0
First-tier ﬁrms 20 9,469 3.5 24.3 17.8 45.6
Second-tier ﬁrms 12 3,860 0.1 16.9 15.3 32.3
Sources: HCLC (1950), Ministry of Finance (1983)
62. Tamaki (1976, p. 454) records that the HCLC sold about 23 percent of holding compa-
nies’ and zaibatsu families’ former shares to employees. The rest were sold through a variety
of general, special, and regional auctions, via underwriters or to trust accounts. Employees
could each buy up to ¥30,000 of shares at deeply reduced prices, and each manager could buy
up to 1 percent. Employees and executives typically cashed out when the stock markets re-
opened in 1949. For example, Mitsui Bussan, prior to its dissolution, had 7,050 employees.
Many of these workers, who lost their jobs after the dissolution, used the cash so raised to set
up new companies to take over their former employers’ business. The SCAP prohibited any
new company from employing more than 100 workers, not including executives, who formerly
worked for either Mitsui Bussan or Mitsubishi Corporation, and prohibited any new com-
pany from involving in any way more than one person who was a manager of any rank, con-
sultant, or executive of either Mitsui Bussan or Mitsubishi Corporation. Former employees
of Mitsui Bussan are thought to have set up as many as 220 small companies to take over for-
mer Mitsui Bussan business while satisfying the legal requirement. The corresponding ﬁgure
for the Mitsubishi Corporation was 140.idends from the other as income, so each has assets and income twice what
would be the case were they freestanding ﬁrms. Since each has ¥200 mil-
lion in assets and two million shares outstanding, both ﬁrms’ shares are
worth ¥100.
The lower panel shows what happens after dissolution of the sort imple-
mented in Japan by the HCLC. The shares previously held by the zaibatsu
family and the cross-holdings are appropriated by the HCLC and sold to
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Fig. 7.10 How cross-holdings aﬀect the value of shares upon zaibatsu dissolutionother shareholders.63 The funds so raised are kept by the government.
None of the proceeds go to either Firm A or Firm B. Thus, the only assets
in both are now their physical assets, and their only incomes are now their
operating incomes. Yet the number of shares outstanding has not declined
proportionately. Consequently, share prices of both ﬁrms fall by 50 per-
cent.
Cross-holdings of this sort were commonplace. For example, 64 percent
and 59 percent of the outstanding shares of the apex companies of the Mit-
sui and Mitsubishi zaibatsu, respectively, were owned by Mitsui and Mit-
subishi subsidiaries. The holding companies of both the Sumitomo and
Yasuda zaibatsu were actually entirely owned by their respective zaibatsu
subsidiaries. Thus, stock prices plunged as the dissolution was announced
and as the value of the bonds issued as compensation dropped.
Share prices in the immediate postwar period were also depressed be-
cause of the extensive damage the war had inﬂicted on the physical assets
of industrial ﬁrms. To begin rebuilding, ﬁrms issued more new shares,
adding these to the former zaibatsu control block shares ﬂooding the mar-
ket. The SCAP also ordered the government to suspend the promised pay-
ments to munitions suppliers to prevent these ﬁrms from proﬁting oﬀ their
wartime activities. The Corporation Reconstruction and Reorganization
Act of 1946 allowed ﬁrms bankrupted by the nonpayment of wartime in-
demnities to resume operations as “special account companies” and also
allowed ﬁrms’ net losses due to oﬃcial nonpayment to be written oﬀ
(Hoshi 1995). Average paid-in ratios of capital to total assets fell to 10 per-
cent by 1950 (Ministry of Finance 1983). Finally, Yafeh (2004) argues that
the population of potential investors was impoverished and probably
highly risk averse. They consequently rapidly sold the shares the SCAP as-
signed them to ﬁnance consumption and low-risk savings. Table 7.17
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63. See footnote 62.
Table 7.17 New share issues, 1948–53
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
(A) Number of new shares issued 50,094 78,718 39,192 83,644 123,336 91,569
(B) Percent of (A) issued to ﬁnance 
restructuring 30.5 17.0 5.6 0.3
(C) No. of shares released by HCLC 
for zaibatsu dissolution purposes 40,317 39,711 854 996
(D) Average price per share 128.85 74.00 93.8 124.06 156.05
(E) Stock return (%) 4.02 4.65 6.61 7.99 8.02 7.96
(F) Excess return above interest rate –4.80 –4.96 –2.47 –1.22 –1.03 –0.85
Source: Miyajima (1994).
Notes: Figures in rows (A), (C), and (D) are for 1,000 shares.shows the numbers of new shares issued, as well as the shares brought to
the stock market by the HCLC for sale. The shares HCLC brought to the
market amounted to 30 percent of the newly issued shares in 1948, 17 per-
cent in 1949, 5.6 percent in 1950, and 0.3 percent in 1951.
It is clear that the shares freed by the zaibatsu dissolution order had a
major impact on the overall stock market. Although non-zaibatsu ﬁrms
suﬀered smaller stock price declines because their shares were not diluted,
their stocks nonetheless fell as the total amount of equity available to the
public rose. Thus, new shares issued by ﬁrms like Toshiba and Hitachi
fetched low prices.
Several economic measures were introduced in 1949 to stabilize the
Japanese economy. These included ﬁxing the exchange rate and suspend-
ing new loans from the Reconstruction Financing Bank. The latter policy
reduced the supply of funds available to Japanese industry, increased in-
terest rates, and induced even more ﬁrms to issue equity. This, on top of the
other factors listed above, triggered a collapse of the Japanese stock mar-
ket. Table 7.18 shows the drop in stock prices from 1949 to 1950. These
stock price ﬂuctuations are also evident in the ratios of price to capital
stock and market to book, shown in table 7.19.
Over the next few years, ﬁrms shied away from further diluting their eq-
uity by issuing shares at the prices prevailing. During the period 1950–54,
new issues accounted for less than 20 percent of Japanese industrial ﬁrms’
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Table 7.19 Price-capital stock and price-equity ratios for Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and
Sumitomo zaibatsu ﬁrms, 1949–53
Zaibatsu Ratio 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
Mitsubishi W/K 1.61 0.46 0.39 0.72 1.00
W/E 2.43 0.68 0.45 0.75 0.97
Sumitomo W/K 1.96 0.34 0.35 0.78 0.86
W/E 3.22 0.34 0.31 0.68 0.77
Mitsui W/K 0.91 0.27 0.27 0.45 0.57
W/E 1.71 0.34 0.44 0.75 0.80
Source: Miyajima (1994).
Notes: W  average share price; K  ﬁxed capital stock (book value); E  stockholders’ eq-
uity set equal to (total assets [book value] – total debt [book value]). The numbers of ﬁrms in-
cluded for Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Mitsui groups are 15, 8, and 12, respectively.
Table 7.18 Tokyo Stock Exchange price index
1949 1950 1951 1952
Low 98.50 (December) 85.25 (July) 102.20 (January) 167.80 (January)
High 176.88 (September) 114.99 (August) 170.20 (October) 370.56 (December)external ﬁnancing. Short-term bank debt was now becoming the main
source of corporate ﬁnancing.
By the end of the occupation, Japan was an Anglo-Saxon economy, in
that its major ﬁrms were freestanding and widely held. The number of
shareholders rose from 1.7 million in 1945 to 4.2 million in 1950. The zai-
batsu dissolution by SCAP massively redistributed the stocks of Japanese
corporations.64 The shares transferred from the zaibatsu families to the
public by the HCLC amounted to over 40 percent of all corporate assets in
Japan. The consequence was a widely diﬀused ownership of much of the
Japanese corporate sector, with individual shareholders holding 70 percent
of the outstanding shares of typical Japanese corporations in 1949 and
1950 (Bisson 1954).
7.6.4 The New Legal Framework for Shareholders
The SCAP also supervised the enactment of new laws that would shape
Japan’s future business activities.
The Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947 was actually also an antipyramid law.
It prohibited the establishment of holding companies, 25 percent or more
of whose asset base consists of the stock of other ﬁrms; manufacturing
ﬁrms’ owning the stock of other ﬁrms; and ﬁnancial institutions’ owning
more than 5 percent of other ﬁrms. Subsequently, this law was frequently
amended in response to corporate lobbying.
An amendment in 1949 allowed manufacturing ﬁrms to own other ﬁrms,
permitting the formation of vertical (capital) keiretsu, in which large man-
ufacturers partly own other manufacturers. A 1953 amendment increased
the limit of banks’ ownership of industrial ﬁrms from the original 5 percent
to 10 percent. This 10 percent limit was reduced to 5 percent again in 1987.
For most practical purposes these limits had never been a barrier for
Japanese banks intent upon exercising corporate governance power over
their client ﬁrms, particularly those under ﬁnancial distress. Banks often
voted additional shares through controlled ﬁnancial subsidiaries, like in-
surance and trust companies.
The Securities Trading Act of 1948 was designed to protect small share-
holders. An auditor system was also established in 1948, followed by a set
of corporate accounting principles in 1950. In 1951, new depreciation rules
ended ﬁrms’ freedom to determine their own depreciation rates and meth-
ods. These initiatives were signiﬁcant, for prewar Japan had no serious
shareholder rights, accounting standards, auditing procedure rules, public
disclosure rules, or depreciation rules.65
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64. Some authors have found some analogy between this historical event and more con-
temporary privatization of government-owned corporations. See, e.g., Yafeh (1995).
65. See Miyajima (2000).The Japanese commercial code was also revised in 1950 to give small
shareholders rights to access company books and records and to establish
ﬁduciary duties of directors to shareholders. However, the government de-
ﬁned a small shareholder as one with at least 5 percent equity ownership.
In subsequent years, Japanese banks intervening in their client ﬁrms’ man-
agement often used this rule.
7.6.5 The Keiretsu Defense
An active market for corporate control developed quickly. Hostile take-
over bids became high-proﬁle events, and several were launched against
formerzaibatsuﬁrms—including Taisho Marine and Mitsui Real Estate.66
As in the United States and Britain, the possibility of a hostile takeover
appears to have a governance impact greatly out of proportion to the ac-
tual frequency of these events.67 In response to this threat, the managers
of ﬁrms from each former zaibatsu began to act as a group—coordinat-
ing white knight and white squire defensive arrangements to protect their
former aﬃliated companies from hostile takeovers.
In the white knight defense, the target of a hostile bid arranges to be
taken over instead by a friendly company that safeguards the positions of
the target’s top executives. In the white squire defense, the target arranges
for a friendly company to purchase temporarily a large enough block of
target stock to prevent the hostile takeover from succeeding.
These coordinated actions were possible because top managers con-
structed postwar analogs to the family councils that coordinated zaibatsu
aﬀairs prior to the war. Thus, former Mitsubishi ﬁrms’ presidents began
having regular Friday luncheon meetings in June 1946, immediately after
the Mitsubishi family council was formally abolished. The Sumitomo
group began their presidents’ council in 1949, and the presidents of the for-
mer Mitsui companies formed their presidents’ club around 1950. Subse-
quently, these regular meetings of the presidents of former zaibatsu com-
panies all came to be called presidents’ clubs.
Hideki Yokoi was one of the best-known corporate raiders in postwar
Japan. Yokoi became wealthy from dealings with MacArthur’s general
headquarters (GHQ) and, allegedly, in the black market created by prewar
and wartime price controls. With a huge cash hoard, Yokoi launched take-
overs of company after company.
In 1953 he purchased more than 40 percent of the outstanding shares of
Shirokiya, a department store company.68 Yokoi then organized a general
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66. For details of some notable Japanese takeovers and takeover defenses at this time, see
Sheard (1991) and Miyajima (1994).
67. See Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988a,b, 1989) regarding hostile takeovers in the
United States and Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (chap. 10 in this volume) regarding the United
Kingdom.
68. Its major property is now a part of the Tokyu department store in Nihonbashi.stockholders’ meeting, at which he won control of the board. Shirokiya
sued Yokoi, and four days later Yokoi lost control of the company. Yokoi
had to ask Keita Goto, then the chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) of Tokyu, for
mediation. Yokoi (1960) reﬂected on the beneﬁt of his takeover to Shi-
rokiya, noting that
I sacriﬁced myself to do the best for Shirokiya which now is in such great
shape; without my takeover and the following business intervention by
Keita Goto of the Tokyu group, Shirokiya would have been unable to in-
crease its capacity and would have either become a third-rate depart-
ment store or an oﬃce building, closing its 300-year history. (quoted in
Sataka 1994, p. 35)
Yokoi continued launching corporate takeovers over the following two
decades. After Shirokiya, he mounted raids on Toa Oil, Daikyo Oil, Impe-
rial Hotels, Tokai Shipping Line, Toyo Sugar, Shibaura Sugar, Taito Sugar,
Dainippon Sugar, and many other companies. He died in 1998 at the age of
eighty-ﬁve.
A pivotal event in the development of the Anglo-American system in
Japan was the raid by Kyujiro Fujinami against Youwa Properties. By 1952
Fujinami, by then a well-known corporate raider, had purchased 250,000
of the 720,000 outstanding shares of Youwa Properties, a company that
had managed landholdings and other properties for the Mitsubishi group.
Fujinami, a former security guard at the Tokyo Stock Exchange, de-
manded seats on the board of Youwa. The Mitsubishi Bank, together with
the companies run by other members of the Mitsubishi Presidents’ Coun-
cil, oﬀered to pay greenmail and buy back all the shares Fujinami had ac-
quired at a price of ¥1600 per share, well above the market price of ¥240.
This coordinated action was necessary because Japanese law prohibited
ﬁrms from repurchasing their own stock. Youwa thus could not pay its own
greenmail. Mitsubishi group ﬁrms each bought a small block of shares
from Fujinami to avoid contravening the Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947.69
This event is thought to have triggered the realization by top executives
that corporate raids could be blocked by establishing suﬃciently large
crossholdings among former zaibatsu ﬁrms. If each former Mitsubishi zai-
batsu ﬁrm owned a little stock in every other former Mitsubishi zaibatsu
ﬁrm, the members of the Mitsubishi presidents’ club could collectively vote
control blocks in every former Mitsubishi ﬁrm. These ﬁrms would then all
be safe from hostile takeovers, the need to pay greenmail would disappear,
and the company presidents would have secure tenure in their jobs.
This keiretsu defense is a variant of the white knight or white squire de-
fense. In the keiretsu defense, a cadre of friendly companies each take a
small position in the target such that these positions, taken together, add
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69. Subsequently, in 1953 Mitsubishi Estates, Mitsubishi’s main land development com-
pany, absorbed both Youwa and another Mitsubishi realtor, Kantou Properties.up to a control block suﬃcient to deter a hostile takeover. Evidence from
the United States suggests that modest white squire positions can deter
raiders. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988b) argue that management-
aﬃliated blocks as small as 5 percent can deﬂect raids because they give in-
siders a head start in any race to accumulate shares. La Porta et al. (1999)
show that intercorporate stakes of 10 percent confer control rights in zai-
batsu-like pyramidal groups in many countries. Yafeh (2004) summarizes
data on such intercorporate holdings in postwar Japan and shows them to
be in this range or higher.
7.7 Self-Assembling Keiretsu
Japan’s postwar keiretsu formed in two waves. In both, defenses against
corporate takeovers appear to have been the primary motive.70 The ﬁrst
wave, discussed above, took place in the 1950s and involved the self-
organization of keiretsu comprising the former member ﬁrms of the old
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo zaibatsu. The second wave, in the
1960s, saw the self-organization of three new horizontal keiretsu. The Fuji
Bank helped organize the Fuyo keiretsu by orchestrating a network of in-
tercorporate share placements. Simultaneously, the Sanwa Bank helped
construct the Sanwa keiretsu,and the Daiichi Kangyo Bank (DKB) helped
assemble the Dai Ichi Bank keiretsu. In both cases, the banks apparently
sought to insulate the managers of their client ﬁrms from hostile takeovers.
Each keiretsu ﬁrm has a “main securities ﬁrm” or kanji gaisha, with
which it has a long-term relationship. These kanji gaisha usually hold the
group’s cross-holdings equity certiﬁcates in their vaults. Thus, one ﬁrm
cannot sell its cross-holdings in another without notifying the kanji gaisha,
which then notiﬁes the other ﬁrm. Hence, there is a credible promise to be
a “stable shareholder.”71
Recent work by Miwa and Ramseyer (2002) contests much of the praise
for Japan’s keiretsubystudents of corporate strategy, such as Porter (1990).
While we concur that much laudatory discussion of the “Japanese Model”
in the 1980s is problematic, we do not agree with the contention of Miwa
and Ramseyer that keiretsuare fables.72Morck and Nakamura (1999) doc-
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70. Yafeh (1995, 2000, 2004) argues more generally that poor performance caused ﬁrms to
reconﬁgure their ownership structure. Since takeovers and the keiretsu takeover defense are
both instances of ownership structure reconﬁguration and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1988a,b, 1989) argue that poor performance invites hostile takeovers, this argument is not in-
consistent with ours.
71. See Sheard (1994).
72. Note also that Gerlach (1992), Lincoln, Gerlach, and Takahashi (1992), Lincoln, Ger-
lach, and Ahmadjian (1996), and other quantitative sociologists typically ﬁnd that keiretsu
connections are important in unconditional multivariate data analysis. See Aoki (1988) and
Kojima (1997) for a detailed analysis of how Japanese corporate governance was thought to
diﬀer fundamentally from that elsewhere. Many of Aoki’s points have not been refuted.ument a clear pattern of repeated bailouts of weak keiretsu ﬁrms, but not
of otherwise similarly troubled independent ﬁrms. Keiretsu ﬁrms—and
especially keiretsu main banks—were remarkably successful at shaping
Japanese institutions to their advantage. Keiretsu are a genuinely impor-
tant feature of postwar Japan, but their role is primarily to entrench top
corporate management and to safeguard a monotonous stability in Japan’s
list of leading corporations.73
Modern Japanese keiretsu divide into two genres: horizontal keiretsu
and vertical keiretsu.
7.7.1 Horizontal Keiretsu
As noted above, takeover defense arrangements led to groups wherein
member ﬁrms were controlled collectively by all the other ﬁrms in the
group through a multitude of small equity stakes. These groups, called hor-
izontal keiretsu, recreated for their member ﬁrms’ top managers the free-
dom from outside shareholder pressure the zaibatsu had provided. More-
over, since no family holding company exercised control, horizontal
keiretsu also freed top managers from oversight by a controlling share-
holder. Thus, member ﬁrms of the keiretsu of postwar Japan were similar
to the widely held ﬁrms described by Beale and Means (1932), for their top
managers were accountable only to themselves.
But horizontal keiretsu took the Beale and Means ﬁrm a step further.
Because a majority of their companies’ stock was in the hands of white
squires, or stable investors, the managers of keiretsu member ﬁrms had no
need to fear corporate raiders, proxy contests at shareholder meetings, or
institutional investor pressure. They were truly free to run their ﬁrms as
they saw ﬁt, without regard for share value, proﬁts, or dividends. Keiretsu
top managers were thus more insulated from shareholder pressure that was
possible in even the most widely held ﬁrm.
Figure 7.11 illustrates a stylized horizontal keiretsu. The intercorporate
stakes involved are each individually quite small, so that each ﬁrm looks
superﬁcially as if it were widely held. However, only a minority of the stock
in each of the companies is left available to public shareholders and thus to
potential raiders.
As rules against pyramids were relaxed after the U.S. withdrawal, core
keiretsu member ﬁrms began establishing new pyramids, with themselves
at the apex. Thus, horizontal keiretsu in contemporary Japan are best
thought of as clusters of core ﬁrms, each of which controls its own pyramid
of publicly traded subsidiaries in a substructure akin to a prewar widely
heldzaibatsu.It is only the core ﬁrms that collectively control a majority of
each other’s shares through a dense network of individually tiny intercor-
porate equity blocks.
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73. See He, Morck, and Yeung (2004).436 Randall K. Morck and Masao Nakamura
Fig. 7.11 A stylized diagram of a post–World War II horizontal keiretsu
Notes: Large circles represent core member ﬁrms of the keiretsu, which hold small blocks of
stock in each other that collectively sum to control blocks. Each core keiretsu ﬁrm holds con-
trol blocks of lesser keiretsumember ﬁrms, indicated by small circles, and many of these sit at
the apex of their own pyramid of such ﬁrms. For simplicity, only one such nested pyramid is
shown.
7.7.2 Vertical Keiretsu
A second genre of keiretsu,called vertical keiretsu,exhibits a more classi-
cally pyramidal structure. Some are simply industrial zaibatsu that escaped
dissolution. These include Shibaura Manufacturing Works (now Toshiba)
and Hitachi, Ltd. Shibaura was a second-tier member of the Mitsui zaibatsu
and the most important prewar electric appliances manufacturer. In 1939,
it spun oﬀ twelve supplier ﬁrms and acquired control blocks in eight other
companies with which it had close customer-supplier relationships. Toshiba
executives also served as directors of these companies.74Hitachi was part of
the Nissan zaibatsu.By 1937 it had set up its own vertically integrated group
with nine supplier companies within the Nissan group.75 Many of these
74. Tamaki (1976, pp. 154–55) describes Toshiba’s relationships with these ﬁrms in more
detail.
75. See Tamaki (1976, p. 399).Toshiba and Hitachi suppliers still exist and are now members of their re-
spective vertical keiretsu.
However, the ranks of vertical keiretsu also contain new groups. These
arose after the war in certain manufacturing industries, like automobiles
and electric appliances, where product assembly was divisible into discrete
steps, each to be carried out by a separate ﬁrm. Again, white squire take-
over defenses were probably key to their original formation.
Vertical keiretsu are more pyramidal than horizontal keiretsu. An apex
ﬁrm holds control blocks in a ﬁrst tier of key suppliers. Each holds control
blocks in its suppliers, which hold control blocks in yet another tier of sup-
pliers, and so on.
Despite their similarity to prewar industrial zaibatsu, some diﬀerences
justify a new term. Unlike industrial zaibatsu, vertical keiretsu also feature
dense fogs of small intercorporate equity stakes of any number of member
ﬁrms in each other, much as in horizontal keiretsu. For example, Toyota
Motors owns controlling blocks in the range of 15 to 30 percent in each of
its main parts suppliers. Nonetheless, only a minority of the stock in these
suppliers is available to public investors, for holdings by other members
of the Toyota keiretsu raise the total stakes of stable shareholders above
50 percent in each case. Still, as in a prewar zaibatsu, the Toyoda family
has substantial control over Toyota Motors itself.76 Some of the Toyota
keiretsu ﬁrms are spin-oﬀs from Toyota Motors or from other older
keiretsu member ﬁrms. Others are independent ﬁrms that ﬁnd it advanta-
geous to cement their alliances to Toyota by selling control blocks to Toy-
ota ﬁrms, and so joining the Toyota keiretsu.
Another important diﬀerence is that the apex ﬁrm in an industrial zai-
batsu clearly directed activities in all the member ﬁrms of the pyramid. In
contrast, vertical keiretsu ﬁrms are alleged only to coordinate decision
making with the ﬁrms directly above and directly below them in the pyra-
mid. This decentralized planning is said to be possible because the inte-
gration in vertical keiretsu is much tighter, with no superﬂuous ﬁrms that
are not direct parts of the production chain leading to the ﬁnal products of
the apex ﬁrm. Industrial zaibatsu,in contrast, often contained ﬁrms whose
activities were disjoint from their main production chains, and even ﬁrms
in entirely unrelated industries.
7.7.3 Other Firms
Some prewar local zaibatsusurvive in various forms, having escaped the
notice of the SCAP and the HCLC. Some are even controlled by their pre-
war controlling families. One example is the Ito group of Nagoya, which
continues to run Matsuzakaya department stores. Others are the Katakura
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76. As discussed above, Toyota Motors was itself spun oﬀfrom Toyota Jido Shokki, a loom
maker.group of Nagano, whose Katakura Industries remains important in tex-
tiles; the Yasukawa group of Fukuoka, whose Yasuoka Electric remains a
major electric appliance maker; and the Mogi group, based in Chiba pre-
fecture, which controls Kikkoman, the soy sauce maker, and other ﬁrms.77
Finally, just as some ﬁrms in prewar Japan were not parts of zaibatsu,
some ﬁrms in postwar Japan belong to no keiretsu.Some of these independ-
ents have prewar roots. For example, Masatoshi Ito built a small family
clothing business founded in 1920 into Ito Yokado, the largest retail chain in
Japan and owner of Seven-Eleven. Other essentially independent ﬁrms are
entirely postwar phenomena. Prominent examples include Honda and Sony.
Firms represented in the presidents’ clubs of the six major horizon-
tal keiretsu—Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo (formerly Yasuda),
Sanwa, and Daiichi-Kangyo—employed only 4 percent of the total work-
force of all nonﬁnancial listed ﬁrms in 1986–90 but owned in 1990 15 per-
cent of their total assets (14 percent in 1986) and 17 percent of their total
paid-in capital (14 percent in 1986). Also, in 1990, they owned 26 percent
of the outstanding shares of all listed ﬁrms (24 percent in 1986), provided
37 percent of corporate debt of all listed ﬁrms (39 percent in 1986), and
provided 45 percent of the directors of the boards of all listed ﬁrms
throughout the period 1986–90 (Toyo Keizai 1991).
Independent Japanese ﬁrms are either private or narrowly held, usually
with a founding family as the dominant shareholder. At present, Japan has
no large widely held ﬁrms in the Anglo-American sense.
7.7.4 More Deﬁnitional Ambiguities
Like the term zaibatsu, the word keiretsu is deeply ﬂavored with the char-
acteristic Japanese taste for ambiguity. Deciding which, if any, keiretsua ﬁrm
belongs to is usually straightforward. However, there are cases where things
become somewhat convoluted. For example, in addition to having its own
vertical keiretsu, Toyota also belongs to the Mitsui keiretsu. Toyota’s presi-
dent attends meetings of the Mitsui presidents’ club, and Toyota considers
the Mitsui Bank its main bank, even though Toyota has no bank debt. Toyota
participates in Mitsui-wide activities with other Mitsui ﬁrms, like Toshiba.
If one stretches the deﬁnition of a keiretsu somewhat, even independent
ﬁrms like Sony and Honda have group ties. Thus, Sony is sometimes listed
as a member of a “quasi-Mitsui group,” as in Okumura (1976, p. 183), be-
cause of its ties and historical dealings with the Mitsui bank. The primary
reason Sony is not explicitly a member of the Mitsui presidents’ club seems
to be that Toshiba is already a member, and each horizontal keiretsu con-
tains only one company from each industry. This may be a holdover from
the SCAP’s concerns about high market shares. Likewise, Honda has ex-
tensive ﬁnancial ties to the Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank but does not belong to
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77. See, e.g., Fruin (1983).Mitsubishi’s presidents’ club. Again, since Mitsubishi Motors belongs to
the Mitsubishi presidents’ club, there may be no room for Honda. Never-
theless, Honda is sometimes listed as a member of a “quasi-Mitsubishi”
group, as in Okumura (p. 171).
By the end of the 1960s, the widely held ﬁrm had disappeared from the
Japanese economic landscape. Japan’s brief acquaintance with Anglo-
American corporate governance was over, and its current patterns of cor-
porate ownership were essentially in place.
7.7.5 The Former Zaibatsu Banks
Banks were exempt from the SCAP’s zaibatsu dissolution program be-
cause it deemed their market shares all acceptably low. However, the for-
mer zaibatsu families lost ownership of their zaibatsu banks—Teikoku
Bank (a merger of the former Mitsui and Daiichi Banks), Tokyo-
Mitsubishi Bank, Sumitomo Bank, and Yasuda Bank.
The SCAP continued using the banks much as the military government
had—assigning speciﬁc banks to “rubber-stamp” loans to selected strate-
gically important ﬁrms. Thus, ﬁrms’ “main banks” in the 1950s tended to
be their “assigned banks” from the 1940s. Banks also won inﬂuence re-
structuring ﬁrms damaged by wartime losses.78 The shareholding culture
of prewar Japan faded from collective memory, and banks assumed a lead-
ing role in the economy.79
The continuity of this role, and banks’ ties to state planners, give rise to
the so-called 1940s theory. This theory, due to Okazaki and Okuno-
Fujiwara (1993) and Noguchi (1998), proposes that the current managed
market economy originated in wartime Japan.80
Regardless, the SCAP’s attitude toward long-term ﬁnancial institutions
was generally negative, and banks were proscribed from issuing bonds. In
response to a perceived capital shortage in 1952, the year of the U.S. with-
drawal, the government passed the Long-Term Credit Law, which permit-
ted a new type of bank, the long-term credit bank, that could issue bonds
but not take deposits. Other banks, thenceforth known as ordinary banks,
could take deposits but not issue bonds.81 Three major new long-term
credit banks formed: the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Japan Long-Term
Credit Bank, and the Nippon Credit Bank.82
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78. See Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) on the postwar continuation of the wartime system and
on the banks’ roles in postwar restructuring.
79. See Hoshi and Kashyap (2001).
80. See Hamada (1998) for a critique of this view.
81. At present, this structure of the Japanese banking system is the subject of considerable
debate. There has already been a degree of reform, and further reforms would appear likely.
82. The IBJ, which practiced investment banking since 1900 under the Industrial Bank of
Japan Act, became an ordinary bank in 1950 when the IBJ Act was repealed. The IBJ resumed
its special status as an investment bank in 1952 when the new Long-Term Credit Bank Act
was created. For details, see footnote 48.Most extant banks, including all the former zaibatsu banks, chose to be
ordinary banks. This was because they had large established deposit and
short-term lending businesses that generated signiﬁcant proﬁts before the
war and looked set to do so again. By remaining ordinary banks, they
could tap Japan’s high household savings rate and lend to large corpora-
tions on a year-to-year basis. Despite their formal short-term structure,
these loans were often really long term, in that they were rolled over indef-
initely.
The former zaibatsu banks retained most of their prewar business rela-
tionships with their fellow former zaibatsumember ﬁrms and were referred
to as the main banks of these client ﬁrms (Teranishi 1999). These networks
of relationships were critical in the formation of the keiretsu in the 1950s
and 1960s, for the former zaibatsu banks often organized the white squire
equity placements that constitute the keiretsu.
This regulatory fragmentation of the Japanese banking system meant
that main banks sometimes had inadequate capital to accommodate their
largest clients’ borrowing needs. In response, the Bank of Japan permitted
syndicated loans.
Under the syndicated bank loan system, a large borrower’s main bank
took charge of organizing a syndicate of banks that could collectively meet
the borrower’s ﬁnancing needs. The main bank apparently was expected to
take a lead role in monitoring the borrower, to take charge of correcting
any impending problems, and to take a disproportionately large hit in the
event of a default.83 This pattern continues in recent cases of defaulting
ﬁrms, where the main bank becomes the “special manager” of a ﬁrm un-
der reorganization.
Banks were thought to collect substantial private information about
each other and about Japanese ﬁrms in general via syndicated lending, and
to utilize this information to promulgate good corporate governance.
However,  Morck and Nakamura (1999), while documenting increased
banker representation on the boards of troubled client ﬁrms, ﬁnd no evi-
dence consistent with corporate governance improvement. They argue that
banks use their inﬂuence on boards primarily to maximize the value of
their loan portfolios, and that this can deviate substantially from ﬁrm value
maximization and economic eﬃciency. Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2004) go
further, arguing that lax bank governance contributed to governance prob-
lems in other industries.
Japan’s large banks also greatly aﬀected the postwar development of the
ﬁnancial system. Bank lobbying is widely believed to underlie the Japanese
government’s ongoing and virtually complete suppression of the corporate
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83. In contrast, Japanese banks did not usually get involved with rescue operations of dis-
tressed client ﬁrms prior to the early 1950s. Failing ﬁrms were simply liquidated. See Miya-
jima (1999).debt market until the 1990s. Corporate debt issues were forbidden unless
fully backed by real property or explicitly approved by the government.
Thus, what corporate bonds existed were little more than alienable mort-
gages. Debentures and other corporate debt securities were outlawed en-
tirely.
The reason the banks took this route is fairly clear. They saw bonds as
competition both for their depositors’ money and their client ﬁrms’ loans.
Why the government accommodated their lobbying is less clear. The SCAP
had promoted the stock market but largely ignored the corporate bond
market. This may have reﬂected a lack of investor interest, for bondhold-
ers were badly hurt by the high postwar inﬂation. Also, the military gov-
ernment had used the banking system to carry out centrally planned capi-
tal allocation, so corporate bonds played little role in the wartime
economy. Managers were not used to issuing debt. Still, the continued in-
terdiction of corporate debt issues decades later raises puzzling political
economy issues.
It is hard to escape the conclusion that the government and the banks
worked to preserve market power for the country’s major banks. Market
power certainly derived from the barriers to competition the prewar and
wartime regulators erected. Banks probably also held an informational ad-
vantage giving them a degree of market power over their clients, as in Ra-
jan (1992). Whatever the precise nature of this market power, it corre-
sponds to a period of great stability for the Japanese banking system. From
the end of the war to 1997, no major bank failed and there were few bank
mergers. While the strong regulatory hand of the Ministry of Finance may
be partially responsible, such stability is certainly also consistent with pro-
longed bank market power.
Indeed, the two explanations are often intertwined in discussions of
postwar Japanese banking. Thus, Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003) write that
the primary purpose of the MOF’s [Ministry of Finance’s] administra-
tive guidance was to suppress full-scale competition in each of the com-
partmentalized ﬁnancial businesses....  T h e  g o v ernment was able to
utilize the rents accumulated in the banking sector as a means of dealing
with banks in ﬁnancial distress. Speciﬁcally, regulators relied on the co-
operation of private banks in implementing the blanket guarantee, and
major banks faithfully bore a disproportionate share of the costs in-
v o l v e d ....   [B]y manipulating regulatory measures the MOF could do
favors to those banks that towed [sic] the line and penalize those that
failed to heed its guidance.
They argue that the Mitsubishi Bank, for example, got permission to pursue
trust banking as a reward for rescuing Nippon Trust. Moreover, the view
that banks transferred the ﬁnancial value of keiretsu to themselves through
such practices is consistent with the ﬁnding of Caves and Uekusa (1976) that
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must therefore be captured by nonindustrial ﬁrms—that is, banks.
Aoki (1994) argues that rents are necessary to motivate proper monitor-
ing by banks. Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) argue that restricted
competition is beneﬁcial in that it reduces banks’ incentives to maximize
shareholder value by taking excessive risks in near-default situations. In
contrast, Allen and Gale (2000) argue that competition is necessary to re-
veal which managers know what they’re doing. Hanazaki and Horiuchi
(2000, 2001) argue that such competition is responsible for the success of
independent Japanese manufacturing ﬁrms and that its absence explains
the weakness of keiretsu ﬁrms and the failure of its banks.
They argue that the international success of Japan’s best ﬁrms undid this
market power. By the 1980s, the country’s most successful multinationals
routinely issued debt abroad through their foreign subsidiaries. In re-
sponse, the government relaxed the rules (somewhat) in the 1990s to allow
ﬁrms whose ﬁnancial ratios exceeded predetermined criteria to issue cer-
tain debt securities.84 This partial deregulation may have let Japan’s best
ﬁrms abandon bank loans and may have concentrated low-quality debt in
the banking system.85This argument, while probably true, does not explain
the alacrity with which the more proﬁtable ﬁrms abandoned bank loans as
a source of capital. That the banks were extracting market power rents in
the provision of capital would explain this rush for the exits.
7.8 Lessons from the Well-Traveled Frog
Japan’s wide-ranging corporate governance history provides some in-
sights into the value of corporate groups under diﬀerent economic cir-
cumstances. Except under the military government, entrepreneurs (and
querulous relatives) were free to start new ﬁrms. Since both zaibatsu and
keiretsu formed spontaneously, survived, and prospered, they must have
had some competitive advantage over new freestanding ﬁrms. There are
several candidate explanations for this advantage.86
7.8.1 Economies of Scope and Scale
Corporate groups might exist because they are superior modes of cor-
porate organization and so are good for the economy. Zaibatsu and
keiretsu are clearly large enough corporate structures to capture a variety
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85. Aoki and Sheard (1992) and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Schaftstein (1993) show that the most
ﬁnancially sound ﬁrms switched to bond ﬁnancing very quickly. Hellman, Murdock, and
Stiglitz (2000) argue that this undermined the banking system. Boot and Thakor (2000) and
Fraser, Ghon Rhee, and Shin (2002) both describe the importance of regulatory restraints on
competition to relationship banking.
86. See also Yafeh (2003).of economies of scope and scale. However, the expansions of both did not
seem driven by such economies. Zaibatsu remained tightly focused and of
limited size until the mass privatizations at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury. Antitakeover defenses seem historically more important than econ-
omies of scale and scope in the formation of the keiretsu, especially the
horizontalkeiretsu.Despite their historical pedigrees, both might still have
ended up capturing such economies. However, the usefulness of corporate
groups is also limited in several ways.87
A major limitation on scale and scope economies in large ﬁrms is the
agency problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Aoki (1988,
1994) and others argue that Japanese corporate groups limit such prob-
lems. However, Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000) and others show
that the presence of a controlling shareholder in a pyramidal group is no
delivery from agency problems; rather, it provides a diﬀerent form of sepa-
ration of ownership from control and new agency problems, such as en-
trenchment and tunneling.
Caves (1982) argues that important returns to scale involve innovation,
and Goto (1982) ﬁnds that zaibatsu were big technology importers.88 Di-
versiﬁed groups of ﬁrms, importing technology and expanding rapidly in
concert, might have allowed a “big push” growth strategy, as in Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). However, a literature survey by Yafeh (2004)
reports no similar ﬁnding for postwar keiretsu. Economies of scope in ver-
tically integrated keiretsu are perhaps more plausible than in horizontal
keiretsu, from, for example, just-in-time inventory management. This gave
Japanese ﬁrms a worldwide reputation for eﬃciency in the 1980s. Huson
and Nanda (1995) conﬁrm that just-in-time inventory management adds
value in U.S. ﬁrms if inventories are a large fraction of assets, but not oth-
erwise. But little is actually known about the impact of just-in-time meth-
ods on the bottom line of the typical Japanese ﬁrm. Vertical keiretsu also
shield corporate managers from takeovers, however. This became overtly
evident in the failed 1989 hostile takeover by T. Boone Pickens of Koito
Manufacturing, a ﬁrst-tier supplier in the Toyota vertical keiretsu.Even af-
ter he became the largest single shareholder of Koito, Pickens could not
put himself on Koito’s board. This was because other members of the Toy-
otakeiretsucollectively controlled more of Koito’s shares than Pickens and
acted in concert to block him. Keiretsualso appear vulnerable to tunneling,
for the ﬁndings of Morck and Nakamura (1999) are certainly consistent
with this. However, we are unaware of direct tests for tunneling in keiretsu.
Other economies of scale and scope can arise from superior managers
A Frog in a Well Knows Nothing of the Ocean 443
87. See Yafeh (2004) for a more detailed survey.
88. See, for example, Aoki (1988, chap. 6) and Blinder (1991) for a detailed presentation of
this view regarding vertical keiretsu. See Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Lang and Stulz
(1994), and many others for evidence of agency problems associated with large, diversiﬁed
ﬁrms.and workers. Morikawa (1980, pp. 16–19) reports that zaibatsu recruited
top managers and technicians and argues this was a decided advantage.
However, the collapse of the Suzuki zaibatsu was due to the concentration
of corporate control in the hands of one exceptional manager—Naokichi
Kaneko. Kaneko made few errors, but a single major mistake destroyed the
entire zaibatsu.
The postwar keiretsu promised lifetime employment, so they were also
preferred career paths for Japan’s best university graduates. After the war,
many older managers were tainted by wartime associations, engendering a
renewed scarcity of talent at that time.89 Perhaps scarce superior manage-
ment gave keiretsu an edge at critical points in Japanese history too. How-
ever, Morck and Nakamura (1999) ﬁnd evidence of poor governance in
keiretsu ﬁrms.
Yet another possible source of group economies of scale and scope is
centralized capital allocation.90 Since external funds cost more than inter-
nal funds, a freestanding undiversiﬁed company is subject to the vagaries
of cost and demand in a single industry. A group bank, or an apex ﬁrm that
acts as a de facto bank, can move funds from member ﬁrms where they ac-
cumulate to where they are needed. Since the group bank has better infor-
mation about the investment opportunities available to each ﬁrm, it can do
this at much lower cost than could outside banks or ﬁnancial markets.
Miyajima (2000) ﬁnds little evidence of this in 1930s zaibatsu, but some in
keiretsu. See also Weinstein and Yafeh (1998).
The depression-era failures of many zaibatsu cast further doubt on the
merits of groups as capital allocators. The Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumit-
omo banks, which avoided lending to their own group companies, survived
the depressions. In contrast, zaibatsu, like Suzuki, that used their banks to
allocate their capital to their own ﬁrms, failed. One possible reason is moral
hazard—managers were more reckless if they had guaranteed ﬁnancing
from so-called organ banks. Another is diversiﬁcation in management strat-
egy—all the Suzuki ﬁrms followed the same strategy, whereas the Mitsui,
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo banks lent to ﬁrms with diverse strategies.
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a,b, 1991, 1993) argue that such
ﬁnancial transfers reduce the cost of ﬁnancial distress in keiretsu.91 Yafeh
(2004) summarizes a literature showing depressed performance in keiretsu
ﬁrms andless variation in their performance. This suggests a co-insurance,
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89. Aoki (1988, 1994) proposes that keiretsu main banks were special repositories of man-
agerial talent and lent their expertise to troubled keiretsu member ﬁrms. Corporate groups
could allocate talent to where it was needed and so make eﬃcient use of scarce governance ex-
pertise. Kaplan and Minton (1992), Morck and Nakamura (1999), and others show that bank
executives were routinely transferred to the boards of ﬁnancially troubled client ﬁrms later in
the postwar period.
90. See Asashima (1982), Okazaki (1999), and others regarding zaibatsu, and Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a,b, 1991, 1993) and others regarding keiretsu.
91. But see Hayashi (2000).rather than banking, role—keiretsu banks rescue distressed member ﬁrms
rather than funding the best ﬁrms. Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue that
this perpetuated poor governance. Evidence in Hanazaki and Horiuchi
(2000, 2001) and Bremer and Pettway (2002) suggests that it also promoted
poor governance in the banks themselves and set the stage for Japan’s 1990s
ﬁnancial crisis, which undermined the credibility of keiretsu main banks’
commitments in any case.
Japanese corporate history tells against using a group bank as a ﬁnan-
cial clearinghouse or provider of ﬁnancial insurance. Despite short-run ad-
vantages, it carries longer-term dangers. The Suzuki zaibatsu, and other
groups with organ banks, prospered in the short run but failed when the
economy as a whole took a downturn. The keiretsu main banks prospered
during Japan’s long postwar boom but are clearly having serious problems
riding out the current prolonged downturn.
Thus, arguments for scale and scope economies in corporate groups
must be balanced against a series of costs these structures impose.
7.8.2 Institutional Asthenia
If groups do not provide an advantage in general, they may do so under
circumstances particular to Japan at critical points in its history. Corporate
groups might then persist because of the path dependence of institutional
development.
Khanna and Palepu (chap. 5 in this volume and elsewhere) argue that the
economies of scale and scope from corporate groups are more likely to
dominate these countervailing costs in economies with weaker institutions.
Zaibatsu-like groups in modern India survive and prosper because they are
an adaptation to market transactions made prohibitively costly by endemic
fraud and corruption. Since group ﬁrms are all controlled by the same
principal, they have greatly reduced incentives to cheat each other. This
lets them do business more eﬃciently than freestanding ﬁrms, which de-
pend on dysfunctional markets for capital, managers, labor, suppliers, and
customers. Khanna and Palepu (2000) also argue that investments in rep-
utation might have large returns to scale. The Tata family of India invested
heavily in acquiring a reputation for fair dealing, sometimes at great ﬁnan-
cial cost. However, once it established a nationwide reputation for honesty
in an otherwise highly corrupt economy, all manner of ﬁrms, banks, and in-
dividuals were willing to pay a premium to do business with Tata ﬁrms
rather than risk being cheated. It seems plausible that similar conditions
prevailed in Meiji and Taisho Japan.
This view is closely related to the idea that coordination across group
companies reduces costs, as in Fruin (1992, p. 101) and others. Some pop-
ular accounts of keiretsu go further, arguing that group ﬁrms pool infor-
mation from across a wide range of industries, unavailable to freestanding
companies, to foresee critical events, react appropriately, and develop ﬂex-
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chronically unable to reproduce this feat despite using the whole apparatus
of the state to collect information for them.
However, such explanations take a weak institutional environment as
given. This seems a strong assumption over the 135 years surveyed in this
chapter. Haber (1989) argues that oligarchic families in Mexico, who con-
trolled corporate pyramids much like zaibatsu, deliberately weakened in-
stitutions to beneﬁt themselves and block the entry of competitors. The
zaibatsu families are thought to have generally supported modernization
programs and institutional development such as legal reforms. However,
the zaibatsu families also clearly had close ties to the premilitary state and
may have shaped institutions to beneﬁt themselves. In postoccupation
Japan, there is more discussion of keiretsu managers’ lobbying for institu-
tional weaknesses. It seems likely that keiretsu undermined the market for
corporate control, thus short circuiting other corporate governance mech-
anisms, like proxy ﬁghts and institutional investor activism. The large
banks and the keystone ﬁrms of the great horizontal keiretsu almost cer-
tainly lobbied for the suppression of the corporate bond market in postwar
Japan. Thus, weak institutions may well have been a consequence, as well
as a cause, of corporate groups.
7.8.3 Private Beneﬁts of Control
This leads to another possibility—groups might beneﬁt those who con-
trol them, rather than the economy as a whole. Zaibatsu families may have
been willing to pay more for control blocks because they valued control per
se more than other shareholders did. This might be because members of
these families had utility functions that assigned greater weight to power.
If the families were not the most able managers, this could have depressed
publicly traded shares while raising the family’s private valuation of its
shares. Or private beneﬁts of control might have existed because these fam-
ilies were more proﬁcient than other shareholders at using control over
corporate assets to enrich themselves. Likewise, the managers of postwar
keiretsu ﬁrms organized those structures to stymie corporate takeover
threats. If they garnered utility from their control of great corporations,
these actions follow logically.92
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92. It is theoretically possible that these managers were blocking takeovers out of beneﬁ-
cence. For example, their goal might have been to protect myopic shareholders from selling
at a large premium to the raider because even larger run-ups in their share prices were likely
in the future. However, the repeated empirical rejection of shareholder myopia models (e.g.,
Chan, Martin, and Kensinger 1990) undermines such arguments. Also, the top managers of
many Japanese corporations receive fringe beneﬁts including expensive housing, golf club
membership, chauﬀeured automobile, and access to special restaurants. Even though their
market value is quite high, none of these fringe beneﬁts appear in the executives’ income ﬁg-
ures. As soon as they leave the executive positions, these beneﬁts are usually taken away from
the executives.There is considerable evidence for the existence of large private beneﬁts
of corporate control elsewhere. Johnson et al. (1985) show that stock prices
rise signiﬁcantly upon the deaths of the ﬁrms’ aged CEOs. Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988b) show that high managerial ownership in certain U.S.
ﬁrms is associated with depressed public share prices. Barclay and Holder-
ness (1989) show that control blocks trade at higher prices than small
transactions. Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that this eﬀect is greater in
more corrupt countries. All of these studies are consistent with the exis-
tence of large private beneﬁts of control. The ﬁnding of Dyck and Zingales
in particular suggests that the size of private beneﬁts is related to corrup-
tion, and it thus favors the view that these beneﬁts involve the consumption
of corporate wealth by the controlling shareholder.
The importance of maintaining control was evident in the house char-
ters of the great zaibatsu families and in the autobiographical writings of
Yoshisuke Aikawa (1934), the founder of the Nissan zaibatsu. Morck and
Yeung (2003) argue that the extraction of private beneﬁts of control is less
dependent on talent than is genuine entrepreneurship, and that leaving
one’s heirs opportunities to extract such beneﬁts is therefore a preferred
way of providing for them.
A ﬁxation on preserving control rights can lead to ineﬃciently risk-
averse investment decisions. Thus, Miyajima (2000) reports that ﬁrms be-
longing to the three major zaibatsu exhibit greater risk aversion than ﬁrms
belonging to newer zaibatsu. One explanation for this is more extensive
private beneﬁts of control for the principals of the established groups,
though there are certainly others too.
In short, private beneﬁts of control probably ﬁgured large in the forma-
tion of zaibatsu and keiretsu. This leaves open, however, the question of
what other considerations might also have been important.
7.8.4 Insulation from Market Pressures
Another possibility is that corporate groups beneﬁt the economy overall
but that group ﬁrms nonetheless exhibit inferior performance in the eyes of
investors. Much literature contemporaneous with the zaibatsu stresses
their ability to ignore shareholders. For example, a Meiji-era report on the
Kyushu Railway deplores how the company was “dominated from the start
by the vulgar view that it had to economize on building outlays.” This
refers to a conﬂict described by Ushiba (1909) between “the stockholders
desiring an increase in dividends even to the point of reducing the business,
and the directors insisting on expanding the business even if it means cut-
ting dividends.” Ericson (1989) describes how a large shareholder, the
banker Imamura Seinosuke, tried not only to curtail the railway’s vast ex-
pansion plans but to force it to downsize in response to the economic
downturn of 1890.
Ericson (1989) applauds the railway’s “substantial progress [sic] in sepa-
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dent, Sengoku Mitsugu, who owned little stock and could therefore go “on
pursuing his positive policies, thrusting aside a second attempt by dis-
gruntled stockholders to interfere with his program in 1902.” But Ericson
concedes that such “sophistication” was the exception. The Kyushu and
Sanyo railroads were Mitsubishi companies, and Mitsubishi “diﬀered
from most railway owners in its primary concern for indirect beneﬁts of
railway investment.” That is, the Mitsubishi railroads were not intended to
maximize shareholder value but to assist other Mitsubishi companies in
transporting inputs and outputs.
The foregoing is a somewhat convoluted way of saying that the zaibatsu
railways were forced to overexpand to reduce the shipping costs of other
Mitsubishi companies, in a clear instance of “self-dealing” or “tunneling.”
However, this may not have been economically ineﬃcient. Since railways
have a public good component, it is possible that shareholder value maxi-
mization would lead to a suboptimal investment. Tunneling by the zaibatsu
to overbuild might actually improve social welfare, though at the expense of
the railways’ other shareholders. By 1905, banks and insurance companies
had emerged as the major shareholders in most railroads, and such self-
sacriﬁce by railroad shareholders was at an end. The railroads were nation-
alized in 1906 and 1907, perhaps permitting more self-sacriﬁce by them.
Governments elsewhere took advantage of large corporate groups as
preexisting command and control devices for implementing industrial
policies. For example, Korea, Malaysia, and Sweden appear to have en-
couraged pyramidal groups so that government oﬃcials could inﬂuence
the corporate sector by dealing directly with a few individuals—the patri-
archs in charge of the pyramids.93 The governments in question seem to
have believed, perhaps correctly, that these small group interactions al-
lowed a highly eﬀective transmission of government policies and a better
coordination of private- and public-sector initiatives.
Certainly, the zaibatsu were more agile and willing than freestanding
ﬁrms to change direction rapidly in order to accommodate changing gov-
ernment policy objectives. By rapidly expanding one ﬁrm with capital from
others, the zaibatsu could quickly change direction and focus. Their large
established capital bases also let them enter new industries quickly. Post-
war keiretsu were also favored as vehicles through which industrial policy
might be implemented (Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura 1988; Okimoto
1989).
This agility was clearly beneﬁcial in terms of endearing the zaibatsu and
keiretsu to certain government oﬃcials. However, it did not always enrich
the groups involved. The zaibatsu families lost out heavily after, and per-
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93. See Högfeldt (chap. 9 in this volume) for details regarding Sweden. Morck and Yeung
(2004) make the argument more generally.haps during, the war despite their groups’ agility in expanding munitions
production. More generally, deviating from value-maximizing behavior
has dynamic costs that disadvantage the group over time, as in Morck and
Nakamura (1999). This may explain the weakness of the keiretsu ﬁrms in
present-day Japan.
7.8.5 Economies of Scale and Scope in Political Rent Seeking
A ﬁnal possibility is that the close relationships corporate groups de-
velop with government generated ﬁnancial returns that compensated for
proﬁts lost while pursuing government objectives. Morck, Stangeland, and
Yeung (2000), in discussing pyramidal groups throughout the world, argue
that government oﬃcials and great mercantile family patriarchs, who
come to know and trust each other, are likely to engage in mutual back
scratching, favor trading, and other forms of corruption that, while bene-
ﬁcial for the family group of ﬁrms, can greatly damage the economy.
Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton
(2003), Rajan and Zingales (2003), and others present empirical evidence
consistent with this more skeptical view.
There is considerable evidence that business-government relations in
both prewar and postwar Japan were largely organized around rent seek-
ing. Morikawa (1992, pp. 3–4) argues that political entrepreneurship, the
use of ties to powerful political ﬁgures to obtain government favors, reaped
huge returns in the provision of goods and services to the state and to state-
owned enterprises in the Meiji period.
The great zaibatsu of prewar Japan all obtained a leg up on their com-
petitors due to government favors. The Sumitomo obtained their cash-cow
copper mines because of their close association with the Tokugawa regime.
The Mitsui and Mitsubishi zaibatsu obtained cash-cow mining operations
in questionably competitive privatizations by the Meiji government. All
three prospered in prewar Japan in part because of their ability to give the
government what it wanted when it wanted it. If the government decided
Japan needed to export, the zaibatsucould move into export-oriented busi-
nesses. If the government decided Japan needed technology, the zaibatsu
could rev up their machinery production. In short, the zaibatsu seemed
able to react to the changing whims of government policymakers with
greater nimbleness and forcefulness than other ﬁrms could manage.
In postwar Japan, the keiretsuﬁrms and their main banks also appear to
have been generously subsidized for their enthusiasm about industrial pol-
icy programs (Okimoto 1989). Indeed, Beason and Weinstein (1996) show
that the greater part of Japan’s postwar industrial subsidies went to mining
ﬁrms, most of which were members of the large horizontal keiretsu.In con-
trast, independent companies like Honda were denied subsidies for delib-
erately contravening industrial policy plans by, for example, producing
automobiles when told not to.
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the status accruing to employment in government. This status existed
largely because of the attractions of a career path involving amakudari—
literally, “descent from heaven.” Amakudari involves an older, high-
ranking government oﬃcial leaving his post to become a senior manager
in industry, and was a common path to the boardroom in postwar Japan.
This practice may have made sense in the immediate postwar period, when
there was perhaps a serious shortage of talent due to the purging of senior
executives who had cooperated with the military government.
However, Van Rixtel (2002) and others argue that amakudari subse-
quently devolved into a system of regulatory capture, as in Stigler (1971).
This was largely because of the genkyoku principle, whereby speciﬁc min-
istries claimed exclusive regulatory power over speciﬁc industries. Since
civil servants in these ministries were prime candidates for amakudari, the
ministries rapidly became vocal advocates within the government for the
interests of their industries. For example, in the race for industrial promo-
tion of biotechnology, the Ministry of Health wanted to participate in pol-
icymaking explicitly on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry, its tradi-
tional amakudari partner. Since the great keiretsu ﬁrms included the most
attractive amakudari landing spots and were the most enthusiastic about
amakudari,these groups may have enjoyed an advantage, in the short term
at least, due to their better connections with government.
This regulatory capture is now thought by some researchers to have con-
tributed to Japan’s current economic and governance problems.94 Bureau-
crats uncritically advanced industry agendas, hopeful of amakudari op-
portunities. Corporate executives, former bureaucrats, realized that their
talents were in inﬂuencing government rather than overseeing new re-
search and development programs. The result was an unhealthy regulatory
morass that came to surround many established industries in Japan, and
that is now the subject of much criticism.
7.9 Conclusions
During Japan’s modern history, beginning in 1868, its corporate sector
was ﬁrst organized into great family pyramids, or zaibatsu, then subjected
to Soviet-style central planning, then reorganized into widely held ﬁrms,
and ﬁnally restructured into keiretsucorporate groups. While many lessons
lie in Japan’s complicated development story, a few that have to do with the
interaction between the corporate sector and Japan’s institutions are espe-
cially noteworthy.
Although Japan specialists often write of zaibatsu as uniquely Japanese
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94. See Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) for a discussion of the role of amakudari in Japan’s
current economic downturn.constructs, they are typical of the family-controlled pyramidal groups that
the other chapters in this volume show dominating the corporate sectors of
most other countries. The postwar keiretsu, in contrast, are more uniquely
Japanese.  Zaibatsu were probably sensible structures for sidestepping
Japan’s early, and probably poorly functioning, markets. By doing business
mainly with each other, zaibatsu ﬁrms could avoid being cheated or other-
wise harmed in ineﬃcient and opaque markets for goods, labor, and capi-
tal. The postwar keiretsumay have been, in part at least, a similar response
to the chaotic early postwar years.
But both zaibatsu and keiretsu were also devices for entrenching insid-
ers. Zaibatsu let great mercantile families and entrepreneurial individuals
direct vast amounts of public investor capital yet retain full control of all
the ventures so funded. Keiretsu probably formed to stop hostile takeovers
and tenure professional managers. That insiders sought such entrench-
ment indicates that they received private beneﬁts of control.
The passage of time exposed weaknesses of corporate groups.
One popular argument for groups is that group banks can ﬁnance group
ﬁrms, avoiding information asymmetry problems and other capital market
failures. Japanese history shows that such arrangements invite moral haz-
ard and agency problems. Zaibatsu, like Suzuki, that followed this model,
failed during the depression era. The current problems of the great hori-
zontal keiretsu also seem to stem from a history of ineﬃcient capital allo-
cation.
Although zaibatsu and keiretsu might initially have been devices for ex-
tracting economies of scale from scarce talented managers, by entrenching
insiders they ultimately kept talented outsiders out of boardrooms. This
certainly aﬀected ﬁrm-level performance. But it may have retarded macro-
economic growth as well. Morikawa (1980, 1992) argues that entrenched
zaibatsu families’ risk aversion and aversion to external ﬁnancing to pre-
serve family control retarded prewar Japan’s growth. He argues that few
projects for Japan’s industrialization were initiated by zaibatsu. Morck,
Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) argue that oversight by entrenched
bankers may have had a similar eﬀect on keiretsu ﬁrms.
Yet despite these and other weaknesses, corporate groups persisted.
In part this may have been because they retained genuine economies of
scale and scope. Zaibatsu in particular funneled foreign technology into
Japan, probably continually renewing their economies of scale.
But both zaibatsu and keiretsu probably also altered Japanese institu-
tions to favor their continued importance. Both supported Japan’s politi-
cal elite vigorously at critical historical junctures. By participating enthu-
siastically in government industrial policies, no matter how wrongheaded,
zaibatsu and keiretsu nurtured relationships that generated both subsidies
and political inﬂuence. This inﬂuence was often instrumental in securing
lasting advantages over the competition, as when the early zaibatsu fami-
A Frog in a Well Knows Nothing of the Ocean 451lies obtained tax-farming concessions, mines, and government contracts.
The cooperation of zaibatsu and keiretsu with industrial policies probably
led to captive regulator problems. Entire ministries were likely captured by
industrial groups through genkyoku and amakudari. This undermined the
state’s ability to regulate prudently the economy and the ﬁnancial system,
and locked in favoritism to established large ﬁrms that “played the game.”
The collapse of the Suzuki zaibatsu because of its lack of political connec-
tions is the exception to prove this rule. In the postwar period, keiretsu
banks and ﬁrms also beneﬁted disproportionately from regulatory fa-
voritism and overt subsidies. By lobbying for the suppression of the corpo-
rate bond market in postwar Japan, main keiretsu banks seriously weak-
ened the ﬁnancial system overall.
Thus, zaibatsu and keiretsu survived the institutional conditions that
gave them birth. By investing heavily in political connections, they pro-
longed their competitive advantage even as the institutional deﬁciencies
underlying their formation faded. But this political rent seeking prolonged
some institutional weaknesses and engendered others.
Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) and many others show pervasive
rent seeking to impede growth. This is because it diverts talented individu-
als from genuine entrepreneurship toward more lucrative careers in rent
seeking. Both rent seeking and innovation have increasing returns to scale
for individuals and ﬁrms. However, rent seeking is a zero or negative-sum
game, while innovation is a positive-sum game. Diverting talent into ever
more lucrative rent seeking diverts ever greater resources into zero or neg-
ative-sum games, and thus slows growth.
We do not argue that groups are wholly bad. Rather, Japan’s history ex-
poses how groups in general, and groups that rely on internal capital mar-
kets in particular, can distort institutional development.
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Comment Sheldon Garon
In their chapter, Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura write that “Japan’s
corporate sector has, over the past century, been reorganized according to
every major corporate governance model.” Nearly the same could be said
for the shifting interpretations of corporate governance in Japan—partic-
ularly those of the combines known as zaibatsu before 1945 and the busi-
ness groups called keiretsu following World War II. Prewar Marxists criti-
cized the zaibatsufor their concentration of wealth, while rightists attacked
(sometimes literally) zaibatsu leaders for their proﬁt-making, unpatriotic
behavior. To the Americans who occupied a defeated Japan between 1945
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Sheldon Garon is a professor of Japanese history at Princeton University.and 1952, the zaibatsu constituted the most formidable obstacle to build-
ing economic democracy in the New Japan. Arguing that the zaibatsu had
abetted wartime militarism and stunted the growth of a healthy small-
business sector, the occupation broke the big four zaibatsu into scores of
independent ﬁrms. Or so the Americans thought. The old zaibatsu units
and other ﬁrms soon regrouped into the more loosely constituted keiretsu.
As Japan achieved its “economic miracle” in the 1950s and 1960s and in-
creasingly challenged U.S. business interests, historical evaluations of the
zaibatsuandkeiretsushifted again, from criticism to admiration. Chalmers
Johnson (1982) judged that the zaibatsu had contributed to prewar eco-
nomic development with their economies of scale, their pioneering role in
commercializing modern technologies, their close cooperation with the
state’s developmental agenda, and above all their “introduction of a
needed measure of competition into the [state’s] plan-rational system” (p.
23). Johnson similarly lauded the bank-centered keiretsu for their contri-
bution to postwar economic growth (pp. 204–6). When the Japanese econ-
omy sunk into its long decade of slow growth and no-growth after 1991,
observers generally concluded that Japan’s corporate governance—so re-
cently praised—had for a long time in fact impeded economic growth. Or
as Morck and Nakamura state here, the zaibatsuand especially the keiretsu
enthusiastically engaged in rent seeking that “probably retarded ﬁnancial
development and created long-term economic problems.”
Their chapter oﬀers a sweeping historical analysis of the changes in cor-
porate ownership of the zaibatsu and keiretsu, beginning with era of the
Tokugawa shoguns (1603–1868). For students of Japanese economic his-
tory, the most valuable contribution may be the detailed structural analysis
of ownership and governance within a variety of the major combines both
before and after 1945. The authors also challenge the thesis of “transwar”
continuity, or in Yukio Noguchi’s formulation, the “1940 system.” John-
son, Noguchi, and others describe how Japanese enterprises, which before
the 1930s depended signiﬁcantly on equity markets, became heavily reliant
on banking capital during World War II, and they suggest that this pattern
of bank-centered ﬁnance continued unabated into the postwar era
(Noguchi 1995, pp. 8–9). Morck and Nakamura instead reveal the reap-
pearance of a vibrant equity market following the occupation’s dissolution
of the big zaibatsu in the late 1940s. The ensuing wave of corporate raids
and attempts at hostile takeovers, the authors cogently argue, prompted
the former zaibatsu ﬁrms to defend themselves by restoring some of their
ties in the form of keiretsuand by instituting cross-shareholding against the
raiders.
By adopting a long-range historical perspective, the authors provide a
set of persuasive explanations for the rise and persistence of the prewar zai-
batsu and the postwar keiretsu. These explanations cluster around (a) the
combines’ advantages in environments of weak markets, low trust, and
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pyramids by the family owners and sometimes their trusted managers, and
(c) the combines’ symbiotic relations with the state.
The paper, moreover, oﬀers useful ways of deﬁning and understanding
thezaibatsu.Amid the confusion over what constituted a zaibatsu,the U.S.
occupation ended up restricting the category—and thus its dissolution
policy—to only the big four combines: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and
Yasuda. However, there is much utility in the authors’ inclusive deﬁnition
of a zaibatsu as any “large pyramidal group of publicly traded ﬁrms.” By
opting for a more expansive deﬁnition, the paper ably revisits the question
of whether there were substantial diﬀerences between the so-called old and
new zaibatsu in the 1920s and 1930s. The authors demonstrate that these
distinctions may have been more apparent than real, as the old zaibatsu
moved into military-related chemical and heavy industry—much as the
new zaibatsu were doing—and these operations constituted rapidly grow-
ing shares of each concern’s proﬁts. Furthermore, the old zaibatsu resem-
bled the new zaibatsu in ﬁnancing their heavy/chemical industrial ﬁrms by
relying on equity.
The chapter’s contributions notwithstanding, the argument could have
been strengthened in several areas. I begin with questions about the over-
all analysis. The title is baﬄing because it obscures the agency of the actors
in this story. Are we to assume that leaders of Japanese corporations, like
the proverbial frog in the title, only viewed their reﬂection at the bottom of
the well and remained ignorant of the world? Or, in the authors’ words,
have “the Japanese literally searched the world for the best institutions of
capitalism, and changed their institutions more radically . . . than in any
other major industrial economy”? And if so, who, precisely, played the key
roles in changing these institutions—the U.S. occupation, the Japanese
state, or the zaibatsu/keiretsu? Second, the chapter is subtitled “A History
of Corporate Ownership in Japan,” yet the paper presents little evidence of
alternative models of ownership outside the zaibatsu and keiretsu. One
wonders about ownership patterns within the small- and medium-business
sector, which employed many more people and was central to the prewar
export sector (more so than the zaibatsu). By the 1920s and 1930s, small
businesses had organized themselves eﬀectively as a political bloc and
were inﬂuencing government policy. In the 1950s, curiously, the man who
uniﬁed the small-business associations was none other than Aikawa
Yoshisuke (also written Ayukawa Gisuke), pioneer of the prewar Nissan
zaibatsu (Garon and Mochizuki 1993, pp. 145–66; Samuels 2003, p. 236).
Although this chapter focuses on the zaibatsu/keiretsu, we must note that
the big combines coexisted in uneasy political and economic relationships
with smaller ﬁrms.
Because the paper covers the century-and-a-half evolution of the zai-
batsu and keiretsu, it is also appropriate to raise several historically based
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eral historiography of modern Japan, and several of their historical judg-
ments rest on decades-old interpretations or the anachronistic assump-
tions of present-day economists. One of the more egregious anachronisms
appears in their statement that the Tokugawa shogunate’s “antiglobaliza-
tion backlash continued to hermetically isolate Japan” between the 1630s
and the 1850s. Globalization is hardly the apt term to describe the world of
European monopolistic trading companies, nor did the shoguns “hermet-
ically” isolate Japan, which continued to trade with the Dutch, Koreans,
and Chinese.
The chapter’s most serious historiographical problems lie in the analysis
of the wartime economic order (1931–45) and its legacies for postwar cor-
porate governance. The authors insist that wartime Japan was a “rigidly
centrally planned economy,” in which the state “de facto nationalized all its
major corporations, subordinating them to central planners.” By 1945,
they conclude, “Japan had an economy little diﬀerent from that of Russia
in the 1920s,” and the nation, “though a former right-wing dictatorship,
was nonetheless virtually as centrally planned as many Eastern European
countries were in 1989.” By 1938, claim Morck and Nakamura, “most sen-
ior economic planners under the military government were Soviet trained.”
As further evidence, they cite the wartime compulsory cartels known as
“control associations” (to ¯seikai), arguing that the cartels’ “control com-
mittees, of course, would end up staﬀed by military personnel.” Referring
to the weakening inﬂuence of the zaibatsu families due to the wartime
regime’s controlled economy, the authors describe the drama as one of
“marching into serfdom”—the comfortable scions apparently playing the
role of the serfs.
These are extraordinary statements. Rarely are they totally wrong, but
in all cases they suﬀer from exaggeration or inadequate evidence. Let us be-
gin with how the zaibatsu fared under wartime controls. By nearly all ac-
counts, the zaibatsunot only prospered during World War II but increased
their domination over the economy. Despite some attempts by the army to
diminish their inﬂuence in the early 1930s, the zaibatsu—both “new” and
“old”—beneﬁted tremendously from the exploitation of the militarily oc-
cupied territories of Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia. Although the
zaibatsuoften protested state intervention in the economy, in practice they
took advantage of wartime controls to strengthen themselves against ri-
vals. The U.S. occupation’s foremost authorities on the subject emphati-
cally concluded that the industrywide control associations had permitted
the zaibatsu to reserve for themselves the lion’s share of resources and ﬁ-
nance, thereby weakening and even destroying smaller ﬁrms within each
cartel. The control associations, noted T. A. Bisson (1954), were “manned
almost exclusively by top Zaibatsu personnel”—not military men—and
“in essence they merely added government sanction to the kind of behav-
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ers also used the bureaucratically imposed labor-management councils in
each workplace to decimate the remnants of organized labor (Garon 1987,
chap. 6).
In addition, the authors remain unclear about the fate of dividends.
They assert that “dividends were restricted so that earnings could be rein-
vested patriotically.” At other points, they suggest that dividends for zai-
batsu families were “apparently now sharply curtailed,” and the most re-
cent draft claimed the wartime dividends were “outlawed.” A little more
research would have shown that state policies toward dividends were less
revolutionary than the chapter supposes. To be sure, a 1938 law controlled
dividends, but it hardly eliminated them. A ﬁrm that planned to pay more
than a 10 percent dividend needed to obtain a permit from the Ministry of
Finance (Okazaki 1994, p. 364). Moreover, concludes Johnson (1982) in
his well-researched study, “dividends on equity shares continued to be paid
until virtually the end of the Paciﬁc War,” and “these zaibatsu ownership
rights turned out to be virtually the only civilian rights that were respected
throughout the wartime period” (p. 139).
Indeed, it is diﬃcult to square the wartime regime’s maintenance of the
zaibatsu’s rights of private ownership with the chapter’s insistence that the
Japanese state’s controls should be considered in the same category as So-
viet central planning. Admittedly, wartime bureaucrats and economists
studied Soviet planning. It is also true that the government’s Planning
Board (Kikakuin) included some relatively socialistic bureaucrats, and
many wartime planners disliked the zaibatsu for their allegedly selﬁsh, pa-
triotic behavior. However, wartime planners were much more taken by
their extensive surveys of Nazi German controls (and, to a lesser extent,
the Italian Fascist and even New Deal models). If one looks at the actual
policies adopted vis-à-vis capital and labor, they more closely resembled
Nazi policies than Soviet programs. This is hardly surprising. Like the
Japanese oﬃcials, the Nazis denigrated shareholders in favor of workers
and managers, yet maintained private ownership by big business. The Ger-
man corporation law of 1937 likewise permitted the payment of dividends,
while diminishing governance by shareholders and reinvesting more of the
proﬁts in the companies. Japanese bureaucrats, of course, enjoyed greater
access to information on the policies of its German ally than it did to the
hostile Soviet Union. As for the inﬂuence of the Socialist-leaning experts,
many were arrested or removed in 1941 as the result of pressure from big
business (Johnson 1982, chap. 4).1 In short, the zaibatsu in wartime should
not be likened to their Russian counterparts who were obliterated under
Soviet rule. They remind us more of Nazi-era big business, which some
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1. On the importance of German and fascist models, see Garon (1987), chapter 6, and
Fletcher (1982).have compared to “the conductor of a runaway bus who has no control
over the actions of the driver but keeps collecting the passengers’ fares
right up to the ﬁnal crash” (Grunberger 1971, p. 184; see also p. 177).
Moreover, the authors misjudge the nature of the wartime state and pay
scant attention to the “transwar” role of the civilian bureaucracy in eco-
nomic policy. They subscribe to the dated view that the “military assumed
dictatorial powers over the economy.” Accordingly, they miss what the
mainstream scholarship on the Japanese political economy has high-
lighted for the past two decades: the enormous wartime inﬂuence of the
“economic bureaucrats” located in the Ministry of Commerce and Indus-
try and its successors.2 It was these oﬃcials, not military men, who devised
the industrial policies that promoted the development of heavy and chem-
ical industries, placed small ﬁrms under the control of the zaibatsu, and
weakened shareholder control in favor of the managers. These bureaucrats
were also forced to conclude that they could not fully subordinate the zai-
batsu to state control. The result was not the reduction of the zaibatsu to
“serfdom,” but rather the evolution of cooperative relationships between
the bureaucrats and big business that continued after 1945. Signiﬁcantly,
the economic bureaucrats generally escaped the U.S. occupation’s purges
and actually saw their authority over the economy strengthened as the
Americans supported the continuation of state intervention to revive the
economy. The economic bureaucrats gained a powerful base with the for-
mation of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in
1949.
The inclusion of the economic bureaucrats would have nuanced the au-
thors’ interesting analysis of the emergence of the postwar keiretsu. As it
stands, their chapter explains the rise of keiretsu primarily in terms of the
companies’ joint defense against corporate raiders in 1952–53. In so doing,
however, they ignore the formidable role of the state in the immediate post-
war years. They particularly overlook transwar continuities in the thinking
of the economic bureaucrats, who sought to diminish the inﬂuence of the
zaibatsu families and the equity market in favor of bank-centered ﬁnance
and the state’s use of the ﬁnancial system to promote certain types of in-
dustrial development. Long before the attempted hostile takeovers of the
early 1950s, the economic bureaucrats were already nudging the dissolved
zaibatsu companies toward reconsolidating themselves around banks,
rather than the old family holding companies (Johnson 1982, pp. 174, 199,
204–6).
Finally, after a detailed, historical examination of corporate governance,
the chapter suggests that the prewar zaibatsu and postwar keiretsu “may
have retarded macroeconomic growth.” This is an intriguing question, yet
there is little in the present essay that rigorously and historically relates cor-
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2. See Johnson (1982).porate governance to overall growth. Curiously, the authors chose not to
critique (or even cite) Chalmers Johnson’s inﬂuential history of Japanese
industrial policy, which placed the zaibatsu and keiretsu at the center of
Japan’s economic growth before 1975.
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